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The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation
Catherine T. Struve, J.D. *

INTRODUCTION
Both the tort system and the FDA seek to protect consumers of medical
products. The tort system provides compensation when a consumer is harmed by
a defective product and sets incentives for companies to design safer products.
The FDA imposes an elaborate system of prior restraint: Pharmaceuticals and
some medical devices must undergo extensive testing and stringent risklbenefit
analysis before the FDA will approve them for marketing.l
Formerly, the FDA viewed its risklbenefit analysis as setting a floor but not
a ceiling for product safety: FDA-approved products could be marketed, but the
manufacturer might still incur liability if a court later decided that a product was
defective or a warning was inadequate.2 This view has changed in recent years,

* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful to Kristin
Madison, Theodore Ruger, William Sage, and Kim Scheppele for their suggestions on the initial
stages of this project, to participants in a University of Pennsylvania Law School ad hoc workshop
and participants in faculty workshops at Rutgers School of Law-Camden and at Brooklyn Law
School, and to Allison Arwady, Stephen Burbank, Rochelle Chodock, Frank Goodman, Geoffrey
Hazard, Richard Nagareda, Kermit Roosevelt, Chris Sanchirico, Anthony Sebok, Jonathan Siegel,
Allan Stein, Aaron Twerski, and an anonymous reviewer for extremely helpful comments on prior
drafts. I thank Dylan Steinberg for superb research assistance and for being a thoughtful sounding
board for many of the ideas discussed here, and Ronald Day and the staff of the Biddle Law
Library for assistance in obtaining sources. Remaining errors, of course, are mine.
1 . See infra text accompanying notes 25-43. But see source cited infra note 43 (observing that
the FDA does not require comparisons between the product under review and alternative
treatments).
2. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective and Position, 52
FOOD & DRl)G L.J. 7, 1 1 ( 1 997) ("FDA product approval and state tort liability usually operate
independently, each providing a significant, yet distinct, layer of consumer protection."). As
Porter-then FDA's Chief Counsel-explained, "FDA regulation of a device cannot anticipate and
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however, as policymakers have stressed the need to bring innovative medical
treatments to market. Some now argue that the FDA review process should set
both a floor and a ceiling: FDA approval of a new product indicates not only that
the product can be marketed, but that it should be; FDA rejection of a proposed
product warning means not only that the warning is unnecessary, but that it could
be counterproductive.
FDA officials who hold this view consider the tort system dangerous. The
threat of tort liability, they warn, deters pharmaceutical companies and device
makers from developing much-needed new technologies.3 Even if those
innovations are merely delayed rather than abandoned altogether, the cost is felt
not merely in financial terms but also in the suffering of people whose illnesses
could have been treated with the new drug or device.
These critics argue that the tort system-and juries in particular-should not
be permitted to determine product safety. Lay juries, it is claimed, are incapable
of understanding the complex scientific and statistical evidence relevant to
product safety; they are eager to help injured plaintiffs-especially when the
defendant has deep pockets-and they overlook the many consumers who might
benefit

from

the

product;

they

award excessive

compensatory

damages,

especially for pain and suffering; and they often compound the problem by
awarding staggering sums in punitive damages. 4 With these concerns in mind,
the FDA's then-Chief Counsel took the controversial step, in 2002 through 2004,
of submitting amicus briefs in support of the defendants in several cases

protect against all safety risks to individual consumers." !d.
3. See Amicus Brief at 26, Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 024597) (arguing that tort awards "can harm the public health by retarding research and development
and by encouraging 'defensive labeling' by manufacturers to avoid state liability, resulting in
scientifically unsubstantiated warnings and underutilization of beneficial treatments").
4. As the FDA argued last year (with respect to medical devices) in a submission to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:
State actions are not characterized by centralized expert evaluation of device regulatory
issues. Instead, they encourage,and in fact require,lay judges and juries to second-guess
the balancing of benefits and risks of a specific device to their intended patient
population-the central role of FDA-sometimes on behalf of a single individual or
group of individuals. That individualized redetermination of the benefits and risks of a
product can result in relief-including the threat of significant damage awards or
penalties-that creates pressure on manufacturers to add warnings that FDA has neither
approved, nor found to be scientifically required, or withdrawal of FDA-approved
products from the market in conflict with the agency's expert determination that such
products are safe and effective.

Jd. at 25-26.
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concerning FDA-approved products.5 Detailed FDA scrutiny of a product, the
briefs contended, should preempt litigation challenging the product's safety
(unless the defendant has violated FDA requirements).
There are strong reasons to question the view that FDA approval should
6
preempt products liability c1aims. To establish that preemption is warranted,
proponents should be required to provide convincing evidence of serious flaws in
the current system.7 In this regard, it should be noted that the opponents of the

5. See Amicus Brief for Defendant, Horn (No. 02-4597); Horn, 376 F.3d at 178 (quoting
Statement of Interest of the United States at 7-9, Murphree v. Pacesetter, Inc. (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Dec.
12, 2003) (No. 005429-00-3)); Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States, in Support of
Defendants/Respondents, Dowhal v. Smithkline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d I (Cal.
2003) (No. S109306); Amicus Brief for the United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee
and Cross-Appellant, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 02-55372, 0255498).
Concerns over the FDA's stance arose partly from reports that the FDA's Chief Counsel
solicited input from industry lawyers concerning cases in which the FDA could usefully intervene
on behalf of defendants. In December 2003, then-FDA Chief Counsel Daniel Troy participated in a
"roundtable" entitled "The Case for Preemption" at a continuing legal education conference
designed for in-house and outside counsel for pharmaceutical and medical device companies.
Program, 8th Annual Conference for In-House Counsel and Trial Attorneys: Drug'and Medical

Device Litigation (Dec. 14-16, 2003), http://www .gibbonslaw.comJpublications/uploadedfiles/
602L04-NYC.pdf.

Jessica Dart, who represents a number of products liability plaintiffs, attended the
conference after learning that the roundtable agenda included two of her cases. Affidavit of Jessica
R. Dart at �� 1, 3, Dusek v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. A. H-02-3559, 2004 WL 2191804 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
20, 2004). According to Dart, Troy "made it clear that he was interested in filing even more amicus
briefs on behalf of pharmaceutical manufacturers and actually invited his defense counsel audience
to approach him with requests . . . . " [d. � 5.
Daniel Troy resigned from his post as Chief Counsel in November 2004. See FDA,
Statement of Dr. Lester M. Crawford, Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs on the Resignation
of Daniel E. Troy (Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.fda.govlbbs/topics/news/2004INEW01135.html.

News reports, however, have suggested that the FDA's Acting Commissioner continues to support
Troy's policy views. See, e.g. , FDA Chief Counsel Dan Troy Resigning, Masoudi Rumored as

Replacement, FDA WEEK, Nov. 19, 2004 (quoting an internal email from Lester Crawford that
praised Troy for "put[ting] his personal reputation on the line defending the Agency's prerogatives
from intrusion by courts applying state law in product liability actions").

6. For a summary of current law concerning preemption, see infra notes 105-110 and

accompanying text.
7. The tort system is designed to promote product safety and compensate those injured by
defective products-roles that were entirely compatible with the FDA's previous view that tort
liability could supplement the FDA's efforts to ensure product safety. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text. Moreover, products liability law lies within the area of consumer health and
safety-an area traditionally within the regulatory powers of the states. Therefore, those who assert
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tort system overstate the case:8 Empirical data indicate that juries do better than
9
their critics assert at handling technical issues, that juries are not as eager as
1
some think to award damages against business defendants, O and that punitive
damages are awarded rarely in products liability suits (and mainly in cases
ll
involving egregious misbehavior).
In addition to demonstrating a need for change, advocates of preemption
should also be required to demonstrate that preemption is the best alternative to
the status quo. It is true that the FDA possesses greater expertise concerning

that Congress should preempt state tort liability should bear the burden of showing that such
preemption is necessary.

8. Theodore Eisenberg and James Henderson have argued that, in fact, data indicate a pro

See Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson,
Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731, 741 (1992) (noting

defendant trend in recent decades.

Jr.,

Inside the

"a continuing

decline in plaintiff success rates" over the period from 1979 to 1989); Theodore Eisenberg,

Decisionmaking in Federal Products Liability Cases, 1978-1997,49

Judicial

DEPAUL L. REv. 323, 323-24

(1999) (noting low plaintiff win rates at trial and also observing that "[o]f those cases that survive
early pretrial skirmishing, and end in pretrial judgment, an increasing percentage is resulting in
pretrial judgment in favor of defendants" based on data extending "through fiscal 1997").

9. See, e.g. , NEIL VIDMAR, MEDI CAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERlCAN JURY: CONFRONTING

THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 265

(1995); Joe S. Cecil et aI., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury

Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 727, 729 (1991).
10. See VALERlE P. HANS, BUSINESS

ON

TRlAL:

THE

CIVIL JURY

AND

CORPORATE

RESPONSIBILITY 23, 175-77 (2000). Other researchers have noted that plaintiffs' win rates are

See Theodore
Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19

relatively low in products liability jury trials (compared to other types of cases).
Eisenberg et aI.,

SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 437 (1996) (reporting with respect to products liability claims (other than
asbestos claims) tried in 1991-1992 that "success rates are 40 percent in state court and 37 percent
in federal court"). Of course, this fmding does not prove that juries are particularly unsympathetic
to products liability plaintiffs; the mix of cases selected for trial can differ across types of cases and
can affect win rates. However, the finding does suggest that juries are not automatically receptive
to plaintiffs' claims in products liability cases.

11. See, e.g. , Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing

Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78

IOWA L. REv. 1, 23 (1992) (describing a study of products

liability verdicts that indicated that "punitive damages were rarely awarded," which showed that
"[t]he gap between what was awarded and collected was great," and that cases resulting in punitive
awards involved "corporate misconduct and serious injuries"). Researchers recently summarized
the empirical findings on punitive awards: "Contrary to popular belief, juries rarely award such
damages, and award them especially rarely in products liability and medical malpractice cases.
Rather, juries tend to award punitive damages in intentional misconduct cases. When juries do
award punitive damages, they do so in ways that relate strongly to compensatory awards."
Theodore Eisenberg et aI.,

Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87

CORNELL L. REv. 743, 745 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
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product safety than a civil jury. The FDA is correct to suggest that FDA
regulation and the tort system should not operate entirely independently; the
FDA's expertise gives its views on product safety considerable authority and
those views should play a role in assessing product liability. But I will argue that
even if systemic change is shown to be necessary, allowing FDA regulation to
supplant the tort system is not the only, or the best, solution.
Pennitting FDA approval to preclude the possibility of tort liability does
more than ensure that product safety decisions are reserved to the FDA.
Preemption of tort litigation removes the opportunity for litigation to aid the FDA
in its goal of monitoring product safety. 12 Preemption also denies compensation
to persons harmed by an FDA-approved product--even if they were harmed after
a safety problem first surfaced but before the FDA took regulatory action to
3
remove the product from the market or to require additional warnings. 1
There exists a large body of literature concerning the appropriate scope of
14 I
will argue, however, that this literature fails to
FDA regulatory preemption.
1
contemplate the full range of possible options. 5 Even if proponents of reform can
ultimately carry their burden of showing the need for change, policymakers

12. See Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2069 (2000)
("[I]f we are substantially dependent on the tort system to provide the educational function of
revealing massive cover-ups of health information by industries like asbestos, or occasional efforts
to conceal risk information from regulatory agencies like the FDA, then it is undeniably the case
that tort law is serving a positive function of some consequence.").
13. Plaintiffs could, under some circumstances, assert a claim against the United States based
upon the FDA's failure to act concerning a product, but such claims would often fail due to the
"discretionary function" exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Berkovitz v. United States,
486 U.S. 531, 545 (1988) (stating that "application of the discretionary function exception" to a
claim concerning agency determinations that a vaccine complied with federal standards "hinges on
whether the agency officials making that determination permissibly exercise policy choice").
14. See, e.g. , Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The
Courts Run Amok, 59 Mo. L. REv. 895 (1994); Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability and
Preemption: A Judicial Framework, 39 BUFF. L. REv. 181 (1991); Richard C. Ausness, Federal
Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44 S.c. L. REv. 187 (1993); Brian J. Donato &
Mary Beth Neraas, Federal Preemption ofProduct Liability Claims Involving Drugs and Medical
Devices Regulated Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 305
(1993); David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liabilityfor Prescription Drugs:
Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other Paths to Uniform Pharmaceutical Safety
Standards, 45 DEPAUL L . REv. 395 (1996); Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal
Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REv. 559 (1997); Lars Noah, Amplification of
Federal Preemption in Medical Device Cases, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183 (1994).
15. Cj Richard A. Nagareda, In the A ftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L . J. 295,
298 (1996) (arguing that "the debate over procedural reform within the tort system ignores the
relationship between that system and the modern administrative state").
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should keep in mind that preemption is not the only alternative to the status quo.
In addition to considering whether there are ways to improve the performance of
the current litigation system, policymakers should ask whether litigation could be
restructured in a way that could improve the FDA's regulatory performance.
This Article considers whether Congress could create structural links
between the litigation system and the FDA-either by providing for agency
adjudication of products liability claims or by requiring federal courts to refer
issues of product safety and causation to the agency for determination. After
comparing four possible configurations, I conclude that policy considerations
would weigh in favor of adjudication in federal court, with referral of technical
questions to the FDA. In discussing this possibility, I draw upon insights
provided by Richard Nagareda, who has argued that such a referral could be
6
accomplished through the use of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.1 I conclude,
however, that such a mechanism could well violate the Seventh Amendment if
applied to private

products

liability claims.17

Accordingly,

I describe an

alternative scheme in which product safety claims for damages by the United
States as parens patriae18 could be litigated in federal court by qui tam relators.19
The system would employ a somewhat novel process to adjudicate claims.
After a period of discovery, a suit that survived summary judgment would
proceed to a bench trial. Instead of ruling upon the issues of product safety and
causation, however, the judge would refer those issues to an FDA advisory panel.
The panel's determinations would be reviewed by the FDA, and the FDA's final
determinations would be conclusive regarding product safety and causation?O If
warranted, the court would then determine an aggregate amount of damages and
would enter judgment. A fraction of the damages would be paid to the

qui tam

relator, and the bulk of the damages would finance a federal compensation fund

16. See id. at 352 (suggesting that Congress enact a framework within which courts would
"apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to defer their disposition of i.p.dividual claims pending
agency action"); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 899, 978 (1996) (suggesting a regulatory scheme for facilitating claim resolution, within
which "[a] mass tort centered upon a medical device like breast implants appropriately might come
within the expertise of the FDA-the agency that originally licensed that product").
17. See infra notes 238-265 and accompanying text.
18. This phrase, which translates "parent of the country," denotes the state's ability to sue to
protect its interest in the health and safety of its citizens. See infra notes 153-157 and
accompanying text.
19. Qui tam relators are litigants who sue on behalf of the government (and who may earn a
bounty for doing so successfully). See infra notes 158-170 and accompanying text.
20. The FDA's findings would be reviewed in the federal court proceeding for compliance
with procedural requirements and to ensure that the findings were supported by some evidence. See

infra notes 143-151 and accompanying text.
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for those harmed by the prodUCt. 2

1

Such a mechanism might improve the FDA's postmarketing surveillance of
regulated products. The filing of such a suit could flag possible safety problems
for the FDA. Discovery obtained in such a suit might uncover evidence that had
not been reported to the FDA, or upon which the FDA had not yet focused. And
the FDA's review of panel determinations would provide the agency with an
opportunity to reassess its product safety determinations

in light of the record

developed in the litigation.
The scheme would also change the landscape of compensation. The amount
of damages awarded could vary depending on the presence and degree of fault on
the part of the company: A carelessly overlooked safety problem could trigger
compensatory damages, while instances of willful deception might generate
additional penalties. Even in the absence of fault, the scheme might require the
company to provide some minimum level of damages to compensate for harms
traceable to the product. Damages awarded in such a scheme would likely be
smaller than some jury awards in similar cases tried in the tort system. On the
other hand, damages could be recovered in cases where suits would currently be
preempted, as well as in cases where preemption would not exist but where state
law would not impose liability.
Companies could choose whether or not to opt in to the new system; if they
declined to opt in, there would be no preemption of state-law tort claims. The
opt-in feature would have an interesting policy implication.22 Though preemption
advocates argue that the size and variability of jury awards deter companies from
pursuing desirable projects, that assertion is hotly contested and difficult to
evaluate. Companies themselves are better suited than legislators to determine
the incentive effects of litigation, but their statements are likely to be self
interested. By permitting companies to choose between the tort system and the
new alternative, the scheme would elicit a more accurate picture of companies'
preferences.
My argument proceeds in four steps. I begin by summarizing, in Part I, the
FDA's role in scrutinizing product safety. Part I explains why premarketing
review predictably will fail to identify all potential safety issues and discusses
flaws in the FDA's current postmarketing surveillance system. In Part II, I
consider several possible structural changes that could link litigation more
closely to the regulatory process. After weighing the relative merits of agency
and court adjudication, and comparing the types of entities that might press a
claim concerning product safety, I suggest that

qui tam

suits on behalf of the

2 1 . See infra notes 168-169, 176-178 and accompanying text.
22. Companies' ability to choose whether or not to opt in to the system also addresses
possible constitutional concerns about the scheme. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
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litigated in federal court, might be the best

option for creating structural links. Part III considers the advantages of the
system's opt-in feature and argues that the system could supplement and improve
the FDA's postmarketing surveillance efforts. In conclusion, I consider potential
disadvantages of the system-including the possibility that a pro-industry bias or
a lack of resources might compromise the agency's role in the proposed
scheme-and I assess the place of the hybrid scheme in the debate over
preemption. While this Article does not establish that the hybrid scheme is
superior to the status quo, it does support the contention that the hybrid scheme is
superior

to

preemption.

Advocates

of

preemption,

then,

not

only

must

demonstrate that the current system is undesirable, but also should be required to
show that preemption is preferable to a hybrid system.
I. THE ROLE OF POSTMARKETING SURVEILLANCE IN THE REGULATORY SYSTEM

An FDA task force recently summarized the agency's role in promoting
consumer safety:

The Agency establishes and enforces product quality standards intended to
prevent defective products from reaching the market. For products of
acceptable quality, the central element of FDA's risk management is
controlling product entry to the marketplace. The majority of FDA program
resources are devoted to premarketing scientific risk identification and
assessment and approval or nonapproval. Significant, but substantially fewer,
resources are devoted to postmarketing surveillance and risk assessment
activities. 23
In this Section I explain why postmarketing surveillance is critical to
consumer safety, and I argue that despite the FDA's efforts to Improve
postmarketing surveillance, that aspect of its program still falls short.

A. Premarket Scrutiny
During premarket review, the FDA weighs a medical product's known risks
and determines whether the product should be approved for marketing and, if so,

whether warnings should be included in the labeling. 24 New drugs and medical
devices undergo varying degrees of FDA scrutiny depending on their originality
and other factors.

23. TASK FORCE ON RISK MGMT., FDA, MANAGING THE RISKS FROM MEDICAL PRODUCT USE
CREATING

A

RISK

MANAGEMENT

FRAMEWORK

29-30

(1999),

riskmanagement.pdf [hereinafter RISK MANAGEMENT REpORT].
24. !d. at 30.
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The standard drug approval proceeds in four steps:

Phase I seeks phannacologic effects information and early evidence on
effectiveness in several dozen healthy persons. Phase II measures several
hundred closely monitored sick patients for the clinical effectiveness of the
drug. Both prepare the product for its real test, the multiple Phase III
effectiveness and safety tests which form the basis for risk assessments and
label warnings, during which more than a thousand patients are likely to be
exposed.
The final phase of the review process leads to formal acceptance of the
proposed [new drug application] ?
The process is lengthy; approval can be somewhat speedier, however, for
certain urgently needed drugs and for generic versions of drugs already on the
26
market. A "fast track" approval proc ess is available for new drugs that "treat [] a
serious or life-threatening condition and . . . demonstrate[] the potential to
,, 2
address unmet medical needs for such a condition. 7 Manufacturers of generic
2
drugs can take advantage of the abbreviated new drug application process, 8 often
, 2
bypassing "the extensive clinical testing that a pioneer product would endure . , 9
Medical devices are grouped in three categories, in ascending order of
30
riskiness. In Class I are seemingly innocuous devices such as dental flOSS; these
3l
Devices whose safety and
receive the least demanding regulatory oversight.

25. 1 JAMES T. O'REILLY, POOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 13.11, at 13-66 to -67 (2d ed.
1995).

See James O' Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off- Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer
Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 304 (2003)
26.

("The PDA approval process is complex and detailed, and its timing cannot keep up with the fast
pace of medical discovery about pharmaceutical benefits. Even with the advent of the accelerated
'fast-track' approval process, the process for drug approval is one that is still lengthy and time
consuming." (footnote omitted)).
27. 21 U.S.c. § 356(a)(1) (2000);

see also

21 C.P.R. § 314.500 (2004). Por drugs that receive

fast track evaluation, the FDA may impose safety restrictions on the distribution or use of the drug,

see id.

§ 314.520, and may require postapproval studies,

see id.

§ 314.510, and "[p]ostapproval

reporting of adverse events is much more closely monitored," 1 O'REILLY,

supra

note 25, § 13.13,

at 13-83.
28.

See 21 c.P.R. § 314.92 (2004).
supra note 25, § 13.15, at 13.93.
See 21 c.P.R. § 872.6390 (2004).
See id. § 860.3(c)(1) ("Class I means the class

29. 1 O'REILLY,
30.
3l.

of devices that are subject to only the

general controls authorized by or under sections 501 (adulteration), 502 (misbranding), 510
(registration), 516 (banned devices), 518 (notification and other remedies), 519 (records and

5 95
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32
effectiveness require greater scrutiny-such as contact lenses -are grouped in
33
Class II and subjected to additional controls.
When more study is needed to
determine the safety and effectiveness of a medically important or potentially
dangerous device, it is assigned to Class III and the manufacturer must obtain
34
premarket approval from the FDA.
A company seeking premarket approval of an innovative Class III device
must test the product and must provide detailed data, including "full reports of all
information, published or known to or which should reasonably be known to the
applicant, concerning investigations which have been made to show whether or
,,3
not such device is safe and effective. 5 However, an applicant can use
"premarket notification" to bypass the full premarket application process if it can
show that its device is "substantially equivalent" to a device already on the
36
Though a premarket notification applicant will need to submit an
market.
analysis of existing data on the device, the FDA will not usually demand
37 If the FDA accepts the notification, it will approve the product for
testing.
marketing; if not, the applicant will have to proceed to the premarket application.
The

FDA ' s

premarketing

mission

review,

but

of protecting
its

mandate

consumer
to

foster

safety

dictates

innovation

rigorous

creates

a

countervailing pressure. In 1997, finding that "prompt approval of safe and
effective new drugs and other therapies is critical to the improvement of the
,,3
public health, 8 Congress directed the FDA to employ the "least burdensome"

reports), and 520 (general provisions) of the act.").
32.

See id.

§ 886.5916(b)(1) (stating that daily wear rigid gas permeable contact lenses are

Class II devices);

id.

§ 886.5925(b)( l ) (stating that daily wear soft contact lenses are Class II

devices).
33.

See id.

§ 860.3(c)(2) ("A device is in class II if general controls alone are insufficient to

provide reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness and there is sufficient information to
establish special controls, including . . . performance standards, postmarket surveillance, patient
registries, . . . guidance documents . . . , recommendations, and other appropriate actions . . . . ").
34. The regulations explain:
A device is in class III if insufficient information exists to determine that general [or
special] controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of its safety and
effectiveness . . . and if, in addition, the device is life-supporting or life-sustaining, or
for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health,
or if the device presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.

!d. § 860.3(c)(3).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(A) (2000).
36.
37.

See id. § 360e(b)(1)(B).
See 1 O'REILLY, supra note 25,

§ 18.07, at 18-32.

38. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 101(1),

I I I Stat. 2296, 2298 (reprinted at 21 U.S.c. § 379g note (2000».
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methods of evaluating products in the premarket notification and premarket
3
approval processe s . 9 Pursuant to this mandate, the FDA has declared that
premarket approval can sometimes be based on "well-designed bench and/or
40
animal testing" rather than clinical tests. Moreover, the FDA will consider the
extent to which measures such as postmarketing trials can substitute for
41
premarket scrutiny . Though clinical data are in any event not required for most
premarket notifications, the FDA responded to the "least burdensome" directive
by emphasizing that "sub stantial equivalence" determinations should also be
42
streamlined.
Though the details of the approval process are complex, the bottom line is
plain: When a company seeks FDA approval of an innovative drug or Class III
device, the FDA will require the manufacturer to submit test data concerning
safety and effectiveness. The FDA will weigh the product's potential risks and
43
and consideration of the
benefits in determining whether to grant approval,
product's risks can lead the agency to impose detailed requirements concerning
product warnings. Premarketing scrutiny can provide a significant increase in
product safety, but, as the next Section discusses, there is no way that it can
44
discern all potential risks.

39. 21 U.S.c. § 360c(a)(3)(D)(ii) (2000) (premarket approval);

id.

§ 360c(i)(1)(D) (premarket

notification).
40. FDA, THE LEAST BURDENSOME PROVISIONS OF THE FDA MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997:

CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES; FINAL GUIDANCE FOR FDA AND INDUSTRY 10 (2002), http:// www. fda.
gov/cdrhlode/guidance/1332.pdf.
41.
42.

See id.
See id.

at 4.
at 9.

43. However, the FDA does not require comparative testing of the product's performance
relative to competitor brands (though marketing or practical considerations may dictate that the
company perform such tests).

See

Editorial,

Comparing Prescription Drugs, N.Y.

TIMES, Aug. 27,

2003, at A20 ("[T]he drugs used in this country are seldom tested against one another in head-to
head combat. Instead, each is tested separately against a placebo and then, if shown to be safe and
effective, is approved for marketing.").
44. Even as to risks that could be discerned at the premarket review stage, some have argued
that the FDA's reliance on the regulated company to supply the necessary safety data can lead to

See, e.g. , Thomas o. McGarity, Beyond Buckman: Wrongful Manipulation oj the
Regulatory Process in the Law oJ Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 549, 559 (2002) ("When the onus is on
problems.

the regulatee to provide data establishing that its product is 'safe and effective' . . . , the temptation
is strong for a company to discount data indicating that the product may not meet the statutory
test.").
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B. The Needfor Postmarketing Surveillance
4
Even if it is rigorously conducted, 5 a process that focuses on prior approval
46
inevitably will fail to capture all relevant information. Clinical trials normally
47
those that occur relatively
will fail to reveal a number of types of problems :

45. There is some reason to question whether the current premarketing approval process is
always sufficiently rigorous. Results of a 2002 survey of FDA scientists revealed that of the 360
recipients who responded to the question, "Have you ever been pressured to approve or recommend
approval for an NDA despite reservations about the safety, efficacy, or quality of the drug?,"
eighteen percent responded "Yes." OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN

SERVS . , HHS SURVEY, at question 25 (2002), hrtp://www. peer.org/docs/fda/12_14_04_FDA_

survey.pdf [hereinafter HHS SURVEY]. The results to some of the survey questions, which were
made public pursuant to a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), are available at

http://www. peer.org/docs/fda/12_14_04_FDA_survey.pdf; see also News Release, Pub. Employees

for Envt'l Responsibility, FDA Scientists Issued Early Warnings on Drug Approvals (Dec. 16,

2004), http://www .peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=449 (stating that the survey results were
obtained under FOIA). Health and Human Services researchers estimated that 846 Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research reviewers were eligible to participate in the survey; 401 responses were

received. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA's REVIEW

PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG ApPLICATIONS: A MANAGEMENT REVIEW 37 app. F (2003), http://oig.hhs.

gov/oei/reports/oei-O 1-01-00590.pdf. The researchers noted "three main limitations" of their
survey: The survey used web-based technology and technical difficulties may have caused some
"non-responses"; though the survey was anonymous, "some respondents may not have participated
out of concerns for their anonymity"; and "although survey access was limited to CDER
employees, the potential exists that some individuals not in our intended population completed the
survey." Id.
46. See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest
Case, 30 U. MICH. 1.L. REFORM 461, 496 (1997) (discussing "the inability of the [ investigational
new drug] testing process to identify all of the risks associated with use of a dI1lg"); William M.
Sage, Note, Drug Product Liability and Health Care Delivery Systems, 40 STAN. L. REv. 989, 990
(1988) (noting with respect to drugs that "extensive use in humans is the only way to measure
safety or efficacy").
47. This is true even if the trial is designed and executed evenhandedly and in good faith.
Some observers, however, assert that "bias is now rampant in drug trials." MARCIA ANGELL, THE
TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE Us AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 106

(2004). Angell notes a number of strategies that can skew study results; one is "to enroll only
young subjects in trials .. .. Because young people experience fewer side effects, drugs will look
safer in these trials than they would in practice." !d. at 107-08. Results of a 2002 survey of FDA
scientists reveal doubts about the sufficiency of the information provided in new drug applications.
Three hundred and sixty-one survey recipients responded to the question "[H]ow often do NDAs,
including amendments submitted during the PDUFA time clock, contain enough data to adequately
assess the SAFETY of a drug?" While fifty-six percent responded "Most of the time," thirty-two
percent responded "Some of the time" (the other options were "All of the time" (two percent),
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4
rarely, 8 those involving relatively subtle increases in the risk of already common
problems, those that disproportionately affect a population subset not represented
50
4
in the trial, 9 and those with a long latency period. Thus, "premarketing studies
,,51
cannot guarantee product safety.
Though some problems may surface almost immediately after marketing
52
53
commences,
others may take years to appear.
Once problems do manifest
themselves, however, it is critical for the FDA to recognize and respond to those
54
problems promptly, so as to minimize the danger to consumers.
An official
from the General Accounting Office has suggested that there is growing cause for
concern:

"Rarely" (nine percent), and "Never" (two percent». Eighty-seven percent (out of 354 respondents)
stated that "additional SAFETY data [would] improve CDER's ability to adequately assess the
safety of a drug" at least "[t]o some extent." HHS SURVEY, supra note 45, at questions 12,1 3 .
48. See Funmilayo O . Ajayi et aI., Adverse Drug Reactions: A Review of Relevant Factors, 40
J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1 093, 1 094 (2000) ("Most clinically relevant [adverse drug reactions]
occur at a rate of 1 in 10,000 or less .").
49. See Ajayi et aI., supra note 48, at 1 094 ("[A] major shortcoming of clinical trials can be the
failure to account for variability among patients in terms of age, gender, genetic background,
co administered drugs, the coexistence of other diseases, and their concurrent effects on drug
metabolism and/or excretion."); Am. Med. Ass' n, Reporting Adverse Drug and Medical Device

Events: Report of the AMA 's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 3 5 9 ,
359-60 (1994) [hereinafter AMA Report] (noting that "the patient population used in clinical trials
does not usually include vulnerable populations such as the elderly, the young, women, those with
complicated disease, or those taking other medications").
50. See, e.g. , Timothy Brewer & Graham A. Colditz, Postmarketing Surveillance and Adverse

Drug Reactions: Current Perspectives and Future Needs, 2 8 1 lAMA 824, 824 ( 1 999) (noting that
"[p]remarketing trials . . . lack the follow-up necessary to detect [adverse drug reactions] widely
separated in time from the original use of the drug or delayed consequences associated with long
term drug administration").
5 1 . AMA Report, supra note 49, at 359-60.
52. See Examining the Incidence ofMedical Errors, Focusing on Understanding Adverse Drug
Events: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 106th Congo 6
(2000) [hereinafter Senate Medical Errors Hearing] (statement of Dr. Janet Woodcock, Director,
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA) ("New types of risks, and rare risks, may well be
uncovered in the first year a drug is on the market.").
53. See Ajayi et aI. , supra note 48, at 1 09 9 (suggesting that "approximately 2 to 3 years of
postmarketing experience is required to fully understand the safety profile of a new drug") .
54. Cf Alastair J. l. Wood, The Safety of New Medicines: The Importance ofAsking the Right
Questions, 281 lAMA 1 753, 1 75 3 ( 1 999) (discussing five drugs withdrawn from the market, and
stating that "a staggering 1 9 .8 million patients . . . were estimated to have been expose<;l to these 5
drugs before their removal"); Ajayi et aI., supra note 48, at 1094 ("The [adverse drug reactions]
undetected prior to approval of a drug product may pose serious health threats once released into
the general population . . . . ).
"
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[T]he pressures on the U . S . system of pharmaceutical risk management are
increasing. Prescription drug use in the U.S. continues to increase; . . . roughly
10 prescriptions were filled for every American in 1 998 . Further, direct-to
consumer advertising and other marketing techniques can greatly accelerate the
rate at which a new drug is prescribed to large numbers of patients. 55
Other recent changes also serve to raise the stakes : It is now more likely that
a drug will enter the

U.S. market before it has developed a track record abroad

and that it will do so on the basis of a less searching "fast track" review by the
6
FDA. 5 Po stmarketing surveillance, then, must play an increasingly vital role in
7
ensuring consumer safety; 5 but as the next Section discusses, the available
8
resources fall short. 5

C.

Deficiencies in the FDA. 's Postmarketing Surveillance

The goals of the FDA's postmarketing surveillance are "to detect adverse
events not previously observed, improve understanding of the potential severity
of previously unanticipated risks, detect events resulting from drug interactions
or drug effects in particular populations, and assess the potential for causal
,
relationships . 5, 9 The FDA employs several different methods, including
reporting systems, medical databases, and studies and registries focused on

5 5 . Senate Medical Errors Hearing, supra note 52 (letter from Janet Heinrich, Associate
Director, Health Fin. & Pub. Health Issues, U . S . Gen. Accounting Office, to the Honorable James
M. Jeffords, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Health, Educ. , Labor, & Pensions).
56. As Marcia Angell has explained:
[U]ntil a decade ago, drugs were usually first approved in Europe . . . . But now, most
drugs are approved first in the United States. Furthermore, an increasing number of
them are given accelerated review by the FDA, which means they come to market on the
basis of less evidence. Thus, a drug may come into widespread use, with very l ittle
research to back it up, and no experience in another country.

ANGELL, supra note 47, at 1 62 .
5 7 . See Ajayi e t al., supra note 4 8 ,a t 1 097 ("Although fraught with certain limitations such as
underreporting, the use of postmarketing surveillance is still very critical in collecting data on drug
safety because the true adverse reaction profIle of a drug is often not revealed until it has been
widely used."); Sage, supra note 46, at 1 01 5 ("At the time a drug is approved, many adverse effects
are undiscoverable. Though the first such ADRs to arise are unpreventable, effective postmarketing
surveillance can greatly reduce the total damage.").
58. See Senate Medical Errors Hearing, supra note 52

(statement of Sen. Edward M.

Kennedy) ("Approximately 4 8 percent of prescription drugs on the market today have become
available only since 1 990. FDA needs additional resources to identify adverse reactions . . . . ");
Green, supra note 46, at 495-96 (noting with respect to "the post-approval period" concerning new
drugs that "the FDA has inadequate resources to enforce regulatory compliance").
59. RISK MANAGEMENT REpORT, supra note 23, at 52.
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Although the FDA publicly takes a generally positive view of
there are reasons to question the agency 's effectiveness. Indeed,

a 2002 internal survey of reviewers in the FDA's Center

for Drug Evaluation and

Research (CDER) found that some two-thirds of respondents were either "[nJot
at all confident" or only "[sJomewhat confident" that the CDER "adequately
monitors the safety of prescription drugs once they are

on

the market. ,,62 These

concerns are well-founded: The FDA receives large amounts of data both from
regulated

companies

and

from

healthcare

providers,

but

those

data will

sometimes be incomplete or lack sufficient detail. Further, the FDA does not
have the capability-or, some charge, the motivation-to analyze thoroughly and
act swiftly upon all the information that it does receive.
Federal law imposes significant reporting duties on manufacturers of
63
as well as on certain healthcare facilities where those devices
,, 64
are used ("user facilities ). Manufacturers must report deaths , serious inj uries,

medical devices,

and device malfunctions, as well as baseline data, to the FDA within set time
periods. User facilities must also report deaths to the FDA, and must report
6
serious inj uries to the manufacturer. 5 Pharmaceutical companies have similar
66
reporting duties 'with respect to adverse drug events .

60. Id. at 54. An FDA task force recently listed these methods:
spontaneous reporting systems to rapidly identify potential new problems; large
healthcare databases with product use linked to subsequent diagnoses, hospitalizations,
and other adverse events; cohort and case-control studies conducted as needed to
investigate a specific safety issue in depth; and registries initiated when potential risks
(particularly those apparent only with long-term fol low-up) are sufficient to warrant
identification and active follow-up of individuals exposed to a product.
6 1 . See id. at 5 1 ("The Task Force believes that FDA's postrnarketing surveillance and risk
assessment programs are, for the most part, accomplishing the purposes for which they were
designed.").
62. HHS SURVEY, supra note 4 5 , at question 45. Twenty-eight percent of respondents were
"[m]ostly confident" and six percent of respondents were "[c]ompletely confident." Id.
63. See 2 1 U.S.C. § 360i(a) (2000) (imposing reporting requirements on manufacturers and
importers of medical devices); 2 1 C.F .R. § 8 03 . 10(c) (2004) (summarizing device manufacturers'
reporting requirements).
64. See 2 1 U.S.c. § 360i(b) (2000) (imposing reporting requirements on "device user
facilities").
65. See 2 1 c.F .R. § 803 . 1 0 (2004) (summarizing user facilities' reporting duties).
66. Id. § 3 1 4.80 (specifying reporting requirements regarding adverse drug experiences). As
Barbara Noah has explained:
Within fifteen days, manufacturers must submit reports of all adverse drug experiences
that are both "serious" and "unexpected" and they must "promptly investigate" all such
adverse experiences. By contrast, manufacturers need only submit periodic reports for
non-serious or expected adverse events. The periodic reports must contain summaries of
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Potential tort liability (where it exists) and the possibility of FDA penalties
67
give companies incentives to monitor and report adverse events. But there are
countervailing pressures as well: As three government researchers recently noted,
" [t]here are strong disincentives for companies . . . to identify safety problems
with licensed drugs quickly and efficiently . . . . [Sleeking out and sharing bad
,,68
Commenting on
news about a product are unlikely to increase business.
"episodes of falsification and concealment of research by manufacturers,"
William Sage has observed that "[s]ince a manufacturer may have invested
several million dollars in a drug before a single adverse reaction is reported, this
, ,6
misbehavior is predictable albeit unforgiveable. 9 In a reflection of these
pressures, there are indications that Merck was aware of potential problems with

Vioxx long before it withdrew the drug from the market in September 2004, and

that the company may have attempted to retard the spread of information
70
concerning such safety concerns.

all fifteen-day reports, along with reports of other adverse experiences, and explanations
of any action that the manufacturer has taken in response to reported information.
Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing Experiential Data To Promote Patient

Welfare, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 449, 470-7 1 (2000) (citing 2 1 C.F.R. § 3 14-80 ( 1 999)). Noah notes
that manufacturers of new drugs incur additional reporting obligations:
The regulations also require that holders of an approved [new drug application] submit
quarterly adverse drug experience reports for the first three years of marketing and
annual reports afterwards . . . . Finally, additional regulations for new drugs require that
manufacturers submit a brief summary of new information accumulated during the
preceding year that "might affect the safety, effectiveness, or labeling of the drug
product" along with a description of the manufacturer's intended response to this
information.
!d. at 47 1 (citing 2 1 C.F .R. §§ 3 14-80 to -8 1 ( 1 999)).
67. See Thomas Scarlett, The Relationship Among Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting, Drug
Labeling, Product Liability, and Federal Preemption, 46 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 3 1 , 35 ( 1 99 1 )
(noting that "there are severe regulatory and other penalties" for violating FDA 's reporting rules,
and that "product liability pressure . . . pushes in the direction of reporting everything that could
conceivably be reported as an [adverse drug reaction] and making sure it shows up in the
labeling").
68. Marie R. Griffin et aI., Commentary: Postmarketing Surveillance for Drug Safety: Surely
We Can Do Better, 75 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 49 1 , 492 (2004). The authors
are investigators at the Centers for Education and Research on Therapeutics. See id. at 494.
69. Sage, supra note 46, at 1 0 1 9-20; cf Green, supra note 46, at 488 (noting that "the
pharmaceutical industry 's history is littered with instances of deliberate or negligent withholding of
information from the FDA in the new drug approval process").
70. See, e.g. , Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Failing in Drug Safety, Official Asserts, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1 9, 2004, at Al (noting the existence of documents in which "Merck executives and scientists
discussed the possible link between Vioxx and heart damage years before the company publicly
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The

FDA

also

relies upon health professionals

to

identify potential

problems. To this end, it created the MedWatch program, which solicits reports
from health professionals regarding deaths or serious inj uries associated with
7
drugs, medical devices or other regulated products; 1 reports received through
72
this program are evaluated and entered into databases . The system, however, is
73
plagued by underreporting.
For one thing, doctors may notice unexpected
harms, but they are less likely to discern an increase in the probability of familiar
74
harms .
For another, doctors may be unwilling to report events that might get
7
them into trouble. 5 (As some medical devices are marketed for use outside of
76
medical settings, the likelihood of spontaneous reporting decreases still further. )

admitted that the drug could cause harm"); Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara Martinez, Warning
Signs: E-mails Suggest Merck Knew Vioxx .s Dangers at Early Stage. WALL ST. J Nov. l . 2004. at
A l (stating that "internal Merck e-mails and marketing materials as well as interviews with outside
scientists show that the company fought forcefully for years to keep safety concerns from
destroying the drug 's commercial prospects"); Barry Meier, Questions Are Seen on Merck 's Stance
on Pain Drug 's Use, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at A l (stating that Merck was aware, "as far back
as 200 1 ," that Vioxx might not provide gastrointestinal benefits for older users who were also
taking aspirin regularly, and that Merck "never followed up with a plan in 200 1 to run a definitive
test about the drug 's advantages, if any, to aspirin users").
7 1 . See Brewer & Colditz, supra note 50, at 825.
72. See RISK MANAGEMENT R EpORT, supra note 23, at 54-55 (discussing Adverse Event
Reporting System database for drugs and biological products); id. at 58 (discussing the
Manufacturer and User Device Experience database for medical devices).
73. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ADVERSE EVENTS; SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS FOR
ADVERSE EVENTS AND MEDICAL ERRORS: STATEMENT OF JANET HEINRICH 3 (2000),
http://www .gao.gov/archive/2000lhe0006 1 t.pdf (noting that the "FDA believes that its . . . Adverse
Event Reporting System . . . receives reports for only about 1 to 1 0 percent of all [adverse drug
,,
events] ); Brewer & Colditz, supra note 50, at 825 ("[S]erious adverse events that may represent
[adverse drug reactions] are underreported by physicians to either manufacturers or the FDA.") ;.
74. See Brewer & Colditz, supra note 50, at 825 ("Unusual . . . events that occur during initial
or long-term drug use are more likely to be detected by case reports than increases in common
events or events that occur remotely in time from the medication use."); Griffin et aI., supra note
68, at 492 (noting that "voluntary reports are less likely to be helpful in determining whether a drug
causes or increases the severity of a condition that is relatively common in the background
population").
75. See Roxana Mehran et aI., Post-Market Approval Surveillance: A Call for a More
Integrated and Comprehensive Approach, 1 09 CIRCULATION 3073, 3074 (2004) ("[P]hysicians
encountering adverse events while performing off-label procedures may be reluctant to call undue
attention to themselves for using a device in an unapproved manner."); Sage, supra note 46, at
1022 ("Fear of malpractice liability discourages reporting.").
76. See Barry Meier, Flawed Device Places F.D.A. Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1 5 ,
2004, at A l (noting that "[t]he growing use of [defibrillators] in settings like offices, schools and
homes puts them outside the [FDA] 's problem-reporting system").
.•
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Overreporting is an issue as well: The MedWatch system generates some 22,000
77
reports each year, and of these a substantial number may not involve a causal
link between the product and the inj ury. The quality of the reports can limit their
usefulness:

"Much

of the

data FDA

receives

do

not

allow

a

complete

understanding of the problems associated with an adverse event or allow the
,, s
Agency to be proactive in protecting the public. 7
More

generally, the FDA ' s reporting programs

generate

a deluge

of

information. Annually, the agency has received more than 200,000 adverse event

reports regarding drugs or biologic products, and more than 80,000 adverse event
79 It is thus unsurprising that the agency describes its

reports concerning devices.

analysis of this flood of data as "triage,"SO and that the agency laments the
difficulty of its task: "Like the proverbial search for a needle in a haystack, the
number and variety of products and the lack of reliable usage information, make
it difficult to distinguish variability and noise from a real concern . . . . More work
S\
But though more work is needed, the resources
in this area is needed."

77. See Michelle Meadows, MedWatch: Managing Risks at the FDA, FDA CONSUMER MAG . ,

Sept.-Oct. 2003, http ://www .fda.gov/fdac/features/2003/503_risk.html.
78. RISK MANAGEMENT REpORT, supra note 23, at 63-64.

79. See id. at 54 ("In FY 1 998, more than 23 0,000 reports of suspected adverse events were
received by [the Adverse Event Reporting System] ."); id. at 5 8 ("The Agency receives
approximately 80,000 to 85 ,000 device-related adverse event reports every year. "). The numbers
appear to be increasing. See David W. Feigal, et aI., Ensuring Safe and Effective Medical Devices,
348 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 1 9 1 , 1 9 1 (2003) ("The FDA received more than 1 20,000 [device-related]
reports in 2002.").
80. RISK MANAGEMENT REpORT, supra note 23, at 58 ("When received, [medical device]
reports are first triaged by medical professionals."). The agency 's "triage" efforts include some
measures designed to make the flow of information more manageable by cutting its volume. The

FDA permits "summ ary reporting" of events concerning some medical devices with "well
documented adverse event histories." Id. at 58-59. Statutory changes in 1 997, see Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act of 1 997, 2 1 U.S.c. § 3 60i(b)(5) (2000), "direct[] the FDA to
move away from universal, mandatory adverse event reporting by user facilities to a system based
on reporting by a representative sample of facilities," RISK MANAGEMENT REpORT, supra note 23, at
5 3 . In addition, the FDA is improving its electronic data systems and is seeking ways to use
technology to look for emerging safety issues. See id. at 3 (noting that the "FDA has initiated
several changes in the adverse event reporting system, such as consolidating reporting system
components and using electronic reporting"); see also FDA To Use Data Mining To Monitor

Adverse Events, 22 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REp. 48 1 , 48 1 (2003) (reporting that the FDA "has signed a
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement . . . with Lincoln Technologies, Inc . . . . to use
safety data as an early indicator of populations at particular risk of adverse effects and of drug
interactions," and stating that "[t]he data mining will be applied to information the FDA collects
from postmarket reports").
8 1 . RISK MANAGEMENT REpORT, supra note 23, at 67-68.
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necessary to perfonn the task are sorely lacking . 82 Observers assert that the
FDA ' s funding arrangements have led it to privilege new drug approval while
starving the CDER' s postmarketing surveillance ann. 8 3
Other critics suggest that the FDA suffers not only from a lack of resources
but also from a lack of will to pursue safety issues aggressively. David Graham,
the Associate Director for Science and Medicine in the FDA 's Office of Drug
Safety, has charged that the CDER resists airing safety concerns about approved
drugs, both because the officials who approved the drug wish not to be proven
wrong and because upper-level managers in the Office of Drug Safety tend to
support the positions taken by those officials. 84
In summary, though the FDA has made efforts to improve its postmarketing
surveillance, 8 5 more should be done. The problem of insufficient resources

82. See Green, supra note 46, at 499 ("If the FDA had adequate resources to monitor
.
manufacturer post-approval reporting behavior, detect violations, impose adequate sanctions, and
thereby provide an appropriate deterrent, we could be more sanguine about the efficacy of the
[adverse reaction reporting] process. But, once again, there is the problem of inadequate regulatory
resources .") .
83. See Gardiner Harris, At F.D.A., Strong Drug Ties and Less Monitoring, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
6, 2004, at A2 (noting that the FDA no longer has the resources to fund independent studies of
emerging safety issues and that "[i]n the past 1 1 years, spending on [new drug] reviews has
increased to more than four-fifths of the agency 's drug center budget from about half'). Citing
figures from 1 997, Barbara Noah has observed that "the FDA only devotes the equivalent of fifty
five full-time employees to post-approval surveillance, as compared with over 1 700 full-time
equivalents engaged in pre-market review of new drug applications ." Noah, supra note 66, at 452.
84. See Merck and Vioxx: Putting Safety First?: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Finance,
1 08th Congo (2004) [hereinafter Vioxx Hearings] (statement of David J. Graham, Assoc. Dir. for
Sci., Office of Drug Safety, FDA).
8 5 . Efforts continue to be made to strengthen the FDA's postmarketing oversight. For
example, the FDA can premise its approval of a product on the company 's commitment to perform
postmarketing studies. Concerns were raised in the mid- 1 990s about the FDA ' s capacity to
supervise such studies. REpORT TO CONGRESS: REpORTS ON POSTMARKETING STUDIES [FDAMA
1 3 0] 5 -6 (200 1 ), http://www. fda.gov/cber/fdamaJpstrnrktfdama 1 3 0.pdf. In response, Congress in
1 997 expanded the FDA 's authority to follow up on drug and biologic postmarketing studies. See
2 1 U.S.C. § 3 5 6b (2000); Griffm et a1 . , supra note 68, at 492. Some have suggested that those
studies have not yet fulfilled their potential, see id. at 492 ("As of February 2002, only 37% of the
2400 postmarketing commitments for new drugs had been completed and many had never been
started. Despite changes in FDA procedures, potential concerns or 'signals' generated before
licensing can still remain unexplored for years after marketing."), and an FDA official recently
remarked that the FDA "ha[s] very little authority to make sure those postmarketing commitments
are carried out," Denise Grady, A Medical Journal Calls for a New Watchdog on Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at Al (quoting Sandra Kweder, Deputy Director of the FDA's Office of
New Drugs) . But cf FDA Report on the Performance of Drug and Biologics Firms in Conducting
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persists, as does the concern that the FDA may be loath to move swiftly to
address emerging safety issues. 8 6 Commentators have suggested a number of
measures that might help: For example, Congress could create a new regulatory
body-independent of the FDA 's medical product approval arm-that would be
devoted to postmarketing surveillance. 87 The Institute of Medicine, which has
been asked to review the FDA 's postmarketing surveillance system, 88 may
suggest other measures. But even if changes are made, it is likely that litigation
will continue to play an important role in identifying and substantiating
problems. In the next Part, I consider whether the litigation and regulatory
processes might be restructured so as to improve the FDA's postmarketing
surveillance.

Postmarketing Commitment Studies; Availability, 69 Fed. Reg. 1 2, 1 62, 1 2 , 1 63 & tbl. l (Mar. 1 5 ,

2004) (asserting that though 1 3 38 drug postmarketing commitments remain open,and studies have
not yet begun with respect to 864 of those commitments, only twenty-one are "delayed" in the
sense that "[t]he study is behind the original schedule").

86. As a group of doctors recently noted with respect to device regulation, "[w ]hereas large
resources have been devoted to . . . early deVelopment and clinical evaluation . . . , few resources
have been focused on post-market surveillance . . . ." Mehran et aI.,supra note 75, at 3 073.

87. See Vioxx Hearings, supra note 84 (statement o f Bruce M. Psaty,M.D.,Ph.D., Professor,
Medicine, Epidemiology & Health Servs.); see also Editorial, Looking for Adverse Drug Effects,
N.Y. TIMES,Nov. 27, 2004, at A14 ("Critics have proposed a wide range of reforms-a more active
search for adverse consequences, increasing the power of the safety office within the F.D.A.,
ending the agency's reliance on user fees from the industry and establishing a wholly independent
drug safety board . . . ."). Requiring advance registration of all drug trials would reduce a
company's ability to suppress adverse information through confidentiality agreements with
researchers. See Barry Meier,Contracts Keep Drug Research Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,

2004, at A I . There have been many additional proposals. See, e.g., RISK MANAGEMENT REpORT,
supra note 23, at 1 4- 1 5 (listing options); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,ADvERSE DRUG EVENTS:
THE MAGNITUDE OF HEALTH RISK IS UNCERTAIN BECAUSE OF LIMITED INCIDENCE DATA 1 8 (2000)
(noting proposal to "establish[] a network of health care facilities to serve as 'sentinel sites' for
closely monitoring the experiences of the first patients to take a new drug"); Brewer & Colditz,

supra note 50, at 827-28 (suggesting that measures such as meta-analysis of existing studies,and
analysis of information in large databases, may help to identify problem drugs); Mehran et aI.,

supra note 75, at 3076 (suggesting that claims databases and device registries may provide safety
information); Sage, supra note 46, at 992 (proposing that knowledge of drug risks "can be
improved by ( 1 ) medical structures such as HMOs,which can gather information about delayed or
low probability adverse drug reactions, and (2) intelligently selected legal rules governing
physician competence and manufacturers' profit incentives").

88. See Harris,supra note 83.
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II. LINKING THE REGULATORY AND LITIGATION S YSTEMS
In theory, the regulatory and litigation systems could operate entirely
independently: Compliance with regulations would be irrelevant in litigation, and
litigation outcomes would not directly affect agency regulation. 89 Few, however,
would advocate total independence . It seems clear that the FDA's expert
assessments of product safety should not be irrelevant in litigation arising from
alleged safety defects. Rather, the dispute is over what the effects of the FDA
safety determinations should be.
As noted above, 90 some argue that the FDA ' s expert balancing of product
risks and benefits leaves no room for disagreement within the tort system. In this
view, there is no reason for judges or juries to second-guess the FDA ' s
judgments, and, indeed, second-guessing i s likely to produce undesirable results
because of the limited capabilities and circumscribed perspective of a civil jury.
Others, however, point out that the FDA cannot discern and address. all
product safety issues ahead of time, and, that the agency may not act quickly
enough to address those issues when th :y a'ise after a product enters the market.
Even if agency capture does not inhibit the FDA 's investigation of a safety
problem, other limits on the FDA's postmarketing surveillance capacity may
produce a similar effect. Scholars have also noted a substantial body of data that
suggests juries do better at assessing technical and scientific questions than their
critics assert. 9 1
Courts considering the effects of FDA determinations have struggled to
balance these competing considerations and have developed a number of
doctrinal methods for doing so. FDA determinations can help a plaintiff establish
a claim, but they may also help a defendant avoid liability. And in recent years,
some-including, recently, the FDA itself-have asserted that certain types of
FDA determinations ought to preclude litigation altogether.
Though there is no private right of action for violation of requirements
imposed under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 92 such a violation is
hardly irrelevant in cases asserting products liability under state law. A violation
of FDA-imposed requirements can be the basis for a finding of negligence per
89. Obviously, litigation itself has regulatory effects. See, e.g. , W. Kip Viscusi et at, Deterring

Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance
Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 437, 144 8 ( 1 994) ("The common law regulates behavior through
the imposition of damage awards against tortfeasors."). My point here, however, is to consider the
extent to which litigation outcomes might operate independently from agency decisions.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
9 1 . See supra note 9.
92. 2 1 U . S.c. §§ 3 0 1 -399 (2000); see Ellis v. C .R. Bard, Inc., 3 1 1 F.3d 1 272, 1 2 84 n . 1 0 ( l I th
Cir. 2002) ("[N]o private right of action exists for a violation of the FDCA.").
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3
se. 9 Even if the violation does not establish negligence per se, it can be
considered to be evidence of negligence. 94
Conversely, some have argued that compliance with FDA requirements
should establish a defense to negligence claims. 95 Under a regulatory compliance
defense, "[m] anufacturers of drugs and extensively regulated devices would be
shielded from liability by compliance with FDA regulations, including
conformance with agreed-upon testing protocols and timely submission and
,
complete , accurate description of all required information. ,96 Proponents assert
that this system "would strengthen current incentives to comply with FDA
regulations, while attenuating current incentives to exceed FDA safety
standards .',97 Acting upon such princ iples, some states have barred punitive
damages where a defendant has met FDA requirements. 98
Similarly, some states have essentially rejected the notion that an FDA
approved drug can suffer from a design defect. An influential comment in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts set the terms of the debate by asserting that many
drugs are "unavoidably unsafe" and that the manufacturers of such products
should not incur liability in the absence of manufacturing defects or inadequate
wamings . 99 Most jurisdictions purport to follow this rule, but they disagree on its
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 note ( 1 998) ("The
overwhelming majority of American courts hold that violations of product safety regulations cause
products to be defective as a matter of law in cases involving both design and failure to warn.");
Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp ., 5 1 0 F. Supp. 96 1 , 965 (E .D. Wis. 1 98 1 ) (holding that a
violation of FDA requirements concerning contraceptive labeling would establish negligence per se
under Wisconsin law), amended by 532 F. Supp. 2 1 1 (E.D. Wis. 1 98 1 ). But see, e.g. , King v.
Danek Med. Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting negligence per se claim that
was based on defendant's failure to obtain premarket approval or clearance for medical device).
94. See, e.g. , MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N .E.2d 65, 7 1 (Mass. 1 985) (stating in
dictum that "violation of FDA requirements is evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of
negligence").
95. See, e.g. , Viscusi et aI., supra note 89, at 1 478-80 (arguing that in the absence of fraud,
compliance with FDA requirements should preclude tort liability).
96. STEVEN GARBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND
at xxxii ( 1 993). The defense could take several different forms. For example,
compliance could provide a rebuttable presumption that liability should not attach. See, e.g. , N.J.

ME DICAL DEVICES,

STAT. ANN. § 2A:5 8C-4 (West 2005) ("If the warning or instruction given in connection with a
drug or device or food or food additive has been approved or prescribed by the [FDA] . . . a

rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate.").
97. GARBER, supra note 96, at xxxii.
98. See Viscusi et ai., supra note 89, at 1 476 n. 1 40 (citing statutes).
99. As the comment explained:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
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scope. Many courts engage in a case-by-case risklbenefit analysis to determine
whether a particular drug or device is "unavoidably unsafe." l OO Some other
courts, however, have concluded that all prescription drugs should be viewed as
"unavoidably unsafe," such that the manufacturer should not be liable on a
1
design defect theory. 01 Though a blanket application of the rule seems less
persuas ive with regard to medical devices than with regard to pharmaceuticals, 1 02
some courts have found whole categories of medical devices to be "unavoidably
unsafe" as wel1. 10 3 A strong undercurrent in the case law broadly applying the

common in the field of drugs . . . . Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied
by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
RESTATEMENT ( SECOND ) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. k ( 1 965). The Restatement (Third) of Torts:

Products Liability proposes a different test:
# .. ..
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective design if
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great
in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers,
knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug
or medical device for any class of patients.
RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 6(c) ( 1 997). This standard has been
criticized by both courts, see, e.g. , Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 6 1 8 N.W.2d 827, 83 9-40
(Neb. 2000) (reviewing objections to Section 6(c) and rejecting it because "recovery [ under this
standard] would be nearly impossible"), and commentators, see, e.g. , George W. Conk, Is There a
Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 1 09 YALE L .J. 1 087, 1 089
(2000) (arguing that Section 6(c) 's "declaration that manufacturers of medical products need not
make a safer product if the existing product does more good than harm reverses thirty-five years of
safety-advancing products-liability law"). But see James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug
Designs Are Different, I I I YALE L.J. 1 5 1 (200 1 ) (responding to Conk's critique).
1 00. See, e.g. , Freeman, 6 1 8 N.W.2d at 840 (holding in a prescription drug case that comment k
will provide an affirmative defense "when it is shown that ( 1 ) the product is properly manufactured
and contains adequate warnings, (2) its benefits justify its risks, and (3) the product was at the time
of manufacture "and distribution incapable of being made more safe"); Tansy v. Dacomed Corp . ,
8 9 0 P2d 88 1 , 8 8 6 (Okl. 1 994) (applying similar test in medical device case).
1 0 1 . See, e.g. , Grundberg v. Upj ohn Co., 8 1 3 P.2d 89, 99 (Utah 1 99 1 ) .
1 02. Alternative designs of prescription drugs may often be impossible to find or create. But see
5 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I . FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 0.03A[3], at 50-29 (2004)
(noting that birth control pills "can be designed in many different ways"). However, it seems likely
that alternative designs of many medical devices could be pursued. See GARBER, supra note 96, at
xxviii (noting that medical devices "can often be made safer at low or moderate costs"). Take for
example the variety of possible designs for intrauterine devices (IUDs). See RONALD J. BACIGAL,
THE LIMlTS OF LITIGATION: THE DALKON SHIELD CONTROVERSY 1 0 ( 1 990) (describing the choice
between monofilament and multifilament tail strings for IUDs and explaining that the Dalkon
Shield' s multifilament tail strings "wicked" bacteria into the uterus).
1 03 . See, e.g. , Hufft v. Horowitz, S Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 992) (holding that
"all implanted medical devices" should be viewed as unavoidably unsafe). But see GARBER, supra
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"unavoidably unsafe" notion is that the FDA ' s approval of a medical product
evidences an authoritative j udgment that the product ' s benefits outweigh its
04
riskS. 1
Even in the absence of structural connections between the litigation and
regulatory systems, then, strong substantive connections exist. Violation of FDA
requirements can help establish liability, while compliance can sometimes help
defend against a claim or mitigate its damages. Some advocates of "tort reform, "
however, contend that the regulatory-adjudicative relationship must be structured
more formally through the mechanism of preemption. Under the current system,
when FDA regulation preempts state tort claims, the regulatory system displaces
the litigation system. Because no federal cause of action currently exists ,
preempting state tort claims eliminates the potential for lawsuits concerning
product safety.
Questions of preemption currently turn upon both the nature of the claim and
the degree of prior FDA scrutiny of the product. Claims seeking damages from a
company that violated FDA requirements are not preempted.

l OS

Nor are claims

challenging the safety of a medical device approved under the relatively
1 06
streamlined "substantial equivalence" process.
Claims asserting that the
1 7
defendant perpetrated a fraud on the FDA, however, are preempted. 0 And while
there is a circuit split on the question of preemption for claims with respect to
medical devices that have survived the more rigorous "premarket approval"
lo
process , the emerging maj ority view is that such claims are impermissible. 8 In

note 96, at 39 ("It is unclear whether comment k has been as widely applied to devices as to drugs
and biologicals.").
1 04. For example, the Grundberg court explained its holding as follows:
In light of the strong public interest in the availability and affordability of prescription
medications, the extensive regulatory system of the FDA, and the avenues of recovery
still available to plaintiffs by claiming inadequate warning, mismanufacture, improper
marketing, or misrepresenting information to the FDA, we conclude that a broad grant
of immunity from strict liability claims based on design defects should be extended to
FDA-approved prescription drugs in Utah.

Grundberg, 8 1 3 P.2d at 99.
1 05. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 5 1 8 U.S. 470, 495 ( 1 996) (holding that "[n]othing . . . denies
Florida the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties
when those duties parallel federal requirements").
1 06. See id. at 494.
1 07. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs ' Legal Comm., 53 1 U.S. 34 1 , 348 (200 1 ) (holding that
"state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflict with, and are therefore impliedly pre-empted by,
federal law"). But see McGarity, supra note 44, at 572 (arguing that Buckman 's holding should be
narrowly construed).
1 08. Compare Hom v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 1 63 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding preemption where
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the area of prescription drugs, although most lower courts have rej ected the
preemption defense in failure-to-warn cases, at least one has disagreed. lo9
The FDA, in its notorious 2002-2004 court filings, took up the defendants '
1
side of t.he argument in both of the latter disputes . 1 0 Moreover, there are
indications that the

Bush

Administration intends to

expand the reach of

preemption in other ways. A bill introduced in the Senate during the 1 08th
Congress would have immunized manufacturers from punitive damages
connection with medical products

in

unless the plaintiff shows by clear and

convincing evidence that the manufacturer violated a specific requirement
imposed under the FDCA.

III

Despite recent events concerning Vioxx and other

controversial FDA-approved drugs , it appears likely that the Administration will
2
continue to press for passage of this measure. 1 1 Thus , it continues to be

important to assess the arguments#of�ose who support preemption of claims for
medical products liability.
As can be seen from this summary, each proposal to take tort claims away
from civil j uries rests upon the assertion that j ury determinations of product
safety are at best duplicative-because the FDA exists to make j ust such safety
assessments-and at worst harmful because unwarranted jury awards can deter
companies from developing and marketing useful products . But, as
those po sitions have been

subj ected to powerful critiques .

I

have noted,

In addition to

medical device went through premarket approval process) ; Medtronic, Inc., 254 F . 3 d 573 (5th Cir.
200 1 ) (same); Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 200 1 ) (same); Kemp v.
Medtronic, Inc., 23 1 F.3d 2 1 6 , 227 (6th Cir. 2000) (same); Mitchell v . Collagen Corp., 1 26 F . 3d
902 (7th Cir. 1 997) (same); Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 1 07 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1 997) (same), with
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 1 67 F.3d 1 3 67 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 999) (finding no preemption).
1 09. Compare Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 1 2 7 F . Supp. 2d 1 085, 1 092 (CD. CaL 2000) (rejecting
preemption defense in prescription drug failure-to-warn case and noting that "most courts have
found that FDA regulations as to design and warning standards are minimum standards which do
not preempt state law defective design and failure to warn claims"), with Ehlis v. Shire Richwood,
Inc., 233 F. Supp . 2d 1 1 89, 1 1 98 (D.N.D. 2002) (holding failure-to-warn claim preempted because
"[t]he FDA dictates the contents of the label for Adderal1® and defendants were prohibited from
changing it without prior approval from the FDA, except in limited circumstances for a limited
period of time"), affd on other grounds, 367 F.3d 1 0 1 3 (8th Cir. 2004).
1 1 0. See, e.g. , Horn, 376 F.3d at 1 77-79 (describing FDA's arguments in support of preemption,
based on FDA premarket approval, in a medical device case); Brief of Amicus Curiae United States
at 2, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc, 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-55372) (advocating preemption, in
a prescription drug case, because "[t]o require a warning of a supposed danger that FDA concludes
has no actual scientific basis, no matter the warning's language, would be to require a statement
that would be false or misleading, and thus contrary to federal law") .
I l l . Patients First Act of 2003, S. 1 1 , 1 0 8th Congo § 7(c)( 1 ).
1 1 2. See Bob Herbert, A Gift for Drug Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A23 (criticizing
the Administration's position).
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the

notion of j ury

incompetence,

commentators

V:2 (200S}
have

argued

persuasively that some amount of redundancy is desirable : The tort system
should remain free to redetermine product safety in the light of information
developed during litigation, because the FDA may not always uncover relevant
safety information and may not act quickly enough upon the information that it
does receive.
Proposals for FDA regulation to displace tort litigation-either through
preemption or through a regulatory compliance defense-cannot fully meet this
obj ection. A carefully designed regulatory compliance defense might attempt to
improve postmarketing surveillance, for instance by precluding liability if and
only if the defendant had complied with regulatory requirements, including
disclosure requirements. 1 1 3 Thus, proponents have urged that the defense should

be available only where there was full disclosure . 1 1 4 But even with this caveat,

the effectiveness of such a system would require that the FDA act quickly and
effectively to address all indications of emerging safety problems . Especially in
the light of recent questions concerning the FDA ' s performance, this assumption

seems unduly optimistic. A regulatory compliance defense would remove a

company ' s incentive to work proactively to address emerging safety issues; to
avoid

liability, the company would simply have to disclose any relevant

information to the FDA.

liS

And such disclosures might well not facilitate the

FDA ' s task: A system in which disclosure provided immunity would enc ourage
companies to inundate the FDA with information.
So long as the regulatory and litigation systems remain structurally separate,
the policy debate may have reached an impasse : In order to privilege FDA

1 1 3 . Michael Green has pointed out that incorporating such nuances into the regulatory
compliance defense will render that defense complex and costly to litigate. See Green, supra note
46, at 5 07-08.
1 1 4. See 2 AM. LAW INST., REpORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 97 ( 1 99 1 ) [hereinfafter ALI REpORTERS' STUDY] (arguing that a regulatory comp liance
defense should apply only if the defendant "publicly disclosed to the relevant regulatory agency
any material information . . . of which it has reason to be aware . . . concerning the risks posed by
the defendant's activities and/or the means of controlling them," and stating that the requirement
should "extend to information indicating that agency standards or tests may be inadequate or
inappropriate") .
1 1 5 . As Michael Green has noted:
With a regulatory compliance defense available, manufacturers would no longer have an
incentive to seek labeling changes that would disclose additional risks discovered in the
post-marketing period. The impetus for such changes would be left to the FDA
. The
.

.

.

specter of inadequate resources available to the FDA makes this role reversal of
significant concern.
Green, supra note 46, at 502.
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decisionmaking, one must lose the added benefits that the tort system could
provide. In particular, eliminating litigation would deprive regulators of a
potentially useful source of information on product safety

1 16

and would repose in

the FDA and the regulated companies a level of trust that seems unwarranted in
the light of recent events . In this Part,

I

explore some structural options that could

offer a way around the dilemma. Each of the options
some

opportunity

for

persons

injured

by

I

consider would preserve

medical

products

to

obtain

compensation, and some of those options would also preserve a role for the
private plaintiffs ' bar in bringiIfg s.fety problems to light. As

I

will argue, a

system that preserves those compensatory and monitoring functions is preferable

to preemption, which would sacrifice both.

I

will compare four ways in which Congress could link litigation to

regulation. In each option described here, Congress would preempt state tort
claims and substitute a federal cause of action. On the assumption that one goal

would be to submit safety and causation questions to the FDA (or other expert
agency) for resol�tion, each of the options described here would incorporate
agency determinations of liability . A basic question in that regard is whether, in
light of the fact that key liability questions would be determined by the FDA, the
rest of the proceeding should unfold within an agency setting, or whether the suit
should be litigated in federal court with a mechanism for referring specific

questions to the FDA. I first consider two options for situating the adjudication
within the agency itself; I then outline two possible frameworks for litigation in
federal court. Finally, I compare the four options in the light of a number of
constitutional and policy considerations .
Before embarking on this comparison, I should note that my discussion
assumes that the tort system should seek to apply the same substantive standard,
and roughly the same evidentiary requirements, that the FDA employs in making
its safety determinations. This assumption is, of course, debatable; it is not
uniformly reflected in current state tort law, and it need not guide the choice of
substantive and evidentiary standards under a new federal cause of action either.
However, much of the debate over the interaction between FDA regulation and
tort liability presumes that the standards should be the same and focuses on
asserted flaws in one or the other institution ' s application of those standards . My
project is not to defend a particular choice of substantive liability rules, but rather
to examine whether structural changes could improve the application of the
chosen standard. On that premise,

I will proceed to

consider po ssible alternatives.

1 1 6. Cf id. at 482 ("Sometimes it is the tort system that uncovers instances of noncompliance
with FDA regulatory standards, rather than the FDA itself.").
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A. Agency Adjudication
One possible approach would be to situate the adjudication of product safety
claims

within the

agency itself.

Such adjudication could proceed on the

government ' s initiative ; in addition, Congress could authorize private persons to
bring claims.

1.

Agency Enforcement

In an agency enforcement model, Congress would preempt private state tort
claims and replace them with a claim by the government for penalties. The genn
of such a penalty system already exists within the framework of the FDCA.

Though the FDA ' s principal enforcement options include injunctions, civil
seizures, and criminal penalties, 1 1 7 it also has authority to seek civil penalties 1 1 8

for violations of certain laws governing prescription drugs l 1 9 and medical
12
devices. o Civil penalty proceedings begin with a complaint by the relevant
2
center within the FDA. 1 1 The respondent can request a hearing, at which it can
I 22
The presiding officer at the hearing has the power
be represented by counsel.
2
to subpoena witnesses and evidence. 1 3 Discovery is more c ircumscribed than in
civil court proceedings: Though parties can obtain discovery of documents if

they establish that the documents are "relevant to the issues before the presiding
, ] 24
to obtain permission to take depositions, they must show that the
officer, ,

1 1 7 . See Megan Hanley Baer & Whitney Moore, Federal Food and Drug Act Violations, 40
AM. CRlM. L. REv. 6 1 3 , 63 1 -3 3 (2003) (discussing criminal penalties for violations of the FDCA).

1 1 8 . In addition, at least one court has held that the FDA can bring a claim for restitution arising
from violations of the FDCA. See United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs:', Inc., 1 9 1 F.3d 750, 762
(6th Cir. 19 99) (holding that "nothing in the FDCA precludes a court sitting in equity from ordering
restitution in appropriate cases"). This view, however, is not universally shared. See id. at 76 1
(noting "a number of district court cases that determine that recalls and disgorgement are
unavailable under the FDCA"); see also Jeffrey N. Gibbs & John R. Fleder, Can FDA Seek
Restitution or Disgorgement?, 58 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 1 29, 1 47 (2003) (criticizing Universal
Management Services).
1 1 9. See 2 1 U.S.c. § 333(b)(2)-(3) (2000).
1 20. See id. § 333(f)( I )(A).
1 2 1 . See 2 1 C. F.R. § 1 7.5 (2004).
1 22. See id. §§ 1 7 .9, 1 7 . 1 5 .
1 23. See id. §§ 17. 1 9, 1 7 .27.
1 24. !d. § 17 .23 . This standard may roughly correspond to the current presumptive standard in
federal civil practice. See FED. R. Cry. P. 26(b)( 1 ) (setting general rule that "[p]arties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party"). However, in federal litigation a party may be able to obtain a court order authorizing
broader discovery. See id. (providing that "[f1or good cause, the court may order discovery of any
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information sought is not available in some other way and that "relevant and
probative evidence may otherwise not be preserved for presentation by a witness
,, 1 2 5
at the hearing.
Direct testimony at the hearing is given in writing, but cross
12
examination occurs through live testimony. 6 The evidentiary rules are more
relaxed than those applied in federal court, though the hearing officer may draw
12
upon the Federal Rules of Evidence for guidance . 7 Liability and size of penalty
12
must be proven by a prepondefan� of the evidence. 8 Either side may appeal the
hearing officer' s decision within the FDA ; findings of fact are reviewed for
12
"substantial evidence" and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. 9 A

dissatisfied respondent may then seek j udicial review of the fmal agency
1 0
decision. 3
Though

the

current

system

provides

a

starting point

for an

agency

enforcement model, it would require some adj ustment. Penalties available under
current law are directed toward deterrence but not compensation. Neither the
1
1 1
maximum allowable penalties 3 nor the factors to be considered 3 2 relate to the
extent of harm caused by a violation. The money recovered goes into the general
1
treasury, 33 not toward compensation of injured persons. If an agency
enforcement proceeding were to substitute for private civil actions, the amount of
the penalties could be keyed to the level of damages incurred by consumers , and
the proceeds could be earmarked · for distribution to injured persons. The other

matter relevant to the subj ect matter involved in the action").
1 2 5 . 2 1 C.F .R. § 1 7 .23 (2004).
1 26. See id. § 1 7 .37.
1 27. See id. § 1 7 .39.
1 28. See id. § 1 7 .33. The decisionmaker must consider aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and articulate the reasons for the chosen penalty. See id. § 1 7 .34.
1 29. See id. § 1 7 .47.
1 30. See id. § 1 7 .5 1 . Because the FDA's penalty procedure includes a public hearing, see id. §
1 7 .33(d) ("The hearing shall be open to the public unless otherwise ordered by the presiding
officer . . . . "), and results in the development of an administrative record, it appears likely that the
FDA's decision would be reviewed in federal court using the "substantial evidence" standard set
forth in 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(E) (2000). See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 40 1
U S . 402, 4 1 4 ( 1 97 1 ) ("Review under the substantial-evidence test is authorized only when the
agency action is taken pursuant to a rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure Act
itself . . . or when the agency action is based on a public adjudicatory hearing.").
1 3 1 . See 21 U S .c. § 333(b)(2)-(3), (t)( 1 )(A) (2000) (setting maximum penalties); 21 C .F.R. §
1 7 .2 (2004) (adjusting maximum penalties for inflation).
1 3 2. See, e.g. , 2 1 US.c. § 333(t)(3)(B) (2000) (with respect to penalties for medical device
violations, factors include "the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation or
violations and, with respect to the violator, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do
business, any history of prior such violations, [and] the degree of culpability").
1 3 3. See 2 1 C.F .R. § 1 7 .54 (2004).
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major change would be that the agency ' s enforcement resources would have to
be increased, as would its staffing for internal hearings .

2.

Private Enforcement

Alternatively, Congress could preempt state tort claims, and sub stitute a

system of private products liability claims that would be adjudicated within the

agency. That adj udication could employ procedures similar to those discussed in
Subsection II.A. l . above. Some differences, however, would arise from the
presence of private plaintiffs in the suit. For example, it would be necessary to
provide procedures to govern the joinder of multiple plaintiffs, either as named

parties or as members o f a plaintiff class. In non-class actions where liability was

proven, damages would be determined on an individual basis; in class actions, a
finding of liability might be fo llowed by a determination of aggregate damages
and the adoption of a set of guidelines for distributing those damages to class
members. Although a private enforcement system of this type would remove the
need for additional government enforcement resources, it would still entail a
substantial increase in the number of agency personnel staffing the hearing
process.

B. Hybrid Adjudication
Thus far, the discussion has assumed that the desirab ility of obtaining FDA
resolution of safety and causation issues would dictate that the litigation should
occur within the administrative system. An alternative, however, would be to
permit claims to proceed in federal court, but refer certain issues to the FDA for
resolution. 1 3 4 In a 1 996 article, Richard Nagareda made a similar proposal for the
treatment of mass tortS . 1 3 5 He suggested that Congress enact a scheme under

which the doctrine of "primary j urisdiction" would come into play when a
particular mass tort resulted in federal litigation that merited consolidation by the

1 34. Existing rules provide somewhat analogous mechanisms. A court can refer a matter to the
FDA for administrative determination, and if the Commissioner accepts the referral, the FDA can
employ a range of procedures to determine the referred matter. See 2 1 C.F.R. § 1 0.60 (2004). Thus,
for example, courts have referred to the FDA the question of whether a product falls within the
definition of a "new drug" under 2 1 U.S.c. § 3 2 1 (P) (2000). See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm. ,
Inc., 4 1 2 U.S. 645 , 6 5 3 ( 1 973) ("[T]he District Court' s referral o f the 'new drug' and the
'grandfather' issues to FDA was appropriate, as these are the kinds of issues peculiarly suited to
initial determination by the FDA.").
1 3 5. See Nagareda, supra note 1 5 , at 353; see also id. at 3 5 9 (stating that "the FDA would seem
to be a strong candidate for" inclusion in his proposal).

616

THE FDA AND THE TORT SYSTEM

Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 1 36
The primary jurisdiction doctrine requires a court to stay (or dismiss) an
action so as to defer to agency determination of an issue (or a claim) in
appropriate cases. 1 3 7 The rationales for deference to the agency may include a
need for uniform agency determination of an issue, 1 3 8 as well as a recognition of
superior agency expertise, particularly with respect to specialized facts within the

; Primary jurisdiction has loomed large in certain

agency' s field of experien�e�i}

areas of federal regulation; for example, the doctrine has played a prominent role

in coordinating the reach of federal antitrust lawsuits with the authority of other
federal regulatory schemes. The doctrine has not, however, yet been employed as
a way to link the mass tort and regulatory systems. Nagareda proposed that the
doctrine could be used as a way, in effect, to refer to an agency (such as the
FDA) a question (such as general causation) that would benefit from the agency ' s
decisionmaking. 1 40 The proposal I describe here i s similar to Nagareda ' s in that it
contemplates that litigation would be commenced in court but that the court
would (at an appropriate juncture) refer issues of product safety and causation to

the FDA for determination.
Discovery, in this system, would be supervised by the federal court. After
discovery, the defendant could obtain summary j udgment 1 4 1 unless the plaintiff

1 3 6. See id. at 36 1 ("The primary jurisdiction doctrine would apply only if [the] litigation . . .
progresses to the point that similar claims inundate the federal system, so many as to warrant
consolidation by the MDL Panel and to trigger the opportunity to petition the relevant regulatory
agency .").
1 37. See, e.g. , Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 ( 1 993) (stating that where a claim
"contain[s] some issue within the special competence of an administrative agency," the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction "requires the court to enable a 'referral ' to the agency, staying further
proceedings so as to give the parties reasonable opportunity to seek an administrative ruling").
1 3 8. See, e.g. , Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-4 1 ( 1 907)
(stressing need for uniform determinations concerning railroad rates). But see Great N. Ry. v.
Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 2 8 5 , 290-9 1 , 294 ( 1 922) (holding that prior resort to agency is not
necessary in order to obtain uniform determination of a pure question of law, because review by the
Supreme Court can ensure uniformity with respect to such questions).
1 39. See, e.g. , Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 ( 1 952) ("Uniformity
and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured . . . by
preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to
agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through
experience, and by more flexible procedure.").
1 40. See Nagareda, supra note 1 5, at 3 6 l .
1 4 1 . As in current federal civil litigation, a defendant moving for summary judgment would
"bear[] the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, ' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
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pointed either to evidence that the defendant violated FDA requirements or to
new information concerning product harmfulness. To survive summary judgment
on the latter ground, the plaintiff would have to show the existence of
information, material to the product' s safety, that the FDA did not consider when
it initially approved the product. That showing, or a showing of facts from which
a reasonable decisionmaker could infer that the defendant violated FDA
requirements, would entitle the plaintiff to a bench trial. 142
The trial would be segmented, because the court would refer questions of
product safety and causation to the FDA. I43 The FDA would initially submit the
questions to an advisory committee for nonbinding determination. The advisory
committee could resemble those currently employed by the FDA to assist it with
I44
new product reviews and other matters. Advisory cdmmittees can enhance the
accuracy of the FDA's decisionmaking and improve its credibility; they can also

issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7, 323 ( 1 986).

142 . Procedure under the proposed system would differ from ordinary summary judgment
procedure for two reasons : first, because the system does not contemplate a jury trial, and second,
because the system divides liability questions between the district judge and the FDA.
As to questions relegated to the district judge, a summary judgment motion might
sometimes provide an occasion for the judge to resolve the questions without taking live testimony:
When evidentiary issues are in dispute, when the credibility of witnesses may be in
issue, when conflicting evidence must be weighed, a full trial is clearly necessary
regardless of whether it is a bench or jury trial . . . . But when the question for decision
concerns drawing inferences from undisputed evidence, or interpreting and evaluating
evidence to derive legal conclusions, a trial may not add to the judge 's ability to decide.
WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL. , THE ANALYSIS AND DECISION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION S

39 ( 1 99 1 ) .
By contrast, as to questions entrusted to the FDA, it might be' appropriate for the judge to
play even less of a role in screening cases through summary judgment than the judge would
ordinarily play in a case where the right to a jury is asserted. In the context of jury trials, the judge
plays the role of gatekeeper by determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Judges may be
well suited, in comparison to juries, to serve such a function. However, as to questions that the
proposed system would relegate to the FDA, little purpose would be served by requiring the judge
rigorously to screen expert evidence for admissibility prior to sending the issues to the FDA: The
advisory committee and agency officials are better equipped to assess such evidence.
143. Some safety and causation issues might be suitable for determination by the district court
(assisted where necessary by a special master). For example, safety determinations could be
straightforward in cases involving violations of existing FDA requirements. Also, one of the
causation issues in failure-to-warn cases is whether the physician would have prescribed the
product even if the appropriate warning had been given; that issue might not require resolution by
the FDA. See infra note 332.
1 44. Such committees are governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2
§ § 1 - 1 6 (2000), as well as by FDA regulations, see 2 1 C.F.R. §§ 14. 1 -. 1 74 (2004).
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provide an opportunity for stakeholder and public input concerning important
decisions. Employing an advisory panel to assist the FDA in liability
determinations could carry similar benefits.
Panel members would be selected through a public nomination process , 145
and would include researchers with relevant scientific and medical expertise.
FDA committees can' also include members selected to represent consumer,
patient , and industry interests. The liability panel could include such stakeholder
representatives, but it would be necessary to screen carefully for conflicts of
interest and to protect against an appearance of bias. Conflicts screening would
also be key as to medical experts. 146 Although members of FDA advisory
committees are subject to federal disclosure and conflicts provisions that ban
participation by those with financial interests in the outcome, 147 the conflict can
be waived if "the official responsible for the employee's appointment . . .
certifies in writing that the need for the individual's services outweighs the
,
potential for a conflict of interest created by the financial interest involved. , 148
Critics charge that conflicts are routinely waived, even in instances where waiver
is unwarranted. 149 Because the proposed system would place significant reliance

1 45. Cj 2 1 C .F .R. § 1 4 .82 (2004) (providing nomination process for voting members of
standing advisory committees); id. § 14.84 (providing nomination process for nonvoting members
of standing technical advisory committees).
1 46. Cj Gardiner Harris & Alex Berenson, 10 Voters on Panel Backing Pain Pills Had Industry

Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005 , at A l ("Ten of the 32 government drug advisers who last week
endorsed continued marketing of . . . Celebrex, Bextra and Vioxx have consulted in recent years for
the drugs' makers, according to disclosures in medical journals and other public records."). Partly
as a result of the Bayh-Dole Act, which fostered ties between industry and academia, see ANGELL,
supra note 47, at 8 ("The Reagan years and Bayh-Dole . . . transformed the ethos of medical
schools and teaching hospitals . . . . One of the results has been a growing pro-industry bias in
medical research . . . . "), a large proportion of b iomedical researchers derive material benefits from
their relations with industry. A recent analysis found multiple studies documenting ties between
researchers and industry: " Studies suggest that 23% to 28% of academic investigators in
biomedical research receive research funding from industry. A 1 998 survey found that 43% of
investigators also receive research-related gifts . . . . Approximately one third of investigators at
academic institutions have personal financial ties with industry sponsors." Justin E. Bekelman et
aI., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 289 lAMA 454,
456 (2003).
1 47. See 1 8 U.S.c. § 208(a) (2000).
1 48. Id. § 208(b)(3); see also FDA, Policies and Procedures for Handling Conflicts ofInterest
with FDA Advisory Committee Members, Consultants, and Experts, at http ://www . fda.gov/oc/
advisory/conflictofinterestlpolicies.html (last visited Sept. 1 9, 2004).
1 49. See ANGELL, supra note 47, at 2 1 0 (stating that the FDA "regularly waives [the conflicts
rules] on the unlikely grounds that someone's advice is indispensable"). Angell cites a USA Today
study that "examined FDA hearing records in 2000 and found that 'at 92 percent of the meetings at
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on the panel process, measures should be taken to ensure that conflicts are
identified, and waivers should be granted only rai-ely and only upon a rigorous
showing of necessity.
Panel meetings would presumptively be open to the public, 150 and they could
include an opportunity for public comment. 1 5 1 The panel would consider
evidence submitted by the parties, and could request additional infonnation that it
considered necessary. The panel' s determinations would be reviewed by the
FDA, which would render the final determination concerning the safety and
causation questions. Regarding safety, the FDA would detennine whether the
product is too dangerous to remain on the market, and whether (if the product is
worth keeping on the market) it should be subjected to restrictions such as
additional safety warnings. The FDA could address questions of causation by
listing the factors and analysis that would determine whether a particular
person's injury was caused by the defect in question.
The FDA ' s determination would be sent to the district court. The judge
would review the FDA ' s safety and causation findings to ensure that they were
supported by some evidence and that the agency had complied with the
procedural requirements described above. If warranted, the district court would
then apply the FDA's causation guidance, assess damages, and enter judgment.
1 . Private Claims
Congress might attempt to use the hybrid system to adjudicate private
claims. To accomplish this, Congress would preempt state tort claims and
substitute a federal products liability claim that could be brought in federal
district court. The claim would be adjudicated using the procedures described
above.
Though this option has the advantage of being relatively uncomplicated, it
would be vulnerable to constitutional challenge (as I explain in Subsection
II.C. l .c below). Thus, it is worthwhile to consider whether a constitutionally
permissible alternative exists.

least one member had a financial conflict of interest, ' and 'at 55 percent of meetings, half or more
of the FDA advisers had conflicts of interest. '" Id. (quoting Dennis Cauchon, FDA Advisors Tied to

Industry, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 2000, at A I ).
1 5 0. Cf Federal Advisory Committee Act, S U.S.C. app . 2 § 1 0 (2000) (setting presumption of
openness); 2 1 C.F.R. § 1 4.20 (2004) (providing for public notice of advisory committee meetings);
id. § 1 4.22 (providing for public access to the open portion of advisory committee meetings).
Portions of the meetings could be closed as necessary. Cf id. § 1 4.25 (providing for closed
presentation of data and closed deliberations under certain circumstances).
1 5 1 . Cf id. § 1 4 .29 (providing opportunity for public comment at committee meetings).
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Qui Tam Claims

Qui tam claims on behalf of the government could provide another way to
harness litigation as a supplement to the regulatory process. Under such a system,
state tort claims would be preempted but the United States would possess a
parens patriae claim for harms to consumers. A qui tam mechanism would
permit such claims to be initiated and litigated by a private person, subject to
152
federal supervision and review. A portion of the defendant' s damages payment
would provide a bounty for the qui tam relator and the rest would fund an
administrative compensation scheme for victims.
Congress can authorize the United States to sue as parens patriae to recover
damages for injuries arising from a company's violations of federal law. 153
Parens patriae suits are an appropriate way for a government to protect the
health and welfare of its citizens, 154 and suits concerning the safety of FDA-

1 52 . Readers familiar with Jonathan Siegel 's discussions of qui tam suits and state sovereign
immunity will see that I am borrowing from him the notion of qui tam suits in parens patriae. See
Jonathan R. Siegel, Congress 's Power To Authorize Suits Against States, 68 GEO. WASH. L . REv.
44 ( 1 999) [hereinafter Siegel, Suits Against States]; Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of
Congress 's Power To Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 7 3 TEX. L . REv. 539 ( 1 995').
The qui tam device came into use in English law long before the founding of the United
States. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rei. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774-75
(2000). The first Congress under the Constitution adopted the device, and since then various
American statutes have employed it; the most prominent current example is the False Claims Act.

See id. at 768 & n. 1 , 776.
Some have proposed the extension of the qui tam mechanism to provide for enforcement of
federal regulatory requirements in areas such as medical product regulation or environmental law.
See, e.g. , Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REv. 939, 940 (2002)
(arguing that "the [False Claims Act's] private justice model should be expanded to two areas:
protection of financial markets and protection of the environment"); McGarity, supra note 44, at
5 80 (suggesting that a "statute, modeled on the [False Claims Act], creating a federal private right
of action for damages caused by wrongful manipulation of a licensing regime administered by a
federal agency" could help to address "situations in which companies make false claims to a federal
agency about the safety and efficacy of their regulated products"). However, such discussions have
not proposed a hybrid adjudicatory scheme such as the one outlined here.
1 5 3. See Siegel, Suits Against States, supra note 1 52, at 69. As Siegel notes, " [a] statute
authorizing the federal government to espouse private claims . . . may give the government the right
to collect any sums that the defendant would have had to pay in a suit brought by the injured
private party." Id. (noting as an example that the Fair Labor Standards Act "empowers the
Secretary of Labor to bring suit against any employer who has violated the Act and to distribute
any sums recovered to affected employees").
1 54. " [A] State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being-both physical and
economic--of its residents in general." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex reI. Barez,
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regulated products clearly implicate the federal government' s interest in
consumer welfare. lss
The parens patriae model is often thought to be particularly appropriate for
harms that affect a substantial portion of the population. This is likely to be true
of many medical products liability claims. Especially in light of the speed with
which new medical products spread through the market, a safety problem with
such a product is likely to create a large number of claimants . In particular,
claims concerning pharmaceuticals will ordinarily involve large numbers of
potential claimants, because harms to only a handful of people will not be
amenable to proof. (A manufacturing defect might cause isolated injuries; but
manufacturing defects are unusual in the field of pharmaceuticals, if not in the
I
area of devices.) S6
Moreover, though most parens patriae actions allege harm to large numbers
of citizens , arguably the real touchstone should be, not the number of persons
already harmed, but the degree of government interest in regulating the
challenged conduct. As the Court explained with respect to a parens patriae
action by Puerto Rico, one factor "in determining whether an alleged injury to the
health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as
parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely
attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers." I S7 The FDA has a
clear interest in addressing product safety problems before those problems harm
large numbers of people. Allowing parens patriae claims of the type posited here
would further that mission, even if the group of people who have so far suffered
harm is a small one.
Parens patriae actions, then, could usefully enforce medical product safety
standards and obtain damages for harm to consumers. However, the United
States' litigation resources are limited, and as discussed above , the government
will not always discern safety problems quickly. To address these lssues,

458 U.S. 592, 607 ( 1 982); see also Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Champion for Fourteenth
Amendment Rights: The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 1 1 , 1 42 ( 1 997)
(discussing Snapp).
1 5 5 . Cj Nagareda, supra note 1 5 , at 327-28 (noting that mass torts are not "purely private
disputes" and that they "more closely resemble the issues of broad public concern that constitute
the daily business of the administrative state").
1 56. See RISK MANAGEMENT REpORT, supra note 23, at 8 ("Injury from product defects is
unusual in the United States because of the great attention paid to product quality control and
quality assurance during manufacturing.").
1 57. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607 (noting that " [a]lthough more must be alleged than
injury to an identifiable group of individual residents, the indirect effects of the injury must be
considered as well in determining whether the State has alleged injury to a sufficiently substantial
segment of its population").
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Congress could authorize private persons to bring the parens patriae suit on
behalf of the United States.
This proposal is modeled loosely on the qui tam provisions in the False
Claims Act, 158 although the specific features of the qui tam suit proposed here
would be set by the statute authorizing the new system. The qu i tam mechanism
permits a private person (the "relator") to sue to recover damages for harm to the
United States; in return, a successful qui tam relator receives a cut of the
damages recovered. The primary justifications for the use of the qui tam
mechanism under the False Claims Act apply in the present context as well. In at
least some instances, the best evidence concerning an unsafe product will be
known only to company insiders; but those insiders often will not come forward
without a monetary incentive. 1 59 As noted, the federal government's limited
resources prevent it from pursuing all potentially valid claims. 16o Moreover, in
some instances an agency might fail to pursue a claim because of undue
1
influence from the regulated industry. 61 Allowing private litigants to press
claims on behalf of the government could address these concerns.
Congress could authorize the assertion of qui tam claims when a medical
product had harmed consumers. An injured consumer could bring the suit; so
could a person-such as a company insider-who possesses significant
nonpublic information that supports the claim. 162 At the outset of the suit, the
government would have an opportunity to review the relevant info imation and

1 5 8 . That Act imposes treble damages and civil penalties upon persons who submit false
monetary claims to the federal government. See 3 1 U.S.c. § 3729(a) (2000). Suits under the Act
can be brought either by the Attorney General or by a private person "in the name of the
Government." ld. § 3730(a)-(b). The Act's growing use against asserted health care fraud has
engendered controversy. See, e.g. , Joan H. Krause, "Promises To Keep ": Health Care Providers
and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1 363 (2002).
1 5 9. Cj Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 34 1 , 350
( 1 989) (noting, with respect to the False Claims Act, that "detecting fraud against the Federal
treasury often is extremely difficult for the government without the aid of ' informers, '" in part
"because often the only persons who know about frauds are associated with the perpetrators . . . and
are therefore reluctant to notify the authorities").
1 60. Cj id. at 350-5 1 ("[G]iven the 'harsh reality of today's funding limitations of . . . the
budgets of the government's prosecuting agencies,' public officials often cannot commit the time
and resources necessary for the successful prosecution of fraud even when they have already
somehow managed to detect it.").
1 6 1 . Cj id. at 3 5 1 (noting with respect to the False Claims Act that "[g]overnment agencies may
be sufficiently dependent upon (or co-opted by) specific players in the military-industrial complex
that the desire to prosecute wrongdoers diligently is compromised").
1 62. There would be no Article III standing bar to such a claim. See infra notes 269-270 and
accompanying text.
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decide whether to pursue the action on its own behalf, either through litigation or
an administrative proceeding. 163 As discussed below, this early review not only
would provide the government with early input on the suit, it also would alert the
FDA to the possible existence of a safety problem. Even if the government
decided not to press the civil claim, this early warning could spur other
investigative action within the FDA.
If the government did not take over the case, it would still retain some
supervisory control. It could require the relator to provide it with copies of
pleadings and with relevant information gained through discovery. 1 64 If it
changed its decision later in the litigation, it could seek to intervene at that
point. 165 The government could obtain dismissal of the suit over the qui tam
relator' s obj ection by establishing good cause for the dismissal (as in the case of
a demonstrably frivolous claim).
This distribution of power over the prosecution of the suit would balance
two competing concerns. On one hand, the value of the qui tam system comes
from the opportunity for a private party to press a qui tam claim despite
government inaction. Such inaction may sometimes arise from an agency's
unwillingness to press a claim that would reveal evidence of prior agency errors
or that would disadvantage an influential company. In the light of these concerns,
it would be desirable to place some constraints on the government' s ability to
secure dismissal of the suit over the relator' s objection. On the other hand, it is
possible that if the government's ability to obtain dismissal of the suit were too
constrained, courts might find that the mechanism offended separation of powers
principles. 166 If a requirement that the government show good cause for the

1 63 . The False Claims Act requires the relator to provide the United States with "[a] copy of the
complaint and written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person
possesses." 3 1 U.S.c. § 373 0(b)(2) (2000). The United States then has at least sixty days to decide
whether to take over the action. See id. § 3730(b)(2)-(3). The government can press the claim either
in the civil suit, see id. § 3730(b)(4)(A), or in an administrative proceeding, see id. § 3 73 0(c)(5).
1 64. Cf id. § 3730(c)(3) ("If the Government so requests, it shall be served with copies of all
pleadings filed in the action and shall be supplied with copies of all deposition transcripts (at the
Government' s expense). ") .
1 65 . Cf id. ("When a person proceeds with the action, the court, without limiting the status and
rights of the person initiating the action, may nevertheless permit the Government to intervene at a
later date upon a showing of good cause.").
1 66. See infra notes 275-279 and accompanying text. Constraints on the government's ability to
control the suit might raise separation of powers questions, but should not raise any other
constitutional problems. As discussed below, the standing of a qui tam relator to press the claim is
supported by the notion that the government has assigned a part of its injury to the qui tam relator.

See infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text. The strength of that rationale would not vary
depending on the degree of government control of the suit, because the degree of government
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dismissal were deemed to impinge improperly on the executive branch' s
authority, the standard could b e changed to permit dismissal at the government's
behest for any rational governmental reason. 1 67
A successful relator would be paid a share of any damages recovery or
settlement (but the relator would receive nothing if the defendant prevailed). The
relator' s share would vary depending on the degree of the relator' s participation
and the extent to which information provided by the relator played a role in the
recovery. 16 8 The statute could also require a losing defendant to pay the relator's
reasonable expenses, including attorney' s fees. 169 The terms of judgments and
control would not alter the existence of a cognizable inj ury. Indeed, if anything, a qui tam relator's
eagerness to press a claim (despite government skepticism) indicates that the relator is the sort of
litigant who will litigate the claim zealously, which would subserve the presentation of the merits.
Nor would it be persuasive to suggest that the degree of government control over the suit should
affect the question of whether there is a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on the claim; the
absence o f government control over the suit would not create a right to a jury trial where none
would otherwise exist.
1 67 . The latter standard would parallel court interpretations of the False Claims Act, under
which the government can "cause the action to be dismissed for any rational governmental reason,
notwithstanding the qui tam plaintiff s desire that it continue ." United States ex ref. Stevens v. Vt.
Agency of Natural Res . , 1 62 F.3d 1 95 , 202-03 (2d Cir. 1 998), rev 'd on other grounds, 529 U . S .
7 6 5 (2000).
1 68. In False Claims Act cases taken over by the government, the relator can only receive up to
ten percent of the proceeds if the action was "based primarily" on information that was in the
public record, but otherwise receives from fifteen to twenty-five percent, "depending upon the
extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action." 3 1 U.S.C. §
3730(d)( 1 ) (2000). In cases that the government decides not to take over, the relator receives from
twenty-five to thirty percent of the proceeds. See id. § 3730(d)(2).
Some provision would need to be made for cases in which the relator had worked for the
defendant. Cj id. § 3730(d)(3) ("[I]f [the relator] planned and initiated the violation . . . the court
may, to the extent the court considers appropriate, reduce the [relator's] share of the proceeds . . . ,
taking into account the role of that person in advancing the case to litigation and any relevant
circumstances pertaining to the violation"). On the one hand, current and former employees may
have key information concerning product safety, and the scheme should provide an incentive to
bring that information forward. Cj, e.g. , United States ex ref. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No . Civ.
A.96- 1 1 65 1 -PBS, 2003 WL 22048255, at * 1 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003) (False Claims Act case in
which relator alleged that his former employer "promoted the drug Neurontin for uses not approved
by the Food and Drug Administration"). On the other, it would be unseemly to award a substantial
portion of the damages to a person who had been responsible for the safety problem in the first
place.
If the relator were one of those injured by the product, she would also receive a share of the
damages distributed to injured claimants. See infra notes 1 76- 1 7 8 and accompanying text.
1 69. Cj 3 1 U.S.c. § 3730(d)(1 )-(2) (2000). The False Claims Act provides that if the
government does not take over the case and if the defendant wins, the court "may" require the
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settlements in qui tam actions would be a matter of public record. 170
Under the system sketched here, there might sometimes be competItIOn
among would-be relators and their counsel. The False Claims Act' s qui tam
system accords relator status to the first person or persons · to file a particular qu i
tam claim, and excludes later qui tam suits concerning the same facts. 1 7 1 The
first-to-file rule may make sense in the area of false claims, where the value
l72
added by the relator may lie primarily in the initial disclosure of the fraud. But
when the qui tam suit will settle the question of a product's safety-and the
discovery and trial process may call for significant expertise-some safeguards
should be imposed to ensure that the lawyers litigating the claim are experienced
and competent.
Thus, a modified first-to-file rule could be employed: If more than one qui
tam suit concerning the same facts is filed within a short time period, the actions
could be consolidated in one district court, and the court could select an
appropriate relator (or set of joint relators) and suitable counsel. 173 In evaluating

relator to pay the defendant' s reasonable attorney fees, if the action was "clearly frivolous, clearly
vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of harassment." [d. § 3 730(d)(4).
1 70. As discussed below, defendants may seek confidentiality when settling private lawsuits.
See infra notes 35 1 -353 and accompanying text. Secret settlements of parens patriae claims,
however; would be inappropriate: In suits on behalf of the government, there is a legitimate public
interest in the terms of a settlement. Accordingly, the opt-in system would require that the terms of
settlements be public. For an explanation of the opt-in mechanism, see Section lILA below.
Such a requirement would not necessarily present a significant downside for defendants.
The main reason why secret settlements appeal to defendants is that secrecy deprives other
potential plaintiffs of useful information. Within the opt-in system, however, the likelihood of
follow-on claims would be significantly reduced, because. the claims of all existing claimants would
be resolved in the settlement. Although publication of the terms of a settlement might generate
adverse pUblicity and affect sales, it would not have a direct impact on the liability of a company
within the opt-in system.
1 7 1 . See 3 1 U.S.c. § 3730(b)(5) (2000) ("When a person brings an action under this subsection,
no person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts
underlying the pending action."); see also JOHN E. CLARK, ETHICS ISSUES IN QUI TAM LITIGATION:
SOME THOUGHTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A RELATOR'S COUNSEL, (A.B.A.. Ctr. for Continuing
Legal Educ ., Nat ' l Inst., N02CFCB ABA-LGLED I- I , 200 1 ) ("It is not unusual for two or more
individuals who share knowledge about a prospective defendant's actions-typically because they
are co-workers-to join forces and seek to pursue a qui tam action j ointly.'}
1 72. See United States ex reI. LaCorte v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc. , 1 49 F.3d
227, 234 (3d Cir. 1 998) ("[C]laimants alleging the same material facts as prior relators should not
share in a qui tam award, because their allegations are unlikely to increase the total recovery.").
1 73. In some instances, would-be relators might include both an insider with information about
the product and one or more persons injured by the product. The court would then face the task of
selecting relators from among those persons. According relator status to a company whistleblower
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proposed counsel for the relator, the court should consider, among other things,
any work the lawyer has done to develop the potential claim, the lawyer' s
experience in relevant areas of product liability litigation, and the resources the
lawyer can bring to the representation. 174 The selection of a relator and of the
relator' s attorney could be decoupled if necessary: For example, an industry
insider who brought significant nonpublic information to the table, but who was
represented by inexperienced counsel, could be directed to seek more
experienced representation in order to be allowed to proceed as the qui tam
relator. 175
If, upon referral, the FDA found a safety problem, the district court would

would serve the goal of encouraging those with relevant information to come forward; on the other
hand, according relator status to one or more injured claimants would help to ensure that the
claimants' perspective is presented in the litigation. In at least some cases, the optimal choice
would be to appoint multiple persons to act jointly as relators.
1 74. When appointing counsel in a federal class action:
[T]he court . . . must consider:

•

the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in
the action,
counsel ' s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and
claims of the type asserted in the action,
counsel's knowledge of the applicable law, and

•

the resources counsel will commit to representing the class.

•

•

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1 )(C). The court may also consider other relevant factors. See id.
1 7 5 . The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1 995 (PSLRA) provides a precedent for
such "decoupling." In federal securities fraud class actions, the PSLRA directs the court to "appoint
as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to
be most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members ( . . . the 'most adequate
plaintiff)." 1 5 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000). In tum "[t]he most adequate plaintiff shall,
,

subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class." Id. § 78u4(a)(3)(B)(v). This provision, by "permit[ting] the plaintiff to choose counsel rather than have
counsel choose the plaintiff," S .

REp.

No. 1 04-98, at 1 1 ( 1 995), reprinted in 1 995 U.S.C.C .A.N.

679, was designed to lessen the influence wielded by plaintiffs ' class action lawyers. And while the
provision puts the initial choice of counsel in the hands of the "most adequate plaintiff'-an entity
that will frequently

tum

out to be a large institutional investor-the statute preserves authority in

the court "to approve or disapprove the lead plaintiff s choice of counsel when necessary to protect
the interests of the plaintiff class." Id. at 1 2 . The PSLRA has generated debate over the extent to
which the court should override the lead plaintiffs preference concerning counsel. See, e.g. , Third
Circuit Task Force Report on the Selection of Class Counsel, 208 F . R.D. 340, 345 (2002) ("The
Act raises a number of questions, including the degree to which a court should defer to the lead
plaintiff s choice of counsel and whether a court-sponsored auction is permissible in securities class
actions ."). But it seems clear that in at least some cases the PSLRA will decouple the choice of
plaintiff from the choice of counsel.
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proceed to apply the FDA's guidance on causation in order to detennine or
estimate the number of persons injured by the product. The amount of
compensatory damages would depend on the number, type, and severity of
injuries. Often, damages determinations could be made on the basis of
individualized evidence; however, in the case of a product that harmed huge
numbers of people, the court might use statistical methods to set damages
amounts. 176 In detennining appropriate damages, the court would also take into
account factors relating to the defendant' s culpability, including an assessment of
the time when the safety issue first became known or knowable , and whether the
company was proactive in discerning and addressing the issue. l77
After determining damages, the court would enter judgment. The proceeds
of the judgment would go into a compensation fund, which would be distributed
by a special master to claimants based upon their exposure and injury. 178
Because the parens patriae suit would assert the government's interest in
obtaining redress on behalf of all those currently injured by a product, the
judgment would determine the question of the company's liability with respect to
current injuries. The judgment's finality, however, would be subject to two major
limitations.
One limitation concerns "exposure-only" claimants-those persons who
have used a product, but who have not yet shown signs of injury. The court's
assessment of damages might include a component designed to cover the cost of
compensation for claimants whose latent injuries only manifest themselves after
judgment. However, if it turned out that the class of persons with latent injuries
was larger than the court had anticipated, the government should be able to
reopen the judgment to seek additional compensatory relief.
The other limitation concerns cases in which the FDA detennines either that
the product is safe or that causation is absent. Such a determination will result in

1 76. A number of commentators have discussed the possibility of detennining damages on an
aggregate basis in mass tort cases. See, e.g. , Michael J. Saks & Peter David B lanck, Justice
Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits ofAggregation and Sampling in the Trial ofMass Torts, 44
STAN. L. REv. 8 1 5 ( 1 992); Richard A. Nagareda, Turningfrom Tort to Administration , 94 MICH. L.
REv. 899, 9 1 7 ( 1 996).

1 77 . Subsection III.A.2 discusses in more detail the factors relevant to the damages
detennination. See infra text accompanying notes 323-333.
1 78. The details of the fund's administration would depend on a number of factors. In cases
where the district court' s damages calculations were based on individualized assessments of
damages, the fund administrator would apply those individualized assessments in distributing
payments to claimants. In cases where aggregate damages calculations were employed by the
district court, the fund administrator would need to require some showing from each claimant
concerning exposure to the product and degree of injury; the administrator could then employ a
schedule or matrix to set the award for each claimant.
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a judgment in favor of the defendant, and ordinarily that should be the end of the
matter. However, in some instances, advances in science and research may
uncover evidence concerning safety and causation that was unavailable at the
time of the initial qui tam action, and such evidence may provide the quantum of
proof that was lacking during the first proceeding. In those instances, the
government (or, in appropriate circumstances, a qui tam relator) should be able to
seek to reopen the judgment and relitigate the question of safety and causation.
However, the standard for reopening the judgment would have to be fairly
demanding-both for practical reasons and because of constitutional concerns. 1 79
C.

Comparing the Options

In this Section, I will compare the options described above along various
dimensions. Constitutional constraints impose some limits on the range of
structural options among which policymakers may choose. Thus, I first consider
whether each of the options detailed above is constitutionally permissible. It
seems likely that the system of hybrid adjudication for private tort claims would
face a Seventh Amendment barrier, but that the other three options could
comport with the Constitution. I next compare the remaining three options
government enforcement within an agency setting, private intra-agency
enforcement, and qui tam claims-by considering their likely effects pn the cost
and speed of litigation, the skill and zeal with which claims would be presented,
and the expertise and neutrality of the decisionmaker. I argue that qui tam
enforcement may be the most desirable, because it harnesses the skills of the
private bar, and it provides the protections of an independent, generalist judicial
decisionmaker.
1 79. David Shapiro has noted:
[T]he need to recognize the finality of judgments-their immunity from reopening or
nullification at the hands of the executive or legislature (as well as the oft-repeated
canon that the courts do not sit to render "advisory opinions") is fundamental to the
status of the federal courts under Article III of the Constitution . . . .

DA VID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS

1 4 (200 1 ). The contours of

this constraint are uncertain because "[t]he Supreme Court has seldom had to consider how much
res judicata effect is necessary." RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL. , HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 05 (5th ed. 2003). It seems clear, however, that some

latitude to reopen judgments is permissible. In civil actions, a federal court has discretion to grant
relief from a judgment on the ground of "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial," if the relief is sought within a year after
entry of judgment. FED. R. ClY. P . 60(b)(2). Although the system described in the text would be
more lenient than Rule 60(b )(2) in at least some respects-for example, it would not include the
one-year time limitation-it could presumably be designed so that the judgment in the initial suit
would have enough finality to comport with Article III.
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Constitutional Constraints

To the modem eye, regulation and litigation overlap. It is thus tempting to
consider

the

various

configurations-administrative

adjudication,

court

adjudication, hybrid adjudication-from a purely functional perspective. The
choice of structure, however, can have constitutional implications as well . In this
Subsection, I review constitutional issues posed by each of the four schemes
I80
sketched
above.
The
internal-agency-enforcement
model
is
clearly
constitutional.
constitutional

The
as

private-enforcementlagency-adj udication

well.

Qui tam

claims

in

the

hybrid

model

system

may
also

be

pass

constitutional scrutiny. Private claims in the hybrid system are questionable,
however, because plaintiffs would likely have a S eventh Amendment right to a
jury, and the referral of safety and causation issues to the FDA would likely
violate that right.
It

is

useful ,

at the outset, to review the concerns that underlie

the

requirements set by Article III and the Seventh Amendment. Article III serves
structural values : The requirement that many types of disputes be adj udicated by
life-tenured, salary-protected j udges maintains the function of the Article TIl
courts and prevents the other two branches from aggrandizing themselves at the
181
In addition, Article III protects the litigant' s right t o a
expense of the judiciary.
I 82
fair, independent tribunal.
The Seventh Amendment protects individual rights
by ensuring that disputes within its scope can be heard by juries, which can
provide an independent check on government decisionmaking . The Court has

1 80. The schemes discussed here would operate prospectively: Companies could choose to opt
in when submitting new products for FDA review, see infra Section IILA. Thus, the proposals
considered in this Subsection would not apply to products already on the market, and thus would
not affect any vested legal rights. The preemption of potential state tort claims therefore would not
violate due process. See Olivia A. Radin, Note, Rights as Property, 1 04 COLUM. L. REV. 1 3 1 5 ,

1 3 28 (2004) ("The Supreme Court [has] found that laws that affect future actions do not implicate a
property interest.").

1 8 1 . As the Court has explained:
Article III, § 1, safeguards the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by
barring congressional attempts 'to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for
the purpose of emasculating' constitutional courts, National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co.,
337 U.S. 582, 644 . . . ( 1 949) (Vinson, c.J., dissenting), and thereby preventing 'the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.' Buckley v.
Va1eo, 424 U.S. 1 , 1 22 . . . ( 1 976) (per curiam).
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 , 850 ( 1 986).

1 82. See id. at 848 ("Article III, § l 's guarantee of an independent and impartial adjudication by
the federal judiciary of matters within the judicial power of the United States . . . serves to protect
primarily personal, rather than structural, interests.").
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been_protective of Seventh Amendment rights within the court system,

1 83

but has

permitted Congress some latitude to render that Amendment inapplicable by
1 84
assigning disputes to agencies instead of courts.

a) Internal Agency Enforcement
The

intemal-agency-enforcement

scheme

is

standard

fare

in

the

administrative state . "Congress has often created new statutory obligations,
provided for civil penalties for their violation, and committed exclusively to an
administrative agency the function of deciding whether a violation has in fact
1 85
occurred.,,
Such an arrangement comports with Article III because government
enforcement of civil penalties for violation of an administrative scheme falls
within the traditional core of "public rights" cases that can be committed to non
1 86
(or, by extension, to administrative agencies with limited
Article III tribunals
I 87
review in Article III courts ) . And though a civil penalty defendant would have
88
no such right
a right to a j ury if the action took place in an Article III COurt, 1
89
attaches when the penalty proceeding unfolds within an administrative agency. 1

1 83. See infra note 240.
1 84. See infra note 239.
1 8 5 . Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm 'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450
( 1 977).
1 8 6. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-69 ( 1 982)
(plurality opinion) (describing the requirement of Article III adjudication, and listing exceptions
concerning territorial courts, courts-martial, and cases involving "public rights"). Although the
Court has since held that the "public rights" category includes some disputes to which the
government is not a party, see Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586
( 1 985) ("Insofar as appellees interpret [prior cases] as establishing that the right to an Article III
forum is absolute unless the Federal Government is a party of record, we cannot agree."), cases
brought by or against the government continue to fall within the core of the "public rights"
doctrine.
1 87. See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67 n . l 8 (plurality opinion) ("Congress' power to create
legislative courts to adjudicate public rights carries with it the lesser power to create administrative
agencies for the same purpose, and to provide for review of those agency decisions in Art. III
courts. ").
1 88. See Tull v. United States, 48 1 U.S. 4 1 2, 420 ( 1 987) (stating that an action for civil
penalties under Clean Water Act "is clearly analogous to the 1 8th-century action in debt, and
federal courts have rightly assumed that the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial").
1 89. As the Atlas Roofing Court explained:
[W]hen Congress creates new statutory 'public rights, ' it may assign their adjudication
to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without
violating the Seventh Amendment' s injunction that jury trial is to be 'preserved' in
' suits at common law.' . . . This is the case even if the Seventh Amendment would have
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b) Private Intra-Agency Enforcement
The constitutionality of the private intra-agency enforcement proceeding
would depend on whether the rationales described · above, with respect to
government enforcement, could extend to private claims in the context of the
FDA regulatory scheme. Taken together, two cases Tho mas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Products CO 190 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 1 9 1
suggest that the scheme could be permissible. But because both of these cases are
distinguishable from the FDA products liability proposal, the proposal 's
constitutionality is not entirely free from doubt.
In Thomas the Court held that the "public rights" doctrine extends to some
disputes between private parties. Thomas concerned a pesticide maker' s right to
compensation when its data were used to facilitate regulatory approval (under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")) of a
competitor's similar pesticide. 192 Disagreements between pesticide makers over
the appropriate amount of compensation were sent to binding arbitration, with
very limited federal court review. 193 In rejecting a participant' s Article III
challenge to the scheme, the Court held that the pesticide maker's right to
compensation was "not a purely 'private' right," because it had "many of the
,,
characteristics of a 'public' right. 194 In particular, the use of the pesticide data
played "an integral part" in "a complex regulatory scheme" to protect public
health. 195
Private intra-agency enforcement of claims for violation of FDA
requirements would arguably fall within the Thomas Court' s statement that
"Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional
powers under Article I , may create a seemingly 'private ' right that is so closely
integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for
-

_

.

required a jury where the adj udication of those rights is assigned instead to a federal
court of law instead of an administrative agency.
Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 455. For a critique of this distinction, see Ellen E. Sward, Legislative

Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1 037, 1 1 40 ( 1 999) ("To allow
Congress to avoid the Seventh Amendment by assigning adj udication of certain matters otherwise
meeting the constitutional test for the Seventh Amendment to non-Article III courts is tantamount
to informally amending the Constitution to limit the reach of the Seventh Amendment.") .
1 90. 473 U.S. 568 ( 1 985).
1 9 1 . 3 0 1 U.S. 1 ( 1 937).
1 92. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 5 7 1 -73 .
1 93. See id. at 573-74 ("The arbitrator's decision is subj ect to judicial review only for 'fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct. "').
1 94. Id. at 589.
1 95. Id.
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,
. agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary. , 1 96 As in
Thomas, the private claims adjudication would play an integral role in the FDA ' s
regulatory scheme: Private claims would help to enforce FDA requirements,
would provide infonnation to assist the FDA in its regulatory role, and would
result in compensation for those injured by safety problems.
However, some key differences could limit the application of Thomas'
holding to the scheme described here. The Thomas Court emphasized that those
involved in FIFRA's compensation scheme were "voluntary participants in the
program." 1 97 As explained below, 1 98 potential defendants in the FDA
enforcement scheme could validly consent to the system in advance. However,
the claimants in the private enforcement scheme would be people injured by
medical products; those claimants would not have meaningfully consented to the
use of the non-Article III system. 1 99
In Thomas, the Court also found it significant that the rights at issue were
federal rights that did not "depend on or replace a right to . . . compensation
,
under state law. , 2 0o In the FDA enforcement scheme, although the claim would
arise under federal law, it would substantially resemble (and supplant) state tort
claims for products liability. To the extent that federal rights that displace similar
state common law causes of action fall closer to the core of Article III
concems, 20 1 this difference might cut against extending Thomas to the FDA
1 96. Id. at 593-94.
1 97. Id. at 589; see also id. at 592 ("[U]nder FIFRA, the only potential object of judicial
enforcement power is the follow-on registrant who explicitly consents to have his rights determined
by arbitration.") .
1 98. See infra Section lILA (discussing opt-in mechanism); see also infra note 268.
1 99. Perhaps it could be argued that by using a medical product (labeled with an announcement
of the administrative compensation scheme) one consents in advance to the use of the non-court,
non-jury proceeding. However, there are serious questions as to the practicality and fairness of such
a position. Cf Sage, supra note 46, at 990 (noting, with respect to treatment decisions involving
drugs, that "[m]any consumers are under physical and emotional burdens that may preclude true
freedom of choice").
200. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584.
20 1 . As the Thomas Court explained:
In assessing the degree of judicial involvement required by Article III in this case, we
note that the statute considered in Crowell [v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 ( 1 932)] is different
from FIFRA in significant respects. Most importantly, the statute in Crowell displaced a
traditional cause of action and affected a pre-existing relationship based on a common
law contract for hire. Thus it clearly fell within the range of matters reserved to Article
III courts under the holding of Northern Pipeline. See 458 U.S., at 70-7 1 n.25 (plurality
opinion) (noting that matters subject to a "suit at common law or in equity or admiralty"
are at "protected core" of Article III judicial powers); id. , at 90 (opinion concurring in
jUdgment) (noting that state law contract actions are "the stuff of the traditional actions
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enforcement scheme.
This is not to say that claims replacing state-law causes of action can never
be assigned to agencies for adjudication. CFTC v. Scho?02 demonstrates that
even state-law claims can be heard by federal agencies in some circumstances.
Schor addressed a scheme whereby customers injured by a commodity broker' s
violation o f federal law could seek reparations in a · proceeding before the
,,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC ). 2 03 CFTC regulations
permitted a broker to assert factually related counterclaims in the reparations
4
proceeding. 2 0 Although such counterclaims were state law claims "of the kind
,
assumed to be at the 'core ' of matters normally reserved to Article III COurtS,, 2 05
the Court upheld the scheme.
The Schor Court relied upon two factors that could apply with equal strength
to the FDA scheme. First , the Court emphasized that the CFTC ' s jurisdiction
over state-law counterclaims was necessary to the success of the regulatory
scheme. 20 6 If, as I have argued, private enforcement is a necessary supplement to
FDA regulation, then the claim of regulatory necessity could similarly support
the permissibility of the FDA adjudicatory scheme. Second, the Court noted that
the CFTC 's jurisdiction was limited to a particular field-claims concerning
violations of federal commodities laws, plus factually related claims-rather than
extending to all sorts of state-law claims. 2 07 Likewise , the FDA enforcement
scheme would only concern claims regarding inj ury from certain FDA-regulated
products.
However, Schor, even more than Thomas, turned upon the notion of
S
consent.2 0 Schor stands for the proposition that the assignment of a private-rights

at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1 7 89").

Thomas , 473 U.S. at 587.
202 . 478 U.S. 833 ( 1 986).
203. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 836.
204. See id. at 837.
205. Id. at 853.
206. See id. a t 856 ("It was only to ensure the effectiveness o f [the reparations] scheme that
Congress authorized the CFTC to assert jurisdiction over common law counterclaims. Indeed . . .
absent the CFTC ' s exercise of that authority, the purposes of the reparations procedure would have
been confounded.").
207. See id. at 852-53 ("The CFTC . . . deals only with a. 'particularized area of law,'
whereas the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts found unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline
extended to broadly ' all civil proceedings arising under title 1 1 or arising in or related to cases
under title 1 1 . , (citation omitted» .
208. As the Court emphasized:
Schor indisputably waived any right he may have possessed to the full trial of Conti ' s
counterclaim before an Article III court. Schor expressly demanded that Conti proceed
.

,,
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dispute to a non-Article III tribunal need not offend structural Article III
concerns, so long as Schor' s balancing test is met. 2 0 9 But since the litigant in
Schor had consented to submit the claim to the CFTC, the holding in Schor did
not extend to cases in which no such waiver had occurred. In a subsequent case,
2
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 10 the Court held that in the absence of litigant
consent, a private-rights claim that would carry a jury right if litigated in federal
court is not assignable to a non-Article III tribunal for juryless adjudication. 2 1 I
The Granfinanciera Court explicitly equated the scope of the Seventh
Amendment constraint with that of the Article III constraint. 2 1 2 Thus, though
Schor indicates that private-rights disputes may be assigned to non-Article III
tribunals when the litigants consent, Granfinanciera indicates that absent litigant
consent, a case must fall within the public-rights category (or another traditional
exceptioni 13 in order to be validly assigned to a non-Article III tribuna1. 2 1 4
In that respect, Jones & Laughlin Steel may provide more support for the
private intra-agency enforcement scheme , because it did not involve litigant
consent. Assuming that Jones & Laughlin Steel's holding concerning the
appropriateness of agency adjudication is still good law-a fair assumption,

on its counterclaim in the reparations proceeding rather than before the District Court,
and was content to have the entire dispute settled in the forum he had selectecf until the
ALl ruled against him on all counts; it was only after the ALl rendered a decision to
which he objected that Schor raised any challenge to the CFTC 's consideration of
Conti 's counterclaim.
Jd. at 849 (citation omitted).
209. See id. at 8 5 1 (explaining that factors to be weighed include the degree to which the
.
"' essential attributes of judicial power' are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent
to which the non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested
only in Article III courts"; "the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated"; and
Congress 's reasons for "depart[ing] from the requirements of Article III").
2 1 0. 492 U.S. 33 ( 1 989).
2 1 1 . See id. at 53-54.
2 1 2. See id.
2 1 3 . In addition to the public rights doctrine, traditional exceptions that justify assignment of a
matter to a non-Article III tribunal include matters assigned to territorial courts and to courts
martial. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-66 ( 1 982).
2 1 4. Granfinanciera does tacitly suggest that a private rights claim that would carry a j ury right
if litigated in federal court could be sent to a non-Article III tribunal if that tribunal employed a jury
and acted merely as an adjunct to an Article III court. The existence of such a possible exception
explains why the Court in Granjinanciera, having determined that the claim at issue was a private
rights claim, nonetheless left open the question whether bankruptcy judges (who are not Article III
judges) could conduct a jury trial on the claim, subject to district court oversight. See

Granjinanciera, 492 U.S. at 64. But the juryless adjudication of private claims within an agency
setting obviously would not fit within that possible exception.
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given that the Court has made no suggestion to the contrary-the case must now
be read to rest upon the conclusion that the claim at issue fell within the public
rights doctrine. Thus, the private intra-agency enforcement scheme could be
validated as a public-rights scheme if it were considered sufficiently similar to
the scheme at issue in Jones & Laughlin Steel.
In that case, a union instituted a proceeding against an employer before the
NLRB seeking both injunctive remedies and back pay under federal law. 2 l s
Among other objections, the employer asserted that it had a Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial on the back pay issue? 1 6 Though the Court rejected this
contention partly because it viewed the back pay award as merely incidental to
the injunctive relief, 2 1 7 the Court also suggested that juryless adjudication within
the NLRB was appropriate because the claims at issue were created by Congress:
"The instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit. The
,,
proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is a statutory proceeding. 2 1 8
Since consent was not a basis for the holding in Jones & Laughlin Steel, that case
may support the constitutionality of the scheme outlined here. On the other hand,
the case is not directly on point because it is somewhat difficult to argue that a
claim for products liability is "unknown to the common law."
In addition, Thomas and Jones & Laughlin Steel may also be distinguishable
from the FDA scheme outlined here in that both cases involved decisionmakers
relatively insulated from the executive branch: Jones & Laughlin Steel involved
the NLRB , an independent agency, and in Thomas, the arbitrators were appointed
by a separate, independent federal agency. 21 9 Although the FDA Commissioner
must be confirmed by the Senate, he or she "serves at the pleasure of the . . .
,,
Secretary [of Health and Human Services] and, therefore, the President. 22 0 Thus,

2 1 5. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3 0 1 U.S. 1 , 22 ( 1 937). Because the union
initiated the NLRB proceeding, the case can be viewed as one involving a dispute between private
parties. It appears, however, that the actual disputants during the adjudication within the NLRB
were the employer and the Board-not the union. See id. at 24-25 (describing proceedings before
the NLRB).

at 48.
2 1 7 . See id. (holding that the Seventh Amendment "has no application to cases where recovery
of money damages is an incident to equitable relief').

2 1 6. See id.

2 1 8. !d.
2 1 9. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 574 n. l ( 1 9 85) (quoting
statute that provided for appointment of arbitrator by Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service).

Schor is similarly distinguishable: The Court noted that the CFTC, an independent agency, was
viewed as "relatively immune from political pressures." Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 ( 1 986).
220. John W. Lundquist & Sandra L . Conroy, Defending Against Food and Drug Prosecutions,
THE CHAMPION, July 1 997, at 20, 20.
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the FDA lacks some of the attributes of an independent agency.22 1
In sum, it seems possible that Congress could assign private claims under the
FDCA to agency adjudication, but the answer is not entirely clear, because the
boundaries of the "public rights" doctrine are incompletely defined.

c) Private Enforcement in a Hybrid System
The immediately preceding analysis demonstrates that if a private claim
under the FDCA is deemed to fall within the "public rights" doctrine� the claim
can be adjudicated within the FDA without offending either Article III or the
Seventh Amendment. But if such a claim is brought, instead, in federal court, and
if the right and remedy involved are legal in nature , then a Seventh Amendment
jury right attaches and this right would prevent referral of safety and causation
issues to the FDA for binding determination.
It should be noted that Article III itself would not pose a barrier to the
privatelhybrid scheme. Even if private claims under the FDCA did not fall within
the "public rights" doctrine, Article III would pose no bar to the adjudication of
those claims in federal court with referral of the safety and causation issues to the
FDA. From the perspective of Article III analysis, the privatelhybrid scheme
conforms well to the "adj unct" model exemplified by Crowell v. Benson. 222
In Crowell, the Court considered a workers ' compensation scheme devised
by Congress as a substitute for traditional federal negligence law in admiralty
jurisdiction.223 Under the scheme, claims for compensation were heard and
determined by deputy commissioners within the United States Employees '
Compensation Commission.224 Enforcement of any resulting compensation order
was to be sought in federal court.22 5 Though the court would review the
administrator' s legal determinations de novo/26 the administrator' s factual
determinations generally were reviewed only under a deferential "supported by

22 1 . See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1 988 DUKE L.J.
257, 259 (noting that agency independence typically involves "three statutory arrangements: the
bipartisan appointment requirement; the fixed term requirement; and the requirement that removal
be limited to express causes").
222 . 285 U.S. 22 ( 1 932).
223. See id. at 36-38 (explaining that federal Longshoremen ' s and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act "deals exclusively with compensation in respect of disability or death resulting
'from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States' if recovery 'through
workmen' s compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law"').
224. See id. at 42-43 (describing hearing procedure).

225. See id. at 44.
226. See id. at 45 ("Rulings of the deputy commissioner upon questions of law are without
finality.").
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evidence" standard. 22 7 However, as the Court interpreted the statutory
framework, 22 8 it provided for independent judicial determination of facts relevant
to the commission 's jurisdiction22 9 or to constitutional rights ? 3 0
At the time, the Court viewed the "public rights" doctrine as extending only
to cases in which the government was a party. 23 I But though the dispute in
Crowell was thus classified as a "private rights" case,232 the Court upheld the
statutory delegation of fact-finding to the agency: Even in private rights cases,
the Court held, "there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the essential
attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts
,,
shall be made by judges. 233 It sufficed, in Crowell, that independent federal
court review was available with respect to jurisdictional and constitutional
facts. 2 34
The privatelhybrid scheme fits comfortably within Crowell' s holding with
respect to the requirements of Article III. As in Crowell, a federal statutory claim
would replace a judicially developed cause of action. The field covered by the
statute would be limited to medical products regulated by the FDA. 23 5 The
referral of technical questions to the FDA would "furnish a prompt, continuous,
expert, and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact
which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an
,
administrative agency specially assigned to that task. , 23 6 And the FDA's
decisions would be subj ect to federal court review for compliance with the
statutory scheme , though the FDA ' s judgments on safety and causation would

227. Id. at 46.
228. The Court adopted the interpretation noted in the text in order to avoid the constitutional
issues that would have arisen had it found that the statute required judicial deference to the
commissioner with respect to jurisdictional and constitutional facts. See id. at 62 ("When the
validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, . . . this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided:").

229. See id. at 63 .
230. See id. at 60.
23 1 . See id. at 50 ("[T]he distinction is at once apparent between cases of private right and those
which arise between the government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the
performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments. ").

232. See id. at 5 1 ("The present case does not fall within the categories just described, but is one
of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.").

233. Id.
234. See id. at 62.
235. Cf id. at 54 ("The statute has a limited application, being confined to the relation of master
and servant . . . . ).
236. Id. at 46.
"
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receive deference.
Crowell, however, does not settle the Seventh Amendment question:
Because Crowell concerned a statutory replacement for a claim in admiralty-not
a claim at common law-the Seventh Amendment was not at issue in the case. 23 7
The Seventh Amendment jury trial requirement applies to a claim under a federal
statute if the right and remedy are legal in nature. 23 8 Admittedly , if such a claim
falls within the "public rights" doctrine it can be relegated to administrative
adjudication and the Seventh Amendment jury right will not apply in the
administrative proceeding?3 9 But if, instead, such a claim is brought in federal
court, the Seventh Amendment requires a jury ?40
Under this analysis , situating the federal products liability claim in federal
court would trigger a Seventh Amendment right to jury trial. The claim would be
analogous to a state-law tort claim for products liability and the remedies
sought-compensatory and punitive damages-would fall within the category of
legal relief. 2 4 1 Accordingly, the binding determination of safety and causation
issues by the FDA would be impermissible, because it would violate the right to
a jury trial. 242 Of course , the jury trial right is waivable; but though the defendant
could validly waive the right in advance , the claimant would not have done SO. 2 43
237. See id. at 45 ("As the claims which are subj ect to the provisions of the Act are governed by
[federal] maritime law . . . and are within the admiralty jurisdiction, the objection raised by the
respondent's pleading as to the right to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment is
unavailing. ") .
238. See Curtis v. Loether, 4 1 5 U.S. 1 89 , 1 94 ( 1 974) ("The Seventh Amendment does apply to
actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal
rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law.").
239. See Granfinanciera, S .A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 ( 1 989) ("If a claim that is legal
in nature asserts a 'public right, ' . . . then the Seventh Amendment does not entitle the parties to a
jury trial if Congress assigns its adjudication to an administrative agency or specialized court of
equity.").
240. As the Court has explained, when a federal scheme contemplates "enforcement of statutory
rights in an ordinary civil action in the district courts, where there is obviously no functional
justification for denying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be available if the action involves
rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law." Curtis, 4 1 5 U.S. at 1 95 .
24 1 . I t would b e possible to design a claim that sought solely equitable relief. For example, the
statute could provide for restitution of money the company had derived from sales of a defective
product. However, such a remedy would often not meet · the goal of compensation, because the
harm done by a defective product may exceed the profits a company derived from it. And such a
remedy would not serve the purposes furthered by punitive damages, either.
242. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 3 1 4 ( 1 920) ("A compulsory reference with power to
determine issues is impossible in the federal courts because of the Seventh Amendment . . . . ").
243. The waiver analysis here parallels that discussed in the previous Section with respect to
individual Article III rights. See supra text accompanying notes 1 98- 1 99 .
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Conceptualizing the referral scheme as an application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine would not remove the Seventh Amendment difficulty. The
Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed Seventh Amendment constraints on
the application of primary jurisdiction. The Court' s silence is perhaps
unsurprising, because many of the cases that have presented issues of primary
jurisdiction involved no Seventh Amendment right-for example, because. the
lawsuit in question was brought in state rather than federal COurt, 244 or sought
equitable rather than legal relief. 2 45 In other cases, a litigant who might have had
a Seventh Amendment right failed to argue that claim to the Supreme Court as a
bar to the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.2 46
The two Supreme Court primary jurisdiction cases that most directly
presented a Seventh Amendment issue are inapposite to the question considered
in this Article. In Keogh v. Chicago & N. W Ry. CO . , 2 47 the plaintiff argued to the
Court that he had a constitutional right to a jury trial on his claims for antitrust
damages?4 8 However, the court below had dismissed Keogh's antitrust claims
because by the time those claims reached trial, the Interstate Commerce
Commission had approved the rates challenged by the plaintiff. 249 Given this
procedural history, the Supreme Court's holding that Keogh' s action was

244. See, e.g. , San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U . S . 236, 239 ( 1 959); Tex. &
Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 426 ( 1 907).
245. See, e.g. , Bd. of R.R Comm'rs v. Great N. Ry., 28 1 U.S. 4 12 , 4 1 6 ( 1 930) (suit to enjoin
enforcement of state agency' s rate-setting order); U.S. Navigation Co. v. Cunard S . S . Co., 284 U.S.
474, 478 ( 1 932) (suit to enj oin alleged antitrust violation); Far E. Conference v. United States, 342
U.S. 570, 57 1 , 573 ( 1 952) (suit by the United States to enjoin alleged antitrust violations).
246. See, e.g. , Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 ( 1 973) (claims for damages under
Commodities Exchange Act and Sherman Act; in Supreme Court briefs, petitioner did not assert a
right to jury trial as a basis for reversal); Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 4 1 4 U.S. 1 1 3 , 1 1 3 - 1 4
( 1 973) (per curiam) (deciding case for claims for damages under Commodities Exchange Act and
Sherman Act without a merits briefing; certiorari briefs did not mention right to j ury trial);
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville RR, 406 U.S. 320, 320-2 1 , 324-25 ( 1 972) (damages suit that
had been removed from state to federal court; majority refused to addTess "[t]he constitutional issue
discussed in the dissent" because the issue was not included in the petition for certiorari); id. at 3 3 1
(Douglas, J . , dissenting) ("Under the First Amendment . . . [the plaintiff] i s petitioning the
Government 'for a redress of grievances' in the traditional manner of suitors at common law; and
by the Seventh Amendment is entitled to a jury tria1."); Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass 'n v.
Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 64-65 ( 1 970) (action for damages and declaratory
relief that had been removed from state to federal court; Supreme Court briefs did not mention a
jury trial right).
247 . 260 U.S. 1 56 ( 1 922).
248. See Brief and Argument for Plaintiff in Error at 1 3 , 1 5 , Keogh v. Chi. & N.W. Ry . , 260
U.S. 1 5 6 ( 1 922) (No. 823).
249. See Keogh, 260 U.S. 1 5 6.
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properly dismissed250 does not provide support for the proposition that a claim
carrying a right to a jury can be stayed pending referral of a jury question to an
agency for decision; rather, Keogh can be seen as applying the principle (later
explicitly adopted by the Court25 1 ) that a litigant can be precluded from
relitigating an issue determined in a prior proceeding even if the prior proceeding
was one in which there was no jury trial.
In Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conjerence,252 the Court was asked
to decide whether the Federal Maritime Commission' s jurisdiction over shipping
rates precluded a plaintiff from suing for antitrust damages arising from shipping
conferences' implementation of rate agreements. z5 3 The plaintiff and defendants
focused their Supreme Court briefs on the question of exclusivity: Did the
Shipping Act (administered by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC»
provide the sole avenue for challenging rate agreements , or could a plaintiff also
bring an antitrust claim in federal court? The plaintiff argued that if the Shipping
Act were construed to exclude the antitrust remedy, that construction would
,,
"improperly . . . deprive [ the plaintiff] of a right to trial by jury. 254
The FMC argued that the antitrust action should be stayed, rather than
dismissed, so that the FMC could determine whether the rate agreements violated
the Shipping Act. 255 The defendants disagreed, insisting that dismissal, rather
than a stay, was the appropriate disposition. 25 6 The plaintiff, as well, continued to
focus on the question of dismissal, and continued to argue that if the Shipping
Act provided the exclusive remedy, that would violate the Seventh
Amendment. 25 7 Though the plaintiff also contended that the legality of the rates

250. See id. at 1 63 .
25 1 . See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 4 3 9 U.S. 322, 337 ( 1 979).
252. 383 U.S. 2 1 3 ( 1 966).
253. See id. at 2 1 5 .
254. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4 , Carnation Co. v . Pac. Westbound Conference, 383
U.S . 213 ( 1 966) (No. 20).
255. See Memorandum for the Federal Maritime Commission at 5-6, Carnation Co. (No. 657);
Brief for the United States and the Federal Maritime Commission at 1 3 , Carnation Co. (No. 20).

256. See Supplemental Brief in Opposition for Respondents, Far East Conference, and Members
and Certain Former Members Thereof Named as Defendants at 4, Carnation Co. (No. 657);
Supplemental Brief in Opposition for Respondent Pacific Westbound Conference at 6-7, Carnation

Co. (No. 20); Brief for Respondent Pacific Westbound Conference at

1 0- 1 1 ,

Carnation Co. (No.

20).
257. See Petitioner' s Brief at 7 , 56-59, Carnation Co. (No. 20). Responding to this argument,
one of the defendants asserted that limiting the plaintiff to the Shipping Act' s administrative
remedy would not violate the Seventh Amendment because the plaintiff sought "damages resulting
from a statutory violation unknown at common law"-i.e., the plaintiff was asserting a public
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need not first be determined by the FMC, it did not stress the Seventh
Amendment in connection with this facet of its argwnent.2 5 8
Meanwhile, the FMC concluded that its approval of an earlier agreement did
not encompass the rate agreements challenged in the plaintiff s antitrust suit, and
that the latter agreements violated the Shipping Act. 2 59 In its reply brief, the
plaintiff asserted that the FMC took the view that "any administrative questions
presented that were for determination by the Commission . . . have been
determined, and in such way that petitioner is entitled to pursue its [antitrust]
litigation" (unless, as the defendants contended, the Shipping Act provided the
only possible remedy) .260 Unsurprisingly, the plaintiff s reply brief raised no
Seventh Amendment challenge to the application of the FMC' s findings in its
antitrust SUit.2 6 1 Thus, when the Supreme Court held in Carnation that the
plaintiff s antitrust suit should be stayed "pending the fmal outcome of the
Shipping Act proceedings" (because the FMC ' s decision had been appealed),262
there was no reason for the Court to consider whether the Seventh Amendment
posed any barrier to such a stay, and the Court did not mention the question.
The Supreme Court, then, has not established whether the primary
jurisdiction doctrine can be applied to require referral of factual issues to an
agency for binding determination when those issues arise in a federal lawsuit on
claims for which there is a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The few
commentators to discuss the question have noted the existence of doubt. 2 63 There
rights claim, not a private rights claim. See Brief for Respondent Pacific Westbound Conference at
56 n.5 1 , Carnation Co. (No. 20) (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3 0 1 U.S. 1 , 22
( 1 937)). Another set of defendants similarly disputed the contention that excluding antitrust suits
would violate the Seventh Amendment. See Brief for the Respondents Far East Conference at 4849, Carnation Co. (No. 20).
258. See Petitioner's Brief at 24-25, Carnation Co. (No. 20). The plaintiff did state-in
response to the contention that the outcomes of jury trials on antitrust claims might vary from case
to case-that "[i]f the results turn out to be not entirely consistent, but still sustainable, that must be
laid to the workings of the Seventh Amendment." Id. at 79. This brief mention, however, did not
present a clear argument that a stay, as opposed to dismissal, of the antitrust claims would violate
the Seventh Amendment.
259. See Carnation Co., 3 8 3 U.S. at 223 n.6.
260. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 9, Carnation Co. (No. 20).
26 1 . See id.
262. Carnation Co., 383 U.S. at 223-24.
263. See, e.g. , Robert B. von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARV. L. REv. 929, 963 ( 1 954) (noting that "at least in jury
cases, there appears to be an insurmountable obstacle-the Seventh Amendment-to making an
agency 's findings of fact conclusive"); 5 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 47.03 [2]
(2004) ("It has been argued that a court which refers to an agency questions of fact, as opposed to
questions of law, should not be bound by the agency's decision because of the Seventh
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seems to be no persuasive reason to distinguish such cases from any other
instance in which a federal court contemplates referring a fact issue to a non-jury
decisionmaker for binding determination; and the Court has made clear that the
Seventh Amendment bars such referrals? 64 Accordingly, it appears likely that
private enforcement within the hybrid system could founder upon the Seventh
5
Amendment difficulty. 26

Amendment's guarantee of a right to trial by jury.") (citing von Mehren).
264. See supra note 242. It should be noted that other possible applications of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine (or similar schemes) can be permissible, even as to plaintiffs who would have
a right to a jury trial if they were permitted to sue in federal court. Thus, for example, Congress can
preempt a common law claim for damages (and leave persons injured in the future without a
remedy) without violating the Seventh Amendment. See Nagareda, supra note 1 5 , at 354 n.288.
Also, Congress can provide that a "public rights" claim for damages falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of an agency, such that the claim must be dismissed if it is brought in federal court.
Such an arrangement would relegate the claim to decision by the agency without a jury, but, as
discussed above, this would not violate the Seventh Amendment. See supra note 239 and
accompanying text. However, if Congress instead attempts to provide that the "public rights"
damages claim can be brought in federal court, but that certain fact issues must be referred to the
agency for binding decision, the plaintiff would have a S eventh Amendment right to a jury trial and
the referral would violate that right. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
265 . To avoid impairing the jury trial right, Congress could provide for a jury trial and direct
that the FDA render an advisory opinion that could persuade, rather than bind, the jury. Such a
system could assist the jury in determining difficult issues, but because the jury would retain the
ability to reject the panel ' s findings, the system would not ensure uniformity, and it might not gain
the confidence of potential defendants.
Another possible argument is that there should be a "complexity exception" to the Seventh
Amendment: Some commentators contend that as to highly complex issues requiring technical or
scientific expertise, there should be no jury trial right. See, e.g. , Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of

the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L . REv. 53, 80 (200 1 ) (arguing that a complexity exception "seems
especially appropriate . . . when a forthcoming trial is likely to be protracted and involve difficult
technical or scientific issues"). But though at least one appellate court has endorsed such an
exception, see In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 63 1 F.2d 1 069, 1 086 (3d Cir. 1 980)
(balancing due process and Seventh Amendment rights and finding "the most reasonable
accommodation . . . to be a denial of jury trial when a jury will not be able to perform its task of
rational decisionmaking with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the relevant legal
standards"), other courts have rejected it, see, e.g. , In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 4 1 1 , 4 3 1
(9th Cir. 1 979) ("Not only do we refuse to read a complexity exception into the Seventh
Amendment, but we also express grave reservations about whether a meaningful test could be
developed were we to find such an exception."), and the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the
dispute. Admittedly, an issue can be given to the judge rather than the jury--despite the fact that
the issue arises in a case involving a jury right-if the issue is not one that was historically reserved
for the jury and if the relative capabilities of juries and judges tilt the policy analysis in favor of
judicial determination. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc . , 5 1 7 U.S. 370, 372 ( 1 996)
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d) Qui Tam Claims in a Hybrid System

Maintenance of a parens patriae suit by a qui tam relator, by contrast, would
both comport with Article III and avoid the Seventh Amendment problem.
A qui tam suit within the hybrid system would comply with Article III under
Crowell' s "adjunct" test, for the same reasons discussed in the preceding
Section. 266 Indeed, the Article III argument in favor of the hybrid system would
be even stronger in the qui tam context, because the suit, brought on behalf of the
United States, would all the more clearly fall within the "public rights" doctrine.
A defendant ordinarily would have a Seventh Amendment jury right
regarding qui tam claims brought within the hybrid system; the fact that the claim
was brought in the government's name would not change the analysis. 267
However, as discussed in Section lILA, the defendant would waive that right in
advance, when it opted into the federal products liability system. 268 (It would, in
any event, be an unusual products liability defendant that complained of being
deprived of a jury trial.) And because the qui tam relator would be pressing a
claim on behalf of the government, Congress could, in the statutory scheme,
waive any right to a jury trial on the relator's behalf.
Admittedly, use of the qui tam mechanism would introduce some additional
constitutional issues. But though the qui tam mechanism has been challenged on
both Article II and Article III grounds, the more persuasive view holds that it is
constitutional. The Supreme Court rejected the Article III challenge in Vermont
Agency ofNatural Resources v. United States ex reI. Stevens, 269 when it held that
,
"a qui tam relator under the [False Claims Act] has Article III standing., 2 7 o

(holding that "the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively
within the province of the court"). It is far from clear, however, that issues of safety and causation
in a products liability case would meet this test.

266. See supra notes 222-236 and accompanying text.
267. See Tull v. United States, 4 8 1 U.S. 4 12, 420 ( 1987).
268. The proposal outlined here could hardly be viewed as impermissibly coercive. After all, the
traditional baseline presumption is that states can regulate products that affect health and safety,
and that such regulation can be accomplished through the tort system. Accordingly, a system that
permits companies to opt in to an alternative system (or to opt out, and be subj ect to state-law tort
claims) benefits the company by expanding its choices. Cf Seth F. Kreimer, A llocational

Sanctions: The Problem o/Negative Rights in a Positive State, 1 32 U. PA. L. REv. 1 293, 1 300-0 1
( 1 984) (arguing that in assessing the permissibility of governmental allocations o f benefits, courts
should distinguish threats-i.e., "allocations that make a citizen worse off than she otherwise would
be because of her exercise of a constitutional right"-from offers-i .e., allocations that "merely
expand her range of options, leaving the citizen better off') .

269. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
270. Id. at 778. The Court cited "the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert
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However, the Stevens maj ority declined to address "whether qui tam suits violate
Article II, in particular the Appointments Clause of § 2 and the 'take Care '
,
Clause of § 3 . ,27 1
The Appointments CI�use vests the President with power to appoint federal
officers with the advice and consent of the Senate, but provides that Congres s
may vest the appointment of "inferior" officers "in the President alone, in the
,
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments ., 272 Some have argued that the
False Claims Act's qui tam provision violates this clause by permitting qui tam
relators to function as federal officers without an appropriate appointment. 273 Qui
tam relators, however, should not be viewed as "officers," because they have no
established position, they draw no salary, and they serve their function on an ad
hoc basis. 274
The Take Care Clause provides that the President shall "take Care that the
,,
Laws be faithfully executed. 27 5 Though it is not entirely clear whether this
clause vests power in the President or instead imposes a duty, 2 76 under either
interpretation the clause should pose no problem for qui tam provisions. It seems
clear that in cases where the government intervenes in a qui tam suit , the qui tam
mechanism does not impair the government' s law-enforcement functions? 77 And
because the executive branch retains significant control over a qui tam suit even
in cases where the government chooses not to intervene, 27 8 the more persuasive
the injury in fact suffered by the assignor," and reasoned that the False Claims Act "can reasonably
be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government's damages claim." Id. at 773 .

27 1 . Id. at 778 n. 8
272. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2 .
273. See Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 200 1 WIS . L. REv. 3 8 1 , 43033 (reviewing Appointments Clause arguments concerning qui tam mechanism).
274. See United States ex rei. Stone v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., Nos. 99- 1 35 1 , 99- 1 3 52, 99- 1 353,
2004 WL 433235, a t * 1 7-* 1 8 ( l Oth Cir. Mar. 5, 2004) (finding qui tam relators d o not fal l within
Appointments Clause because they are not federal officers); Riley v. St. Luke 's Episcopal Hosp.,
252 F.3d 749, 757-58 (5th Cir. 200 1 ) (en bane) (same); United States ex rei. Taxpayers Against
Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 4 1 F.3d 1 032, 1 04 1 (6th Cir. 1 994) (same); United States ex reI. Kelly v.
Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743 , 759 (9th Cir. 1 993) (same); Bales, supra note 273 , at 430-33 (reviewing
reasons why qui tam relators should not fall within scope of Appointments Clause).
275. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
276. See, e.g. , Caminker, supra note 1 59, at 356 ("The Supreme Court has suggested
occasionally that the 'take Care ' clause vests the President with prosecutorial discretion over
Federal law enforcement, but this clause is better viewed as a mandate to follow the will of
Congress than as a grant of exogenously defined power.").
277. See Stone, 2004 WL 43323 5, at * 1 9 (rej ecting the "contention that the presence of a qui
tam relator in the litigation so hindered the Government's prosecutorial discretion as to deprive the
Government of its ability to perform its constitutionally assigned responsibilities").
278. See supra notes 1 64- 1 67 and accompanying text.
.
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view holds that those cases do not violate the Take Care Clause either. 2 79
Constitutional considerations, then, would likely eliminate one of the four
options : The Seventh Amendment would probably bar the implementation of the
private claim/hybrid adjudication mode1. 2 80 In the Subsection that follows, I will
compare the merits, from a policy standpoint, of the three remaining options.
2. Policy Considerations

The qui tamlhybrid scheme appears to be the most attractive of the
remaining possibilities for linking litigation with the regulatory system.
Considerations of cost and speed are inconclusive; however, the quality of
decisionmaking and the quality of advocacy in the qui tam system would be
better, on balance, than those in systems that relied upon agency adjudication of
either government or private claims.

279. See Riley, 252 F . 3 d at 757 ("Any intrusion by the qui tam relator in the Executive's Article
II power is comparatively modest, especially given the control mechanisms inherent in the FCA to
mitigate such an intrusion and the civil context in which qui tam suits are pursued."); Taxpayers
Against Fraud, 4 1 F.3d at 1 04 1 (explaining in dictum that qui tam suits in which the government
does not intervene do not contravene separation of powers principles because the government
retains means of controlling qui tam suits even if it chooses not to intervene); Kelly, 9 F.3d at 755
("[T]he Executive Branch exercises at least an equivalent amount of control over qui tam relators
as it does over independent counsels. Thus, the FCA gives the Attorney General sufficient means of
controlling or supervising relators to satisfy separation of powers concerns ."); see also Bales, supra
note 273, at 435 ("Comparing the qui tam provisions of the FCA to the independent counsel
provisions upheld in Morrison [v. Olson , 487 U . S . 654 ( 1 988)] presents the strongest argument as
to why judicial branch involvement in qui tam actions does not violate separation of powers
principles."); Bucy, supra note 1 52, at 956 (suggesting that "because an effective private justice
model brings an invaluable and otherwise unobtainable resource to public regulatory efforts,
namely inside information, the executive branch is unable to 'take Care' that laws are faithfully
executed without such a model").
Objections to qui tam suits have also been based on separation of powers more generally;
these arguments, too, should be rejected. See, e.g. , Kelly, 9 F.3d at 75 5-56 (rej ecting the contention
that "the qui tam provisions disrupt the proper balance of power between the three branches by
permitting the Judicial Branch to encroach on executive authority"); Bales, supra note 273, at 435
(arguing that "because qui tam disperses power among the citizens rather than concentrating it in
the hands of a single political branch, the principles underlying the separation of powers doctrine
are not threatened as they are when, for example, Congress seeks to retain the power
constitutionally apportioned to another branch").
280. This assumption is based on the likelihood that the proposed scheme would not fall within
any possible "complexity" exception to the Seventh Amendment. See supra note 265 .
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a) Cost and Speed

The agency-adjudication options might produce some cost savings relative
to the hybrid-adjudication options, but the additional cost of hybrid adjudication
should be weighed against its benefits. 28 I
Agency adjudication might cut the costs of litigation if it provided a
narrower range of discovery than is customary in civil litigation. Though some
agencies provide for a range of discovery similar to that available in federal
,,
COurt, 282 the rules of other agencies "may severely restrict access to discovery. 28 3
The FDA 's rules for civil penalty proceedings , for example , permit depositions
only upon a showing of necessity and then only for the purpose of preserving
.
testImony. 284
Such restrictions on discovery, however, would reduce the effectiveness of
litigation as a way to uncover safety-related information. Depositions, for
instance, can be a key tool to uncover internal policies and deliberations within a
company.28 5 The savings achieved by restricting discovery to narrower limits
than those imposed in federal court would therefore come at a significant cost.
In the hybrid system , some additional delay might result from the referral
process, but that delay need not be excessive. The referral would occur at a point
in the process when discovery was complete, and summary judgment motion
practice would have served to narrow and focus the issues prior to trial. Because
the proceedings in the hybrid system would not involve a jury, the referral
process would not cause undue disruption; proceedings can more readily be
segmented in bench trials than in jury trials. 286

28 1 . Cj Kevin M. Clennont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REv.
1 1 9, 1 3 0 (2002) ("Delay is an unavoidable feature of life, and it is not an evil in itself. The only
evil is excessive delay, where excessive means that the costs of delay outweigh its benefits.").
282. See 4 STErn ET AL., supra note 263, § 23 .0 1 [2], at 23 - 1 5 ("Agencies such as the Federal
Trade Commission, the Federal Maritime Commission, and the Federal Communications
Commission . . . have closely modeled their discovery rules on the Federal Rules [of Civil
Procedure] . ).
283. Id. § 2 3 .0 1 , at 23-28 (discussing the NLRB). "For example, N.L.R.B. rules do not pennit
depositions except for the purpose of preserving testimony, and then only when in the discretion of
"

the regional director or administrative law judge good cause has been shown." Id. at 23-28.
284. See supra text accompanying note 1 25.
285. See infra Subsection III.B.2.
286. Another factor that bears upon litigation costs concerns the possibility of multiple suits.
Both the agency-enforcement and qui tam options would structure the dispute as a single
proceeding; by contrast, private claims in the agency setting could proceed singly as well as in a
class fonnat. Because they would require the resolution of all claims in a single proceeding, the
agency-enforcement and qui tam systems could, overall, prove more efficient-though they also
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b) Decisionmaking: Bias and Expertise

A consideration that supports situating the proceeding in federal court is that
the court could provide better decisionmaking than the agency with respect to
discovery and damages. The agency's comparative advantage regarding technical
and scientific questions does not extend to all other issues that would arise in
product safety litigation.
The political influence of the pharmaceutical industry is widely noted. 2 8 7
Critics also charge that recent changes have rendered the FDA, in particular,
more vulnerable to industry influence / 88 and that the agency , "although quick to
approve drugs, . . . is slow to take them off the market when they prove
,
dangerous. ,289 Given that each of the options discussed here would accord the
FDA significant power over industry liability, care should be taken, in crafting
the system to improve the FDA's independence. As Marcia Angell suggests,
measures could include enhanced public funding for the agency, as well as
enforcement of conflicts prohibitions for those serving on the FDA 's advisory
committees. 2 90 Even assuming such measures were adopted, however, there
would remain a risk that the FDA could unduly defer to the interest of industry
players. It is therefore useful to assess the degree to which the options discussed
here would protect against the possibility of agency capture . 2 9 1
Despite the internal separation of functions within the FDA-which would
insulate an FDA hearing officer to some extent from the other parts of the
agency-that officer might be subj ect to some pressures to accommodate
industry by limiting the nature and scope of discovery against a products liability

might prove more cwnbersome-than individual private claims within the agency.

287. See, e.g. , ANGELL, supra note 47, at 1 98 ("The pharmaceutical industry has by far the
largest lobby in Washington . . . . According to the conswner advocacy group Public Citizen, from

1 997 through 2002, the industry spent nearly $478 million on lobbying. ") ; id. at 200 ("In the 1 9992000 election cycle, drug companies gave $20 million in direct campaign contributions plus $65
million in 'soft' money."); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Gardiner Harris, Re-Examining Medicare-The
Drug Industry 'S Muscle: Industry Fights To Put Imprint on Drug Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2003, at
AI.

288. Marcia Angell has observed that the Prescription Drug User Fee Act, which seeks to speed
the processing of drug applications by providing for payment of user fees, "makes the FDA
dependent on an industry it regulates." ANGELL, supra note 47, at 208.

289. Id. at 209.
290. See id. at 243-44.
29 1 . Obviously, federal courts could also be staffed with judges who are predisposed to favor
industry defendants over products liability plaintiffs . However, Article III tenure protects judges
from suffering repercussions as a result of decisions adverse to industry-which makes it likely that
judges would be more willing, overall, to make such decisions.
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defendant.2 92 This might be especially true if the discovery in question had the
potential to embarrass the agency-for example, by showing that the agency had
failed adequately to respond to earlier evidence of safety concerns. 2 93 Indeed,
David Graham, the Associate Director for Science in CDER's Office of Drug
Safety, recently raised a very similar concern with respect to the FDA's current
practice of postmarketing surveillance ?94 In the litigation context, permitting the
plaintiff to develop evidence through discovery proceedings under the aegis of
the court could prove a more effective information-gathering tool.
Of course, to the extent that there is agency bias of the sort suggested here,
the problem will extend well beyond discovery. If the FDA's decisionmaking
were unduly influenced by certain stakeholders, that could distort its review of
safety and causation issues under the hybrid system as well. Such a concern may
lead policymakers to rej ect any determinative role for the FDA in resolving tort
claims, and I turn to that argument below. For the moment, it is significant to
note that if policymakers were to grant the FDA a determinative role, the choice
of institutional configuration would be important. Problems of FDA bias would
be mitigated in the hybrid system by the fact that the record on which the agency
made the safety and causation decisions would include evidence developed in a
separate federal court proceeding. If that discovery process uncovered safety
problems with a product, the resulting publicity could provide an inducement for
the FDA to scrutinize the product carefully and to find liability where
appropriate. By contrast, if the discovery process unfolded within the agency, a
captured agency might prevent the plaintiff from ever developing certain
evidence concerning liability.
Moreover, the reasons for submitting the safety and causation questions to
the FDA do not extend to the discovery process. Even if it is taken as given that
scientific and policy judgments concerning medical products should be left to
FDA experts, there is nothing about the discovery process that requires a similar

292. Cj McGarity, supra note 44, at 564 ("The very real possibility of agency capture by the
regulated industry means that federal officials are not always eager to eliminate wrongful attempts
to manipulate the regulatory process . . . . ).
293. Cj Noah, supra note 66, at 503 (noting "the FDA's natural hesitancy to confess error when
a drug it just approved generates unusual and unexpected rates of adverse reactions").
294. In testimony to a Senate committee, Graham warned:
[T]he new drug reviewing division that approved the drug in the first place and that
regards it as its own child, typically proves to be the single greatest obstacle to
effectively dealing with serious drug safety issues. The second greatest obstacle is often
the senior management within the Office of Drug Safety, who either actively or tacitly
go along with what the Office of New Drugs wants.
Vioxx Hearings, supra note 84 (statement of David J. Graham, Assoc. Dir. for Sci., Office of Drug
Safety, FDA).
"
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approach. Federal district judges and magistrate judges handle discovery disputes
in complex litigation on a regular basis. They are expert at it. Indeed, there is
some reason to think that a generalist district judge or magistrate j udge might be
better situated to handle discovery in a complex products liability case than a
specialist hearing officer within the FDA: The experience that the generalist
judge gains with discovery disputes in other types of cases could help to ensure
that the discovery permitted in products liability litigation was calibrated at the
level thought to be appropriate in general civil litigation. 29 5
S imilar considerations apply to the determination of damages. Once the
FDA had settled the issue of safety and had provided guidance concerning the
factors that should determine causation,29 6 the federal court could handle the
question of damages at least as competently as the agency. Indeed, the expertise
gained by the court in assessing damages in other types of cases would provide a
useful source of cross-pollination. There is also some reason to think that the
FDA itself might prefer not to be tasked with determining damages. Such
determinations are likely to be fraught with controversy, and the agency might
well prefer to leave the question to a separate institution.297
c) Litigating: Incentives and Expertise

The three proposals differ with respect to the entity pressing the claim as
well as the entity deciding it. A comparison of the options therefore should
consider the relative expertise of the litigator in each system, as well as that
295. Questions relating to the scope of, and limits on, discovery are not uncontroversial. See,
e.g. , Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context:
The United States ofAmerica, 45 AM. J. COMPo L. 675, 7 0 1 ( 1 997) (noting that "[t]he responses of
practicing lawyers to . . . the 1 993 amendments to Rule 26 (discovery), were very seriously
negative"); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the
Scope ofFederal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REv. 1 3 (200 1 ) (critiquing the 2000 amendments to
the discovery provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). My point is merely that the
experience with discovery in other types of complex litigation can profitably be applied to
questions concerning discovery in products liability litigation concerning FDA-approved products;
and situating the discovery process within the federal courts, rather than within the FDA, would
make possible the application of that experience.
296. The FDA would determine the question of product safety-i.e., whether the product is safe
enough to remain on the market and, if so, whether additional warnings are needed. In a case where
the FDA found the product unsafe or the warnings inadequate, the FDA would also enumerate the
factors that the district court should apply in order to determine specific causation-i.e., whether a
particular claimant's injury should be deemed to arise from the safety problem or inadequate
warning.
297 . Obviously, liability determinations would often be controversial as well . But the FDA's
relative expertise with respect to safety and causation issues would counterbalance this concern.
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litigator' s incentives to press valid claims. Under this analysis, the government
enforcement model may fare less well, both because the government's litigation
resources would be limited2 98 and because the private plaintiffs ' bar may add
useful expertise. By contrast, the qui tam proposal might help to ensure that
claims are litigated by lawyers with appropriate expertise, and would provide
structured incentives for industry insiders to bring forward nonpublic information
concerning safety.
As noted above, the government-enforcement model would require Congress
to dedicate significantly more resources to enforcement. 299 In theory, such a
system could be financed by the private sector, through an ex ante system of user
fees exacted during the product approval process 3 00 or through an ex post system
of fee-shifting. 3 0 1 Such an innovation, however, would likely be controversial.
Absent such a measure, the government might well be unwilling to invest the
significant resources that might be necessary to establish liability in a complex
products liability case. 3 0 2
In any event, excluding the private bar from the enforcement of product
safety standards would raise issues apart from the question of resources. 3 03 On

298. Cf McGarity, supra note 44, at 564 (noting that "the reality of very limited agency
resources means that even those officials who are committed to seeking out and eliminating fraud
are generally not able to do so").
299. As Michael Green noted in 1 997, "The FDA is woefully underfunded for its mandate,
which includes regulatory oversight of products that account for more than twenty-five percent of
all American consumer purchases ." Green, supra note 46, at 476.
300. Congress has enacted legislation requiring companies to pay a fee when they apply for
approval of a new drug or biologic; the fees help to pay the costs of speedier FDA review. See
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1 992, Pub. L. No. 1 02-57 1 , Title I, 1 06 Stat. 449 1 (codified as
amended at 2 1 U.S.c. §§ 379g, 379h (2000)).
30 1 . A fee-shifting provision could provide, for example, that the government could recover the
reasonable costs of a successful lawsuit. Such a provision could provide for either one-way or two
way fee-shifting. Currently, the Equal Access to Justice Act authorizes fee-shifting in favor of
respondents in administrative adversary proceedings where the agency's position in bringing the
proceeding was not substantially justified. 5 U . S .c. § 504(a)( 1 ) (2000). However, most device
makers, and probably all pharmaceutical companies, would be ineligible to receive fees under the
. Act because their net worth exceeds the Act's limitations. See id. § 504(b)( 1 )(B).
302. Cf Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary
Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs ' Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 5 1 DEPA UL L. REv. 2 1 9,
235 (200 1 ) (noting, with respect to the plaintiffs ' bar's involvement in state tobacco litigation, that
"[s]tates turned to contingency fee arrangements as a way of eliminating their own risks of having
to devote substantial dollars or other resources to the litigation").
303. Cf 2 ALI REpORTERS' STUDY, supra note 1 14, at 86 ("Regulatory agency 'failure ' may
occur because of inadequate resources or on account of political or bureaucratic pressures. A
system of privately initiated tort remedies, administered through the decentralized, general purpose
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one hand, the agency might fail to initiate proceedings that should be brought.
Enforcement personnel within the FDA might not always be quick to question
the FDA 's own prior safety determinations-yet that questioning would be
desirable in some instances, when postmarketing experience discloses a
previously unknown safety issue. On the other hand, agency personnel would not
have the direct personal stake in the outcome that leads plaintiffs ' lawyers to be
careful in selecting which cases to take: Agency personnel would be paid their
salary whether or not a given enforcement action resulted in a victory for the
agency.
By contrast, the private plaintiffs ' lawyers who would litigate actions in the
other two models would have a strong incentive to screen cases, because they
would recover fees only if they obtained a judgment or settlement. The more
expertise a plaintiff s lawyer possesses in the field of medical products liability,
the more likely the lawyer is to assess accurately a claim' s potential for success.
Not only has the plaintiffs ' bar generally become more specialized in recent
0
years, 3 4 but the firms handling complex, high-end cases have increased both
their expertise and their resources. 30 5 Such firms, when they specialize in
products liability cases, are likely to possess high concentrations of both
procedural expertise and substantive medical expertise. 306 They also have the
resources to invest in medical and scientific experts and to commission the type
of data-mining projects that could disclose emerging safety issues. 307
A system that employed qui tam suits to litigate product safety issues might
help to ensure that cases were litigated by firms that possessed the necessary
expertise. 3 08 Individual plaintiffs may fail to select the most experienced counsel

court system, can serve as a corrective for these shortcomings.").
3 04. See, e.g. , John P. Heinz et a!., The Changing Character of Lawyers ' Work: Chicago in
1 9 75 and 1995, 32 LAW & SOC 'Y REv. 75 1 , 753-54, 7 6 1 -62 ( 1 998) (reporting, based on a mid-

1 990s survey of Chicago lawyers, that lawyer specialization "appears to have increased
substantially," especially among plaintiffs ' personal injury lawyers).
305. See Nagareda, supra note 1 5 , at 3 1 9-20.
306. See Kritzer, supra note 302, at 23 1 ("Law firms that litigate huge, complex cases, such as
tobacco, breast implant, and the like, require staff and financial resources beyond the scale of the
traditional p laintiffs ' firms."); id. at 232 (noting the emergence of "repeat p layer" p laintiffs' firms
with "the ability to bring to bear substantial legal effort and to deal with the cost of extended,
monster-scale litigation").
307. Although data mining could provide a powerful tool to identify emerging issues, there is
some question whether the private bar would have access to useful databases, in the light of patient
privacy concerns. It seems likely, however, that there will exist at least some relevant databases that
are available for private analysis.
308. Defendants, as repeat players in products liability litigation, are likely to retain lawyers
with substantive and procedural expertise. See Susan Brodie Haire et a!., Attorney Expertise,
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to represent them; though informal networks-such as referrals by generalists to
specialist attorneys-may help to bridge the informational gap, some plaintiffs
with valid claims may select less than expert representation?09 By contrast, in a
qui tam setting, a potential claim could attract more than one set of plaintiffs'
attorneys, and the court could select among them based upon their resources and
0
expertise. 3 1
Another advantage of the qui tam mechanism is that it would provide an
incentive for industry insiders to act upon information concerning safety
problems : An insider possessing such information could bring a qui tam claim
and share in the reSUlting recovery. Admittedly, there are other ways to provide
incentives for the disclosure of such information. For example, Congress could
provide a bounty for the provision of information that leads to a successful
govenunent penalty action.3 1 l However, some insiders might mistrust a reward
system in which the availability of the reward would depend on the govenunent' s
decision to litigate, and success in establishing, the claim; such insiders might be
more likely to come forward if they could bring suit themselves as qui tam
relators. 3 12
Policy considerations, then, suggest that the qui tamlhybrid scheme provides
the best alternative for linking the litigation and regulatory systems.
Considerations of cost and speed are inconclusive: Agency proceedings may be
Litigant Success, and Judicial Decisionmaking in the u.s. Courts ofAppeals, 3 3 L . & SOC 'y REv.
667, 674-77 ( 1 999) (reporting results of study that analyzed degrees of specialization of lead
counsel for plaintiff and defendant in sample of products liability cases drawn from federal
appellate opinions on Westlaw; study indicated that defendants' counsel tended to have more
procedural experience, and somewhat more substantive expertise, than p laintiffs ' counsel) .
309. See id. at 668 ("Although the high stakes of products liability litigation has created a
financial incentive for many plaintiffs ' lawyers and firms to orient their practice in this area,
individual plaintiffs may not be capable of making informed judgments when selecting firms or
attorneys best suited to represent their interests. ").
3 1 0. See supra note 1 74 and accompanying text.
3 1 1 . At least one such provision already exists. See 2 1 U.S.c. § 333(b)(5) (2000) (providing
bounty for information leading to criminal convictions for violations of certain laws concerning
sales of drug samples).
3 1 2 . Such concerns supported Congress's provision of a qui tam mechanism in the FCA. As
Evan Caminker has explained:
Congress determined that potential rewards alone would not provide sufficient incentive
for disclosure; many potential informers are reluctant to come forward because they
refuse to accept the 'personal and financial risk' involved absent any 'confidence in the
Government's ability to remedy' the misconduct, a fear rectifiable only by allowing for
participation in the litigation.
Caminker, supra note 1 59, at 3 5 1 (quoting S . REp. No. 99-345, at 6-7, reprinted in 1 986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266).
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cheaper than hybrid proceedings, but the savings would likely result from
streamlined procedures that would diminish the investigative power of the
discovery process. Quality of decisionmaking favors the use of the hybrid
system, because there are reasons to think that the federal courts could do a more
reliable job of supervising discovery and assessing damages. Quality of advocacy
weighs in favor of the qui tam mechanism, because the incentives and expertise
of qui tam relators and their counsel could improve the investigation and
presentation of potentially valid claims. Having thus suggested that the qui
tam/hybrid system may be the best option for providing a structural connection
between litigation and FDA decisionmaking, I proceed, in the next Part, to
consider how such a mechanism would work.
III. STRUCTURING A HYBRlD SYSTEM
In this Part, I sketch in somewhat more detail the qui tamlhybrid option
described above. A distinctive feature of the proposal is that a company would
have the option to select the federal qui tam system at the time it submitted a
product for FDA approval. Opting in would preempt state tort claims concerning
the product; in return, the company would be required to submit to a rigorous set
of federal products liability standards. In Section IILA, I describe the opt-in
system; Section III.B considers ways in which the qui tam mechanism could
improve postmarketing surveillance with respect to companies that opted in.
A. A n Opt-In and a Quid pro Quo

A central feature of the proposed scheme is that a company would choose,
when submitting a product for FDA approval, whether to opt in to the parens
patriae system with respect to that product. By choosing to opt in, the company
would disclaim any constitutional objections to the adjudicatory scheme
described in Part II. 313 Companies' choices concerning the opt-in could also shed
light on their true assessments of the jury system. In addition, the scheme offers a
chance to obtain a quid pro quo : If the jury system imposes high uncertainty costs
on companies, companies should be willing to opt in to the proposed scheme
even if it broadens the range of situations in which some amount of
compensation must be paid.
1. Revealing Companies ' Views A bout the Tort System

Many in the corporate sector are quick to complain about the tort system.
Critics frequently assert that juries are incompetent to handle technical or

3 1 3. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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scientific questions, that they favor plaintiffs, that they award excessive damages,
and that their determinations are irrational and unpredictable. Such contentions
loom large in the preemption debate : Lay juries, defendants assert, should not be
permitted to second-guess the expert determinations made by the FDA. The
proposal outlined here offers a chance to illuminate companies ' perceptions of
litigation risk. 3 1 4 Given the chance, will companies exchange exposure to the jury
system for a scheme that subjects liability to expert agency determination and
imposes scheduled damages assessed by a judge?
In this regard, the opt-in system would address one of the dilemmas of the
preemption debate. On one hand, preemption is disfavored because it deprives
plaintiffs of compensation and displaces state law in a traditional area of state
regulation. On the other, defendants-and now the FDA-argue that without
preemption, the threat of liability will deter innovation. The problem is that it is
difficult to know when, and to what extent, preemption is necessary in order to
promote innovation: Is it really true that the threat of state tort liability will cause
Company X to exit a line of research? After all, companies may make such
arguments-whether or not they are true-in an attempt to decrease their liability
exposure. 3 15 Research and development decisionmaking is particularly hard to
study because it centers on nonpublic information. 3 1 6 Moreover, numerous
factors may influence the incentive effects of liability risk. New drug
development occurs mostly within large pharmaceutical companies; while new
3 1 4. Of course, the criticisms of the civil justice system described in the text are highly
contested. But if the concern is whether innovation will be deterred or promoted, policymakers may
validly consider the industry's perception of litigation risk, whether or not that perception is
accurate. See Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and

Economic Outcomes, 1 998 WIS. L . REv. 237, 25 0-5 1 ("To dismiss misperception by company
decisionmakers (as many do) as 'their problem' misses the key point: If misperception contributes
to manufacturer decisions and economic outcomes that are socially undesirable, that is also our
(i.e., society's) problem.").
The notion of "revealed preferences"-i.e., the theory that an actor's choices can reveal the
actor's preferences-has been criticized. See, e.g. , Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 , 76-80 ( 1 995) (noting, among other things,
that choices can be highly contextual). However, companies ' choices concerning the opt-in system
described in the text would accurately reveal their views concerning the precise question at issue in
the preemption debate : the extent of the risk companies perceive to flow from the civil justice
system.
3 1 5. See GARBER, supra note 96, at 3 n.2 (noting, with respect to "surveys of the business
community," that "respondents . . . have incentives to exaggerate detrimental effects of liability and
understate beneficial ones").
3 1 6. See id. at 1 42 ("Because innovation is so crucial to private performance, R&D strategies
and activities are typically closely guarded secrets. As a result, very little systematic information
about the innovative efforts of individual companies is publicly available. ").
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medical devices often are developed by smaller enterprises. 3 1 7 The effects of
liability exposure on innovation are likely to vary depending on the type of
product. 3 1 8
My proposal would put the companies ' assertions to the test. A business that
chooses to remain subj ect to state tort law (rather than opting in to the federal
liability system) would have a more difficult time establishing that state tort law
deters it from societally useful innovations . Thus, for a company that fails to opt
in to the federal liability system, there should be no preemption of state tort law.
The proposal described here would offer a choice between state tort law (applied
by j uries) and a federal liability system (applied by an expert panel, the FDA, and
a federal judge). Companies that did not opt in to the federal system would be
subject to state law to a greater degree than they currently are, because there
would be no preemption of state law claims. But they could not claim that they
were deterred from innovating, unless they also argued that the compensation
scheme provided in the opt-in system deterred innovation as wel1. 3 1 9 That, at
least, would have the salutary effect of moving the debate away from complaints
about j ury incompetence and toward a focus on the appropriate balance between
innovation and compensation. Accordingly, I turn next to a discussion of the
shape of liability under the opt-in scheme.

3 1 7. See id. at 22 (noting that "diversified, and hence relatively large, R&D operations" have an
edge in developing new drugs, while "smaller companies are a more typical source of innovation in
medical devices").

3 1 8. See id. at 1 44 (noting reports "that product liability has substantially discouraged
innovation efforts in vaccines, contraceptives, and orphan drugs").
3 1 9. Relevant judgments about litigation risk will be made by the company itself in some
instances; in others, the judgments of liability insurers will be relevant as well. As Steven Garber
has noted:
For some companies, some direct costs [of liability] are covered by commercial
insurance. But the existence of commercial product liability insurance hardly makes
direct liability costs irrelevant. Large companies tend to be self-insured (i.e., uninsured)
for product liability. In addition, liability costs paid or reimbursed by insurance
companies are costly to insured companies because adverse liability experience is likely
to lead to higher insurance premiums--or lack of insurance coverage-in the future.
Moreover, punitive damages payments are not insurable or are only partially recoverable
in many states.
Garber, supra note 3 1 4, at 243-44. The opt-in mechanism described here would provide
information concerning decisionmakers ' views of the relative litigation risks of the state-law tort
system and the opt-in system-whether the decisionmaker in question is the company itself or the
company 's liability insurer.
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2. Broadening Compensation
From a procedural and institutional standpoint, the opt-in scheme would
promise significant advantages to a potential defendant. Instead of multiple
proceedings in various jurisdictions, the
single

action

in

a

single

federal

parens patriae proceeding would be a

district

32
COurt. 0

In

place

of liability

determinations under varying state tort doctrines, applied by lay juries and
generalist judges, the

parens patriae regime would employ a federal standard of

liability applied by a specialist panel (with review by the

FDA).

The opt-in

scheme thus would likely provide a significant reduction in litigation costs and
32
322
could also promise both uniformity 1 and greater predictability.
In return, the scheme could require companies that opted in to submit to
more rigorous standards of liability than they might encounter under some state
tort regimes . This Subsection sketches the possible outlines of such a liability
framework. I do not attempt to show that the measures outlined here constitute
optimal levels of liability for the opt-in scheme; rather, I use them to illustrate the
notion that the opt-in scheme could impose somewhat more rigorous standards,
relative to state tort law, without necessarily deterring innovation. The proof of
this, of course, would come in the execution: If companies failed to opt in to the
system, that could be a sign that the opt-in liability rules had overreached.
323
Like state tort law,
the opt-in system would impose strict ·liability for

320.

qui tam relator might
See supra text accompanying notes 1 7 1 - 1 74.
3 2 1 . Cj GARBER, supra note 96, at 57 (noting that the tort
The possibility that more than one

bring a particular claim is

addressed above.

interjurisdictional

variation

in

doctrine"

contribute

to

the

system' s "complexity and

uncertainty

faced

by

potential

defendants).

322.

Some potential defendants will also like the opt-in system because it eliminates the

possibility of jury trials. Empirical research has rebutted many of the complaints about jury
performance, and, indeed, has suggested that products liability defendants may fare no worse

See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or
Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1 1 24, 1 1 62 ( 1 992 ) (examining data from
before juries than before judges.

federal court cases from 1 979 to 1 98 9 and finding that products liability plaintiffs have higher win
rates in bench trials than in jury trials). Obviously, the win rates in bench trials and jury trials are
affected by the mix of cases heard by judges and by juries,

see id.

at

1 1 62-63,

so that the differing

win rates do not in themselves prove that juries are friendlier to defendants than judges are.
However, the contrast does suggest that juries are not as credulous concerning plaintiffs ' claims as
critics of the tort system suggest. Nonetheless, corporate decisionmakers may still believe that jury
trials are undesirable.

See

Clermont

&

Eisenberg,

supra

note 28 1 , at 1 46 ("Despite years of

research that rebuts stereotypes about juries, every day lawyers and policymakers act on the basis
of those stereotypes. ).
"

323. See, e.g. , RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § § 2(a),
strict liability for manufacturing defects) ; id. § 6 cmt. a (noting that
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manufacturing defects. This is uncontroversial, and (from the viewpoint of drug
manufacturers),

relatively

inconsequential:

The

FDA

tightly

regulates

manufacturing practices, and as a result, cases of manufacturing defects are rare
32
in the prescription drug context. 4 (Manufacturing defects are, however, more
3 5
common with respect to medical devices. 2 ) A manufacturing defect defendant
would be liable for medical costs , other costs of care, lost wages, and scheduled
amounts for pain and suffering.
The treatment of design defects would be more significant, and here the use
of the hybrid system could provide a significant benefit compared with ordinary
3 26
litigation. As I have noted,
the courts are divided over the question of
pharmaceutical design defects : The que stion is whether the FDA ' s risk-benefit
determination (in approving a drug for marketing) should ever be second-guessed
by courts in the light of later-surfaced information. The hybrid system could
avoid this dilemma, by requiring the FDA itself to revisit its safety determination.
The system could direct the FDA to apply the same risk-benefit standard it had
3 27
employed during the premarketing approval phase,
but to update the analysis
3 28
to take account of later-discovered information.
If the later-discovered

"traditional rule[]").
324. See 5 FRUMER &

supra note 1 02, § 50.03A[3], at 5 0-29 (noting that
"prescription drugs are manufactured to stringent standards, overseen by the FDA"). Frumer and
Friedman also note that manufacturing defects-to the extent that they occur-would often be
difficult to prove, because the patient may consume all of the drug, and because other portions of
the same batch "may be used up, contaminated, discarded or changed through age in such a way as
to defy any meaningful scientific evaluation." Id. at 50-20 to 50-29.
325. See GARBER, supra note 96, at 39 ("Manufacturing defects seem relatively unimportant in
the pharmaceutical industry, but they appear more important for medical devices."). The Shiley
heart valve provides a notorious instance. See id. at 39 n. 1 9 .
326. See supra notes 99- 1 04 and accompanying text.
327. See RISK MANAGEMENT REpORT, supra note 23, at 2 1 -22 ("Although medical products are
required to be safe, safety does not mean zero risk . . . . A safe medical product is one that has
reasonable risks, given the magnitude of the benefit expected and the alternatives available.").
328. Alternatively, the opt-in system could impose a more stringent standard. For examp le, the
FDA's Task Force on Risk Management noted that one reason why problems that surface in the
postmarketing period can affect large numbers of people is that the product rollout may extend to
many types of patients. "[I]f use of a new product were evaluated comparatively, the potential
extent of injury from an unknown risk might be reduced because the product' s initial postmarketing
use could be limited to those patients who have been shown to experience a clear therapeutic
benefit over an alternative product." !d. at 49. The FDA's premarketing review does not generally
require a comparison of the product's safety and efficacy with those of competitor products.
However, it might be possible to take comparative efficacy and safety into account ex post, in
determining the appropriate extent of liability for damages when patients have been harmed by the
FRIEDMAN,

product.
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information altered the risk-benefit analysis to such a degree that the product
should no longer be marketed, liability under a product defect theory would be
appropriate. Damages could vary depending on when and how the relevant
information came to light. If the product' s riskiness was both unknown and
unknowable at the time of sale, damages might be limited to medical expenses
32
and cost of care up to a capped amount. 9 By contrast, if the relevant information
could have been uncovered by the company had it been proactive in self
regulating with regard to safety, then damages could include uncapped medical
expenses and cost of care, plus lost wages and scheduled amounts for pain and
suffering.
In many instances, later-discovered information may not justify withdrawal
of the product, but may require additional warnings. State tort law generally
33o
holds defendants liable for failure to warn of known or knowable risks.
If
information that came to light after premarket approval were found to justify a
warning, the opt-in system could impose liability as to claimants who were sold
331
As with product defect claims, damages for
the product without that warning.
failure to warn could vary depending on when the relevant information surfaced
and whether a proactive, self-regulating company should have been aware of the
33
need for the warning at the time of the sale. 2
In all the categories discussed above, the determination could also take into

329. These damages could be considerable. For this reason, in cases where the product defect
was unknowable at the time of sale, the statute could provide for a reduction in damages to the
extent that such costs were covered by a collateral source such as health insurance.
330. See 5 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1 02, § 50.04 [ 1 ], at 50-36 ("[I]n the vast majority of
states, a manufacturer of prescription drugs has a duty to provide adequate warnings of only those
dangers of which the manufacturer knew or should have known at the time of marketing . . . . ").
33 1 . Under the "learned intermediary" rule, a defendant usually satisfies its duty to warn by
providing appropriate warnings to the health care provider rather than the patient. See GARBER,

supra note 96, at 40. But cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. e ( 1 998)
(arguing that "direct warnings and instructions to patients are warranted for drugs that are
dispensed or administered to patients without the personal intervention or evaluation of a health
care provider"). The opt-in system could adopt the "learned intermediary" rule, with appropriate
exceptions. But see GARBER, supra note 96, at 43 (asserting that "liability costs are especially
unpredictable where the learned intermediary rule is vulnerable to exception").
332. Failure-to-warn cases would involve more than one type of causation question. As in all of
the cases discussed in the text, the panel would make a general determination concerning whether
the product causes the type of injuries at issue, and would provide guidelines for the court to use in
determining whether a specific claimant's injuries were caused by the product. Failure-to-warn
cases would also require a determination whether the provision of the warning would have
prevented the harm to the claimant. This type of causation issue need not be referred to the panel; it
could be decided, on a clairn-by-claim basis, or with respect to particular classes of claims, by a
special master under the direction of the district court.
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account whether the company had engaged in misbehavior. Fraud on the FDA or
other violations of FDA requirements could help to establish that the product was
333
unsafe.
Moreover, in appropriate cases, fraud, serious violations of FDA
requirements, or other egregious behavior could result in an award of punitive
damages in addition to the compensatory damages discussed above .
A liability framework along the lines sketched above would extend the scope
of liability, in some respects, beyond the boundaries set by some or all states . It
would, for example, provide some level of compensatory damages in cases where
the company could not yet have known of the relevant danger-such as when a
33 4
safety issue first surfaces during the marketing of a new product.
And it would
provide for design defect liability in cases where the FDA later concluded an
approved product should be withdrawn from the market, though damages would
335
vary depending on whether the risk was knowable at time of sale.
On

the

other

hand,

the

opt-in

framework

could

promise

increased

predictability in damages awards. Pain and suffering damages, when available,
would be calculated based on a matrix that took into account factors such as the
336
type and extent of injury.
This approach would render non-economic damages
awards under the opt-in system less variable than comparab le awards in jury
337
trials.
Though punitive damages would be available under both systems, the
opt-in

system would ensure that there would be no duplicative punitive
33
awards. 8

333. Under state tort law, "failure to comply with [FDA] regulations is often taken as evidence
of negligence per se." GARBER, supra note 96, at 43.
334. As discussed above, state tort law generally does not impose liability for risks that were not
knowable at time of sale.
335. As noted above, some states consider all prescription drugs to be "unavoidably unsafe,"
which in effect precludes design defect liability (though liability can still be imposed on other
theories, such as failure-to-warn).
3 36. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et aI., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 939 ( 1 989) (suggesting a matrix for non-economic damages
determinations based on "the severity of injury, the injured person 's age, and the body part
"

affected").
337. Studies suggest that the non-economic components of jury awards may be more variable
than the components that reflect economic damages (such as medical expenses). See id. at 937 tbI.3
(recounting results of study of personal injury jury verdicts in Kansas City and Florida in 1 970s and
1 980s); Shari Seidman Diamond et aI., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of
Variability and Ways To Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 30 1 , 3 1 7 ( 1 998) (describing
results of jury experiment).
338. An ALI Reporters' Study explained the issues that arise from the possibility of punitive
awards in product liability mass torts:
If liability for punitive damages can be established for any of the resulting tort claims,
then such an award should be available for all the claims arising out of the single
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The opt-in system would also constrain awards, relative to the largest awards
in the j ury system. This would be true, for example, when awards in the opt-in
system were compared to j ury awards that include large components of pain and
33
suffering. 9 It should be noted that media coverage tends to overplay such large
awards and to underemphasize the extent to which they are reduced post-verdict
340
Nonetheless, the highest awards under the
by settlement or judicial review.
opt-in system would likely fail to approach the highest awards that might occur
in the jury system.
From the claimants' perspective, these changes might not have as great an
effect on net compensation as might at first appear. Plaintiffs ' net recoveries in
the tort system are substantially reduced by costs and contingent attorney fees; in
the opt-in system, by contrast, successful relators would recover a reasonable
34
attorney ' s fee as a separate element of damages . 1 From the potential

corporate misdeed. Yet the consequence is that beyond . . . compens-atory damages . . .
the firm will be penalized again and again for a single wrongful judgment or action . . . .
[S]ubstantial payments for the earlier punitive awards may strip the firm of its insurance
coverage and assets, thus endangering the ability of later claimants to [obtain]
compensatory redress.
2 ALI REpORTERS' STUDY, supra note 1 1 4, at 260-6 1 . As this passage indicates, the possibility of
multiple punitive awards for the same course of conduct has caused concern. It is far less clear,
however, that the actual incidence of punitive awards poses a substantial problem. See supra note
1 1 . Nonetheless, to the extent that industry decisionmakers fear the potential for multiple punitive
awards, the opt-in system could provide a valuable alternative.
339. In the case of pain and suffering damages, the difference would result from the fact that, in
the opt-in system, such damages would be scheduled. With respect to some products, a difference
might also arise between the aggregate punitive damages awarded under each system. Empirical
research suggests that juries do not differ substantially from judges in awarding punitive damages:
Juries and judges award punitive damages at about the same rate, and their punitive
awards bear about the same relation to their compensatory awards. Jury punitive awards
have a bit more spread than judge awards, but the effect is not robust and leads to few
jury punitive awards outside the range of what judges are expected to award.
Eisenberg et aI., supra note 1 1 , at 780 app. tb1 . 1 (reporting results of study of data from trials in
1 996 in selected state courts). (As the authors note, the conclusions that can be drawn from these
findings are limited by the fact that case characteristics may differ as between bench trials and jury
trials; but still the data are suggestive. See id. at 746 .) However, a difference could arise from the
fact that, under the opt-in system, punitives would be determined and awarded, if at all, in a single
action, rather than (potentially) in multiple actions concerning the same product. See supra note
338 and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g. , GARBER, supra note 96, at 60 ("[M]ass media seem to provide more complete
coverage of plaintiff victories and large and punitive awards than defendant victories, small awards,
damages reduced by the judge, or cases overturned on appeal.").
34 1 . Cj 2 ALI REpORTERS ' STUDY, supra note 1 1 4, at 229 (warning that limits on pain and
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defendant' s perspective, however, even if the mean payout under the opt-in
system (taking attorneys ' fees into account) were equivalent to that under the tort
system, the opt-in system would eliminate the possibility of truly high-end
awards. This feature might have significant appeal for decisionmakers to the
extent that their deliberations focus on the magnitude of "worst case scenarios"
rather than on their probability. 3 42
As this discussion suggests, the opt-in system might prove attractive to
potential defendants while still serving compensatory (and, where appropriate,
punitive) goals . As I explain in the next Subsection, the system could also
improve the FDA's ability to conduct postmarketing surveillance with respect to
the products of companies that opted in.
B. Improving Postmarketing Surveillance

As discussed in Part I, the FDA ' s postmarketing surveillance of drugs and
devices is less than. optimally rigorous. Though companies must report adverse
events, the data are reported in a summary format that may not disclose all
relevant information. The FDA lacks the resources to adequately analyze
postmarketing data and lacks sufficient ability to obtain further information from
companies when needed. In this Section, I discuss ways in which a parens
patriae litigation system could supplement the FDA's scarce postmarketing
surveillance resources. The system could help FDA regulators to focus their
investigative resources, by flagging emerging safety problems. Information
unearthed during discovery could provide insights that otherwise might not reach
the FDA. And for claims that survived summary judgment, the referral of safety
and causation issues to the panel would provide the FDA with a formal occasion

suffering damages should "be adopted only as part of a multifaceted tort reform that would also
make the successful plaintiff' s attorney fees an independently compensable head of damages").
342. Two studies of corporate executives in the 1 970s and 1 980s found that the executives
based their decisions more on "the magnitudes of possible bad outcomes" than on their probability.
James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI.
1 404, 1 407 ( 1 987). Thus, for example, in one study, eighty percent of the executives "asked for
estimates of the 'worst outcome' or the ' maximum loss'" when evaluating a possible course of
action. Id. The focus on the magnitude rather than the probability of the worst-case scenario "leads
to a propensity to accept greater risk (in the sense of variance) when the probability distribution of
possible outcomes is relatively rectangular than where there are relatively long tails." Id. at 1 4 1 1 ;

see also GARBER, supra note 96, at 7 1 -72 (employing March and Shapira 's findings to assess the
likely effects of products liability exposure on industrial decisionmaking and concluding that "the
possibility of extremely bad outcomes is particularly salient in the decision process"); cf Sage,
supra note 46, at 1 004 (noting that "managerial risk aversion exists regardless of the availability of
insurance") .
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for taking a hard look at its prior approval decision.

1. Providing an Early Alert System
When a

qui tam relator filed a parens patriae suit, it would be required to

serve the complaint and related information on the government. In addition to
providing the government with an opportunity to take over the litigation, this
notice

would provide the

FDA with a systematic

source

of information

concerning potential problems that are ripening into litigation. In instances where
a safety problem has been publicly discussed prior to suit, the filing would not
provide the first indication of a problem; in other instances, as where the

qui tam

relator is a former employee who sues based on nonpublic information, the filing
might provide the first concrete evidence of a safety issue. In either event, the
filing would flag the problem as potentially significant, and it would alert the
FDA to the need to monitor the l itigation so that regulators could promptly assess
information uncovered through discovery.

2. Using Civil Discovery To Supplement Reporting
Discovery in the

qui tam litigation may uncover information that otherwise
3 43
would not make its way to the FDA.
A qui tam relator can use the civil

discovery tools to obtain information that would not appear in report s submitted
3 44
Though private tort suits may already uncover such information,
to the FDA.
the phenomenon

of "secret

settlements" may

limit the

extent to which

information obtained in private suits reaches the FDA; in

qui tam suits, by

contrast, the FDA automatically would have access to the fruits of the discovery
process.
Some

critics

have

complained that the FDA ' s information-gathering
3 45
capabilities are largely passive.
"[T]he FDA lacks the general subpoena power

343. Cf Green, supra note 46, at 499 (noting that drug manufacturers ' reporting of adverse
events "has been less than perfect," and that "[s]ome notable examples of flagrant manufacturer
disregard for [the reporting] requirement have been documented, sometimes as the result of a tort
suit").
344. Cf McGarity, supra note 44, at 5 7 1 ("Private attorneys are adept at uncovering evidence of
fraud and misrepresentation in the discovery that precedes common law trials, and they are willing
to spend the resources necessary to copy and organize documents, take depositions, and fight the
company's efforts to resist discovery .").
345. Cf Rabin, supra note 1 2, at 2069 ("Even in the case of a comprehensive regulatory regime
like FDA certification of new drugs, the agency process is noninvasive: the burden is on the
company to produce evidence in support of its new drug application, and the agency does not
conduct its own testing and experimentation.").
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that other agencies have, and therefore, in most instances cannot compel the
,,3 46
disclosure of information about product risks.
Reporting requirements provide
the FDA with basic information concerning adverse events (so long as companies
comply with their reporting obligations). But discovery in a

qui tam suit could

shed light on problems that might not be as readily apparent in the summary
reports. For example, a lawyer for the plaintiffs in a suit involving Paxil asserts
that "court-ordered discovery allowed her to see raw data on safety and efficacy,
while the FDA saw only the completed write-ups," and that discovery also
produced "the company ' s internal communications about how to approach the
, 347
agency, which the FDA never saw.,
In addition to obtaining documents that would not be turned over in routine
reporting to the FDA, a

qui tam relator could follow up on promi sing avenues by

deposing company employees . In the Bj ork- Shiley heart valve litigation, for
example, employee depositions revealed that workers "disguised cracks in
defective valves," and document discovery unearthed a plant supervisor ' s
memorandum that "complain[ ed] of a company policy of disguising cracked
,34
valves as intact [and stated] 'I feel we are hiding our most serious defect. " 8
Other employees may have equally pertinent information; for instance, sales
representatives who are responsible for marketing a product to physic ians may
34
often have early warning of safety issues with the product. 9

346. Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 6 1
TENN. L. REv. 1 3 57, 1 386 ( 1 994). Schwartz notes that the FDA does have "power to demand
documents where statutory provisions specifically provide, such as those governing factory
inspections and new drug approvals," and that companies may "disclose information voluntarily to
the FDA to create good relations or to avoid an enforcement action." Id. at 1 3 86 n. 1 77 .
347. Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Pre-empt Tort Suits: Does It Close Off Vital Drug

Data ?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1 , 2004, at 1 , 1 2 (discussing statements by Karen Barth Menzies); see also
Gina Kolata, Questions Raised on Ability ofF.D.A. To Protect Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1 992, §
1 , at 1 ("In the case of Ha1cion, critics who have examined case report forms in connection with a
lawsuit against Upjohn charge that the company left out information about adverse reactions
reported on those forms when it prepared its data analyses for the F .D.A. Upjohn denies the
charges . . . . "). Likewise, discovery in the Vioxx litigation has apparently brought to light
documents that bear upon Merck's knowledge of safety problems with the drug. See Harris, supra
note 70.
348. Gina Kolata, Manufacturer of Faulty Heart Valve Barred Data on Dangers, F.D.A. Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2 1 , 1 992, § 1 , at 50.
349. See Kit R. Roane, Replacement Parts: How the FDA Allows Faulty, and Sometimes
Dangerous, Medical Devices onto the Market, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., July 29, 2002, at 57, 59
(describing instances in which sales representatives became aware of concerns about product
safety). "Direct contact between physicians (and other health-care professionals) and sales
representatives of the companies is often the primary form of sales promotion," though other
methods include ads in medical publications, mailings to physicians, and direct-to-consumer ad
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Parens patriae suits will also provide a more effective means of putting
information uncovered during discovery into the hands of the FDA. When
discovery in private civil suits yields information relevant to product safety,
protective orders may sometimes prevent the plaintiffs ' lawyers from sharing that
350
information with the FDA.
Defendants that settle such cases may be able to
obtain a return of damaging discovery materials and a court order that the terms
351
of settlement remain confidentia1.
Plaintiffs may accede to such secrecy
352
Commentators have
provisions in return for a higher settlement payment.
raised concerns that secrecy provisions may prevent the disclosure to the FDA of

campaigns. GARBER, supra note 96, at 2 1 ; see also ANGELL, supra note 47, at 1 27 ("Drug reps are
allowed to attend medical conferences, may be invited into operating and procedure rooms, and
sometimes are even present when physicians examine patients . . . . ").

350. See Kolata, supra note 348 (discussing protective order in case involving Bjork-Shiley
heart valve and stating that company did not disclose to the FDA certain information, covered by
the protective order, until the suit was dismissed) ; Kolata, supra note 347 ("[T]he data that caused
the Commissioner . . . to ban [silicone breast] implants this month pending a review of their
safety . . . were disclosed to trial lawyers eight years ago, but the [FDA] learned about them only
recently because a court agreement had kept them confidential.").

35 l . See Joseph F . Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case
Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.c. L . REv. 7 1 1 , 7 13 - 1 4 (2004) (describing aspects of
secret settlements). As Judge Weinstein has explained, damaging discovery material can include:
"smoking gun" documents that indicate defendants knew of the danger but suppressed
the information. Oral material obtained in depositions is also often highly useful to
plaintiffs and devastating to defendants. Documents showing cover-ups or early
knowledge by defendants of defects can lead to billions of dollars in punitive damages
as well as extensive liability for ordinary damages, so there is strong reason for
defendants to try to keep them secret.
Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 5 1 2 ( 1 994).
Chief Judge Anderson notes that although the parties could reach a secrecy agreement without
involving the court, defendants often "want the judge's signature, and the corresponding contempt
power of the court, to legitimize their conduct and to have assurance that a violation will be
summarily dealt with by the court." Anderson, supra, at 732.
Secret settlements are controversial. Compare, e.g. , Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements To
Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between ?, 30
HOFSTRA L . REv. 783, 787 (2002) ("[A]ny legal regime that facilitates the keeping of secrets as
lethal as the secrets Firestone was allowed to keep [concerning defective tires] may be a legal
regime in need of serious repair. Certainly, the public is likely to feel that way . . . . ") with Arthur
,

R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 1 05 HARV. L . REv.
427, 43 1 -32 ( 1 99 1 ) (arguing that "promoting increased public access to information by restricting
the discretion of the courts to protect confidential information is ill-advised").

352. See Anderson, supra note 35 1 , at 73 1 (noting statements by "some plaintiffs ' lawyers . . .
that court-ordered secrecy gives them the opportunity to leverage a little more money out of the
defendant at settlement time").
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parens patriae suit, by contrast,

the FDA would have the right to review all information made available in
discovery; the statutory framework could require that any protective order in the
case provide the FDA ' s lawyers with the same status, under the protective order,
as the lawyer for the

qui tam relator.

3. Revisiting FDA Approval in Light ofLater Information
In addition to uncovering or highlighting information on which the FDA
may not previously have focused, the litigation process would provide a formal
occasion for the FDA to revisit its prior safety assessments. A referral - from the
35 4
district court in a qui tam suit
would prompt an advisory panel to evaluate the
issues of safety and causation in the light of the information developed during
discovery. The FDA would then be required to review the panel ' s findings and
would be aided in its review both by the parties ' presentation of the issues and by
the panel ' s views. Obviously, the FDA could revisit its safety determinations in
any event. But the

qui tam litigation could enhance the record on which the FDA

based its reevaluation and could provide added incentives for the FDA to take a
355
harder look at a questionable product.
In addition to answering the questions
referred by the district court, the FDA would also have the opportunity to
consider regulatory action concerning the product. The agency could require
labeling changes, or-in extreme cases-direct the company to pull the product
from the market.
C ONCLUSION
In sum, the system described in Part III could offer benefits. In addition to
providing expert agency views on questions of product safety and causation, it

353. See Dorothy J. Clarke, Court Secrecy and the Food and Drug Administration: A
Regulatory Alternative to Restricting Secrecy Orders in Product Liability Litigation Involving
FDA-Regulated Products, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1 09, I I I ( 1 994) (advocating amendment of the
FDCA "to require drug and device manufacturers to submit information to the FDA regarding
product liability litigation and settlements").
354. Such referrals would not cause undue inconvenience for the FDA, because they would only
occur in cases where the relator successfully resisted the defendant's summary judgment motion.
Because summary judgment would be granted unless the relator showed either a violation of
existing FDA requirements or the existence of material information that the fDA had not
previously considered, the summary judgment stage would screen out claims that did not merit
consideration by the FDA.
355. See GARBER, supra note 96, at 36 (noting that "[n]ew information and publicity [generated
by products liability suits] can generate substantial pressure on the FDA to reevaluate its previous
decisions").
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could shed new light on companie s ' true views of the tort system and could
preserve litigation ' s role in generating information on product safety. Potentially,
the system could broaden the availability of compensation for persons injured by
356
a medical product manufactured by a company that had opted in.
Would that system be preferable to the status quo? The answer depends
largely on one ' s vi ew of the civil jury ' s capabilities. If juries truly are
irremediably ill-suited to the task of assessing product safety and causation, then
the

qui tam system would provide a benefit by sending those issues to the FDA.

As I have noted, however, commentators are divided in their assessment of the
357
j ury's capacities.
Moreover, it is possible to improve the performance of
35
judges and juries within the current tort system 8-an approach that holds the
promise of addressing the critiques of the current tort system without embarking
35
on radical systemic change . 9
Equally important, the aim of obtaining expert agency resolution of products
liability questions should be balanced against the risk of agency ineffectiveness
360
or capture .
It should be readily apparent from the discussion above that in

356. However, the details of the compensation model adopted for the opt-in system would be
key: If the opt-in system simply tracked the remedies available under current tort doctrine (rather
than providing broader compensation), the chance to obtain a quid pro quo from the companies that
opted in would be squandered.
357. See supra notes 9- 1 1 and accompanying text.
3 5 8 . Measures such as crafting better jury instructions, providing those instructions before as
well as after the presentation of evidence, pelTIlitting jurors to take notes and submit questions to
witnesses, and pelTIlitting interim arguments by lawyers during a complex trial may improve juror
comprehension and performance. The presentation of expert testimony could be improved in
appropriate cases by directing opposing sides' experts to testify back-to-back or by including
testimony from a nonpartisan expert. Judges could provide juries with better guidance on assessing
noneconomic damages, and could engage in more searching review of awards of such damages.
And improved judicial training could better enable judges to perfolTIl all these tasks.
359. Cf Rabin, supra note 1 2, at 2067 (raising "the question whether . . . institutional reforms of
the tort process offer promise of addressing satisfactorily the criticisms of those who would
displace tort in cases where scientific evidence is in play and a regulatory agency has independently
assessed the risks associated with a product").
3 60. Other costs should also be considered. The qui tam system would in effect require
aggregate determination of all covered products liability claims, thus eliminating the ability of
many claimants to control the presentation of their claims. (Though aggregation would occur in
many instances under the existing system, it would not always be necessary.)
Because the qui tam mechanism would create a speci al procedure for liability claims
concerning FDA-regulated medical products, a question of boundaries would arise: What should be
done with non-products liability claims arising from the same set of facts? For example, many
failure-to-warn cases may also include malpractice claims against a health care provider. See, e.g. ,
Marks v. Ohmeda, Inc., 8 7 1 So. 2d 1 1 48, 1 1 5 1 , 1 1 5 6 (La. Ct. App . 2004) (sustaining judgment
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order safely to privilege the agency's views o n safety and causation, it will be
36
necessary to ensure that those views are accurate and free of improper bias. 1
Recent

events

p ostmarketing

have

underscored the

surveillance

system:

difficulties

Resource

with the

constraints,

FDA ' s

current

and possibly

an

unwillingness to question prior determinations of product safety, have impaired
the FDA ' s ab ility to respond to emerging problems. Those difficulties would also
p lague any system that attempted to rely on the FDA to resolve retrospective
liability questions. Proposals for the creation of an independent po stmarketing
surveillance agency might help to address this issue : If Congress were to create
and adequately fund such an agency, and protect it from pressure by the FDA and
by stakeholders, the independent agency might be able both to monitor product
safety and to resolve appropriately safety and causation issues referred to it by a
court. If Congress does not create an independent safety monitor, however, recent
experience provides strong reason to question the wisdom of giving the FDA (as
currently structured and funded) and its advisory panels (as currently staffed) a
dispositive role in products liability actions .
This Article, accordingly, has failed to demonstrate that the hybrid system

against manufacturer of anesthetic and anesthesia machine, in failure-to-warn case that also
involved malpractice claims against hospital and nurse anesthetist); see also RISK MANAGEMENT
REpORT, supra note 23, at 26 (noting that "[s]ubstantial numbers of injuries and deaths occur
annually" due to "incorrect administration of the prescribed product or incorrect operation or
placement of a medical device"). Such malpractice c laims generally would raise issues spec ific to
the particular claimant and physician, and would be unsuitable for resolution within the qui tam
system (which would focus on aggregate determination of the products liability issues). Thus, any
benefits of the new system would be offset to some degree by the costs of parallel litigation.
36 1 . Richard N agareda has suggested that one advantage of referral to the agency is that the
agency-unlike a jury-is politically accountable for its decisions. See Nagareda, supra note 1 5 , at

299 ("Although agencies have long been considered repositories of technical expertise,
commentators have neglected an equally powerful justification for agency involvement in the mass
tort area: the political accountability of such bodies ."). As he argues, "[t]he conditions of scientific
uncertainty that plague the handling of [mass torts] within the tort system cry out for the application
of political judgment and deliberation through administrative charmels in a manner susceptible to
public scrutiny." !d. at 3 1 3 . The downside of agency accountability, however, is the potential for
bias in favor of the regulated industry. Nagareda notes that "the highly concentrated interests
typified by regulated industries . . . . may be better positioned to sway a single regulatory agency at
the federal level than to exert influence over the multitude of courts within which lawsuits would
proceed in the tort system." [d. at 364. He argues, however, that in the context of a referral to the
agency of issues raised in mass tort litigation, the high-profile nature of the dispute and the
existence of injured victims could counterbalance any tilt in favor of industry. See id. ("Agency
action in the aftermath of thousands of individual tort suits-so many as to call for consolidation of
litigation within the federal courts by the MDL Panel-is far less susceptible to influence by
industry.").
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considered here is ' preferable to the status quo (or to less drastic options for
refonn). But it has shown that the

qui tam system would be preferable to
preemption. By privileging FDA determinations on safety and causation, the qui
tam system would address preemption advocates ' central criticisms of the c urrent
tort system. But unlike preemption, the qui tam system would address those
criticisms

while

preserving

some

compensatory

and

monitoring

role

for

litigation. Where preemption advocates tend to accept uncritically the industry' s
contention that the specter of tort liability chills innovation, the

qui tam system

would provide a means for measuring that contention against companies ' actual
choices concerning the opt-in . And where preemption would remove entirely the
role of the states in regulating product safety, the

qui tam proposal would
displace that role only in instances where the manufacturer opted in to the qui
tam system with respect to the relevant product.
Thus, this Article establishes that advocates of preemption who cast the
debate in binary tenns have failed to address the full range of options. Those
advocates should be required to carry the burden of demonstrating the need for
change, but they also should be required to show that, if change is warranted,

preemption is the best choice . As this Article illustrates, a range of options short
of preemption would address the asserted defects in the tort system without
eliminating the ability to hold companies responsible for hann caused by safety
problems with medical products .
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